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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
Woodes Rogers is best known for rescuing Alexander Selkirk, the castaway who 
formed the genesis for Robinson Crusoe and as the governor of the Bahamas who 
virtually extinguished piracy in the West Indies. However, Rogers first achieved fame 
through a 1708-1711 cruising voyage in which he circumnavigated the globe and 
captured a Spanish Manila galleon. His privateers and investors, and their place in the 
maritime world of the early eighteenth century, are the subject of this dissertation. 
This study explores how the cruising voyage and its organization illustrate 
important commercial, legal, and social facets of the contemporary world. Its 
examination of the socioeconomic status of the “Syndicate” investors who financed and 
directed the enterprise shows that many were heavily engaged in Bristol politics and 
charitable organizations before the voyage. 
The Syndicate obtained letters of marque licensing the two ships of the 
expedition to capture enemy vessels, and at the same time instructed the expedition to 
explore the possibilities of trade with Spanish settlers on the Pacific coasts of the 
Americas. The Syndicate also appointed a “Council” to govern the expedition during its 
voyage. 
Next, the dissertation describes the expedition’s circumnavigation of the globe 
including its raid on Guayaquil and capture of a Manila galleon, and its shift to peaceful 
trading as it crossed the Pacific and returned to Britain via Dutch-controlled colonies. 
The final chapter describes the sale of the ships and their cargoes, the payments of wages 
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and expenses, the calculation of the net profit of the enterprise how it was distributed, 
and the settlement of lawsuits brought by the East India Company and the expedition 
members against the Syndicate. 
The conclusion traces what became of many of the investors and sailors after the 
voyage ended. Many Syndicate members remained in Bristol politics, and others used 
their profits to engage in Bristol civic life for the first time. Some officers used their 
profits to become ship-owners themselves while others went back to sea. Again, the 
work shows how the figures ended their lives as part and parcel of the contemporary 
maritime and economic worlds. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Woodes Rogers, Bristol shipowner, privateer, and Royal Governor of the 
Bahamas, is best known as the commander of the ship that rescued Alexander Selkirk, 
the marooned sailor whose experiences formed the basis for Daniel Defoe’s Robinson 
Crusoe. Rogers’ 1708-1711 privateering expedition circumnavigated the globe and 
captured a Spanish Manila galleon. The expedition and its significance in the early 
eighteenth century’s maritime world are the subject of this dissertation. Rogers cuts an 
impressive figure and his voyage makes for an entertaining story, but relatively little has 
been done to examine the group of investors (collectively referred to as the Syndicate) 
who financed the voyage. 
The War of the Spanish Succession was not just a European war between 
massive armies or gargantuan ships of the line. Nor was it a European war that 
happened to see fighting in the Americas and the Pacific. It involved every colony and 
every individual, whether ashore or at sea, who participated in global trade networks. It 
was impossible to avoid the conflict because every merchant who depended on the sea 
was at risk whether or not he engaged in wartime activity. Every sailor, willing or not, 
was a part of that conflict as well. The Syndicate, and the privateers it sent on a cruising 
voyage around the world, were active parties who stood to gain much and lose even 
more. 
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This study explores several facets of the expedition, including how a single 
cruising voyage, initially comprising two ships and just over three hundred officers and 
crew, reflected important facets of the contemporary maritime world, particularly in the 
commercial and social aspects. It sets the expedition in the context of the War of the 
Spanish Succession that engulfed Europe, North America, and the Caribbean at this 
time. 
It also examines in greater detail the socioeconomic status of the financiers of the 
voyage and the network of business associates, relatives, and personal friends that 
reached ports throughout the Atlantic, Caribbean, and even the Pacific. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates how the Syndicate sought to control the expedition 
by appointing two of its members to positions of command and placing an “owners’ 
agent” onboard each ship. Those two agents and all of the more senior officers 
constituted a “General Council,” also formed at the Syndicate’s behest, which had 
authority to make all major decisions during the voyage. This Council is described in 
other works, but not the degree to which it adhered to Syndicate members’ desires. All 
major decisions were conducted with the officers considering what was best for the 
Syndicate. The Council also served as a forum to mitigate rising animosities between 
the two senior officers. No matter how acrimonious the factions became toward each 
other, the Council ensured that the Syndicate’s ships and companies stayed together and 
did not break up or descend into indiscriminate piracy as so many other privateering 
voyages had done. 
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Most other studies of the Syndicate cruising voyage mention the more prominent 
members of the Syndicate, but few go beyond simply stating that some were city 
officials and members of the Society of Merchant Venturers. More recent studies go 
into detail on how the financiers raised the money, but none examine the combination of 
charitable groups, political organizations, and local politics that the investors involved 
themselves in. Other works either transition directly to another cruising voyage or to 
Rogers’ later career as governor of the Bahamas. From examining what Syndicate 
members did after the voyage, it is obvious that some used their newfound wealth and 
prestige to raise their social and political status in Bristol 
More importantly, all other studies focus on the voyage as a privateering 
enterprise and ignore its commercial aspects. The Syndicate’s explicit orders for the 
voyager’s leaders to investigate opportunities for post-war trade and settlement on the 
west coast of the Americas clearly influenced the actions taken, most importantly those 
at Guayaquil. 
 
 
ORGANIZATION 
 
The dissertation begins by outlining some of the political and economic trends 
that shaped the world that privateers and merchants operated in, such as the shifting 
colonial markets, France’s new role as Britain’s main imperial and commercial rival, and 
Bristol’s place in all those changes. These shifts created the opportunities for Bristol 
merchants with the necessary means and motivation to invest in privateersmen and  
attract the right officers and crewmen. 
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The next several chapters are a narrative of the circumnavigation. It emphasizes 
shipboard tensions, governance, and finances (e.g., division of plunder, ransoms) 
throughout as well as how the privateers were always bound by the Syndicate’s 
instructions. Every capture, major disciplinary meeting, assessment of plunder, and 
significant purchase had to be conducted with the Syndicate in mind. 
The final chapters examine the flurry of administrative activity precipitated by 
the expedition’s arrival in the Netherlands, when Syndicate members used their political 
influence and family ties to prepare the way for their ships to return to Britain with as 
much of their prize cargo as possible. Describing how the Syndicate sold condemned 
prize cargo, and the parsimonious methods with which the Syndicate deducted wages 
from its sailors, further emphasize the measures to which the Syndicate members 
stretched in order to maximize revenue. There was much acrimony and ill feeling as the 
Syndicate members received their profits within the year while some of the sailors 
waited until 1717 to receive their own shares. 
 
 
LITERATURE 
 
Rogers has received relatively little attention in the academic world for a variety 
of reasons. The ways in which historians have described him, however, parallel the 
methods with which they have written about privateers and pirates. As writers’ attitudes 
toward those characters changed, so too did their treatment of Rogers. He first appears 
in Captain Charles Johnson’s (almost certainly a pseudonym for Daniel Defoe) A 
General History of the Pyrates (1724) as the Bahamas governor who suppressed piracy. 
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By 1724, piracy suppression was irrevocably stamping out the marauders in the West 
Indies. Those who did not acquiesce were killed outright in a series of sharp naval 
skirmishes. Pirates were becoming a distant memory; negative aspects of English pirates 
were receding and being replaced by tales of their exploits in myth and legend. Many of 
Defoe’s accounts are pure fiction (with healthy doses of morality regarding the swift, 
sure, and cruel punishment that awaited most pirates), and his information had probably 
been gleaned from sailors’ taverns in Bristol, but it was still accepted as genuine history 
into the twentieth century.
1
 
Defoe’s treatment was of Rogers the governor. The first works written about 
Rogers the privateer and his voyage present him as one of many English buccaneers, 
privateers, and explorers who made voyages into the Pacific. In 1713, the Treaty of 
Utrecht led to a quarter century of relative peace among European maritime empires and 
an end to privateering. Rather than accept an end to their seizure of merchantmen, many 
former privateers became pirates so the following quarter-century became the “Golden 
Age of Piracy.” When that age was brought to a violent end at mid-century, writers 
began to publish more balanced and accurate accounts of pirates and piracy. Charles de 
Brosses’ Terra Australis Cognita (1756) is one such example that features Rogers. Very 
little is written on the Syndicate except a brief mention at the start, saying that some of 
the chief members of the Syndicate held public office. Rogers is also featured in George 
Berkley’s The Naval History of Britain (1756), a nationalistic narrative that does not 
incorporate the economic context into the work. Berkley’s coverage of the Syndicate 
 
1 
Charles Johnson, A General History of the Robberies & Murders of the Most Notorious 
Pirates (1724), 9. 
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largely parallels that of de Brosses. When Berkly does mention market forces, he does 
so only to show how British commerce was expanding.
2
 
Rogers was not written about in any prominent way for over a century and the 
Syndicate all but disappeared from the literature. Towards the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, however, Rogers once again gained notice. Novels such as Robert 
Louis Stevenson’s Treasure Island (1883) and Kidnapped (1886) gained popularity 
among a readership hungry for sailing stories.
3  
The late Victorians were fascinated with 
amateur adventurers, great white hunters, missionaries, and naturalists (especially men 
who engaged in combinations of these activities) who traveled to remote locations and 
described their experiences. As a result of the twin desires for worldly adventure stories 
and sailor’s tales, Rogers became relevant once again although he largely overshadowed 
by more contemporary figures. 
Robert Leslie’s 1889 Life Aboard a British Privateer in the Time of Queen Anne, 
an abridged and heavily annotated version of Rogers’ journal, appealed to audiences 
who wanted to read about successful British explorers, and particularly those explorers 
who spent time describing flora and fauna either through written descriptions or 
sketches. Rogers was not a naturalist, but he did describe unusual plants and animals he 
came across while his fellow officer Edward Cooke sketched them. Due to this focus, 
late nineteenth century authors largely ignored the Syndicate and financial matters, 
perhaps because the Syndicate members seemed like dreary bean-counters compared to 
 
 
2 
George Berkley, The Naval History of Great Britain (1756), 2. 
3 
David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of the Life 
Among the Pirates (1995), 170. 
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Rogers’ swashbuckling figure; Rogers received nearly all the attention in the relevant 
stories while his crewmen and benefactors faded into the background. 
Except for Leslie’s work, the long absence of Rogers from literature continued 
for the next several decades. During the early twentieth century, the Progressive Era in 
the United States, individuals of all socioeconomic status believed that the world was 
gradually progressing into something better, and were dismissive of anyone – especially 
pirates – perceived to impede such progress. Violet Barbour’s 1911 article “Privateers 
and Pirates of the West Indies” for The American Historical Review presents one such 
example. The privateers’ socioeconomic backgrounds were seldom examined and never 
thoroughly researched. Rogers only appeared in broad treatments of privateers or pirates 
except in George Wycherley’s 1928 Buccaneers of the Pacific which devotes an entire 
chapter to Rogers. The first significant examination of the Syndicate appeared in 
B.M.H. Rogers’ “Woodes Rogers’s Privateering Voyage of 1708-1711,” published in 
The Mariner’s Mirror (1933). The article described the finances of the voyage but only 
briefly discussed the individuals who provided the funds. 
More recently, Rogers and his voyage have been the subject of several 
biographies. The most prominent work is Bryan Little’s Crusoe’s Captain (1960). 
Little describes Rogers’ personal and family background, the voyage, Rogers’ 
governorship of the Bahamas. Three years later Fleming MacLeish and Martin Krieger 
published Fabulous Voyage (1963), a detailed narrative of the voyage and life at sea in 
which Syndicate members are mentioned only briefly. In 1967 James Poling published 
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The Man Who Saved Robinson Crusoe. Meant largely for a younger audience. Poling 
presented Rogers as a hero whose strength of character brought success. 
Other historians wrote about Rogers in the 1960s, but follow Wycherley’s 
example by portraying Rogers only as one of many buccaneers, privateers, or pirates in 
collections of voyages. Those works are P.K. Kemp and Christopher Lloyd’s Brethren 
of the Coast (1960) and Alexander Winston’s No Man Knows My Grave (1969). Each 
individual receives one or two chapters as the narrative proceeds chronologically from 
the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries. 
Rogers then largely disappeared from literature again until very recently. During 
his absence, there were significant steps in research on sailors in general and especially 
privateers. Marcus Rediker has recently done much to flesh out sailors’ and especially 
pirates’ social backgrounds in a number of books. The tremendous agency that common 
sailors had and regularly utilized was usually ignored before then. Rediker’s Between 
the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (1987) and The Many-Headed Hydra (2000) explore 
the absolutely oppressive, squalid conditions that sailors faced in the merchant service, 
and why privateering (and piracy) looked like a viable alternative in the face of such 
hardship. More importantly, Rediker examines the economic trends that both pushed 
and pulled seamen far from their ports of origin. It was entirely possible for a sailor to 
wisely choose a specific vessel and captain for a voyage because his skills were in high 
demand.
4  Rediker’s explains how councils and ships’ articles (such as those imposed on 
 
Rogers’ expedition) were devised and what they were supposed to achieve. 
 
 
 
4 
Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (1987), 149. 
9  
 
During the time that Rediker published those two works, David Starkey wrote 
British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (1990) that analyzes the 
economics of privateering and especially the trends that affected where British privateers 
were from, what they targeted, and how they organized themselves. The financial 
backers for Rogers’ voyage receive brief descriptions but are overshadowed by the many 
other cruising voyages that Starkey examines in that same work. Glyndwyr Williams 
largely follows the same line in The Great South Sea (1997) that examines the changing 
ways in which English mariners were fascinated by Pacific exploration from the 
Elizabethan through the Georgian eras. In Preserving the Self in the South Seas 1680- 
1840 (2001), Jonathan Lamb explores the philosophical, patriotic, and scientific factors 
that drove British exploration into the Pacific. Rogers and some of his officers 
frequently appear in the latter two accounts, although Lamb and Williams do not discuss 
the Syndicate. 
Utilizing similar approaches to sailors, their means, and their motivations, others 
illuminated the lives of privateers and pirates. David Cordingly’s Under the Black Flag 
(1995) focuses on pirates but uses Rogers’ journal as a source to describe shipboard life 
and governance among privateers. Cordingly also uses Rogers as an example of how to 
fight pirates, as he suppressed pirates both in Madagascar and Nassau after the voyage. 
Like Rediker, Cordingly presents the sailors as active participants in defining the terms 
of their service rather than as passively accepting the rules set down by shipowners and 
officers, whether they worked for an independent merchant or the East India Company. 
He also dispels the other notion of privateers conducting themselves as gentlemen while 
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freelance pirates were scoundrels. It is this exact approach that makes it possible to 
examine how the Syndicate was able to attract so many crewmen when there were other 
opportunities that were far closer to home. Since all the privateers were free laborers 
and expected certain standards and accommodations, the Syndicate needed to offer 
potential recruits high pay, a command system that allowed for review of orders and 
disciplinary actions by superior officers, and decent food. Otherwise the sailors would 
simply look elsewhere. The high demand for sailors in any allied port also helps to 
explain why so many officers were needed to supervise the crewmen. 
The rise of interdisciplinary studies at the turn of the century allowed for further 
description of sailors and privateers in general. Essays in two recent anthologies use 
interdisciplinary (especially legal history) studies to explore not only the realities of 
privateering, but also the poarts that Rogers visited in the Spanish, Portuguese, and 
Dutch empires as well in order to highlight the roles that each port had in the greater 
maritime world. The first anthology, C.R. Pennell’s Bandits at Sea (2001), contains 
essays examining privateers as an institutional force and also as a commercial system on 
the very margins of legitimate trade. David Starkey again contributes through this work 
with his essay “The Origins and Regulation of Eighteenth-Century British Privateering.” 
Far from portraying privateers as either historical incarnations of Errol Flynn’s rakish 
Captain Blood or bloodthirsty rogues, Starkey explains the series of regulatory 
mechanisms that were designed to keep the practice in check.
5  
Those same mechanisms 
 
could also be exploited or manipulated in order to wreak further havoc upon enemy 
 
 
5 
David J. Starkey, “The Origins and Regulation of Eighteenth-Century British 
Privateering,” Bandits at Sea: A Pirates Reader, ed. C.R. Pennell (2001), 69. 
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shipping. This dissertation emphasizes the degree to which the Syndicate had to operate 
within this framework. 
The second anthology, Seascapes (2007), uses regional and global geographies to 
explain the workings of maritime systems. Emily Tai’s article “Marking Water” 
demonstrates that individuals who invested in privateering sought did not seek simple 
profit for profit’s sake but to raise their socioeconomic and political status.6  In that way, 
it becomes much easier to understand why the Syndicate members invested in 
privateering; the profits allowed some of the more middling backers to join the 
philanthropic and civic groups that wealthy Bristolians were expected to participate in. 
Using this recent, more thorough means of detailing sailors’ lives and the worlds 
in which they lived, Colin Woodard, Graham Thomas and David Cordingly again all 
published works focusing on Rogers, although not exclusively on his role in the voyage. 
In The Republic of Pirates (2008), Colin Woodard focuses on Rogers’ governorship of 
the Bahamas during which he waged a campaign against piracy. Although Woodard 
devotes some attention to Rogers’ personal life and voyage and to the War of the 
Spanish Succession, The Republic of Pirates mostly deals with pirates in the Caribbean 
during the Golden Age of Piracy. 
Thomas provides an immensely readable and entertaining account of Rogers’ 
voyage and governorship in his Pirate Hunter (2009). Thomas fills his narrative with 
vivid descriptions of shipboard life and battles. He devotes only one chapter to 
 
 
6 
Emily Sohmer Tai, “Marking Water: Piracy and Property in the Premodern West,” 
Seascapes: Maritime Histories, Littoral Cultures, and Transoceanic Exchanges, ed. 
Jerry Bentley et al (2007), 205. 
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describing Rogers’ personal life and divides the rest of the book between recounting the 
voyage and Rogers’ terms as governor of the Bahamas. The Syndicate is mentioned 
only in passing. 
David Cordingly, in Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean (2011), describes the careers 
of Bartholomew Roberts and Edward “Blackbeard” Teach in greater detail than that of 
Rogers. The most recent work on Rogers and his voyage is Tim Beattie’s British 
Privateering Voyages of the Early Eighteenth Century (2015), which is based on his 
dissertation The Cruising Voyages of William Dampier, Woodes Rogers and George 
Shelvocke and their Impact (2013). Beattie briefly describes the privateering  
expeditions led by Rogers, William Dampier, and George Shelvocke, then devotes the 
majority of the book to assessing the political, economic, and cultural impact of the 
voyages on eighteenth century Britain. Beattie also authored the recent essays 
“Adventuring Your Estate” for the journal The Mariner’s Mirror (2013) and “Dividing 
the Spoils” in the collection Law, Labour, and Empire (2015), which detail some of the 
finances involved in funding the Rogers expedition and in paying off the sailors at the 
end. 
While each of the recent authors who have written on Rogers have made 
significant contributions, none of them examine the Syndicate members beyond their 
financial contributions or a cursory description of their political lives. This study 
analyzes the social status of Syndicate members, explains the methods they employed to 
govern the voyage, calculates the profits made by members of the Syndicate, officers, 
and crewmen, and describes the impact of their financial success on their later lives. 
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The documentary foundation for this description and assessment of the voyage 
rests on the published accounts of the voyage by the commanders of the Duke and the 
Dutchess: Rogers’ memoir A Cruising Voyage Round the World and Cooke’s journal A 
Voyage to the South Sea (both 1712). Most of the memoirs consist of the captains’ logs. 
Both captains’ goals were to make money by selling this account to merchants interested 
in conducting business in the Pacific regions they visited. 
Archival sources from the United Kingdom’s National Archives provide much 
information as well. Chancery 104/36, 104/37, 104/160, and 104/161 hold an array of 
account ledgers, private letters, and business correspondence that detail the inner 
workings of the expedition and especially the Syndicate members who made it possible. 
The Prerogative Court of Canterbury (Probate) collection also provides the wills of most 
investors – and some officers – involved in the voyage and details their financial status 
and some of their interpersonal relationships. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Through the use of these newer interdisciplinary approaches, it is possible to 
view the emerging Pacific network of exchange and its gradual transition into a global 
network. A new world system was emerging, and Bristol cloth merchants comfortably 
ensconced in Bristol enticed enough sailors to venture forth and seek out Chinese silk 
and Mexican silver from the far side of the world. A cruising voyage from Bristol could 
enter that system and, through the Council and owners’ agents, indirectly bring the 
Syndicate into it as well. 
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It is also possible to understand why the Syndicate imposed rules – and regularly 
enforced them by proxy – that seemed to detract from the voyage’s goals. These rules 
also continually checked the privateers by curbing violent excesses. Most buccaneers or 
privateers had no qualms about using torture to extract information from captives 
regarding hidden valuables. But the Syndicate viewed its expedition partially as a 
cruising voyage and also as an economic probe. Instead of focusing only profits, the 
Syndicate members were keen on learning what future trade could be developed after the 
war’s end. The investors were motivated by long-term prospects, and this motivation is 
again clearly reflected in Rogers’ journal that was marketed to them and their peers. 
The thread that ties the entire voyage together, however, is the Bristol 
Syndicate’s network that enabled Rogers to set out in the first place. Through the 
intricate web of obligations, relations, civic cooperation, and business partnerships, the 
Syndicate members selected Rogers and the other officers because the Syndicate wanted 
the most competent, trustworthy officers and crewmen who would see to their 
employers’ interests. Every aspect of the voyage, from the outfitting to rules of 
engagement, depended on what the financiers wanted. The Syndicate’s rules sometimes 
ran contradictory to how most privateers operated, with emphasis on the cultivating of 
relationships with Spanish settlers whilst simultaneously robbing Spanish merchants. 
Before the dissertation examines all that, however, it must first describe the maritime 
world as it was just before 1708. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SPANISH LAKE 
 
 
In 1708, a group was formed in Bristol to send out two privateersmen to prey 
upon merchantmen from the French and Spanish enemies of Britain. The group, which 
shall be referred to as the Syndicate, appointed the Bristol mariner Woodes Rogers to 
lead the expedition in most practical matters. Such arrangements were not unusual, as 
similar associations often outfitted such expeditions, but the proposed hunting grounds 
made this expedition unique. Instead of the Mediterranean, waters around the British 
Isles, or the West Indies, the Syndicate intended to operate in Spanish American waters 
in the Pacific, something no Englishman had done since Thomas Cavendish over a 
century before. 
This decision was not reached on a whim. There were many factors to consider, 
some of which were years or centuries in the making. What gave the merchants even a 
passing interest, let alone a vested interest, in funding the expedition? Why did the 
British crown concern itself with commissioning privateers at all? What would possess 
members of the Syndicate to think that raiding the remote Pacific Ocean was a good 
idea? To be fully understood the Rogers expedition must be examined in the context of 
England, a developing nation at war, and its position in the maritime world of the early 
eighteenth century. 
By 1708, Great Britain – formed by the union of England and Scotland in 1707 
during the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) – was in a precarious position. 
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The British army, assisting the Grand Alliance in Flanders, had achieved some 
impressive victories but was fighting for its very existence against consistently superior 
enemy forces. 
Centuries of conflict, England’s relatively small population, and limited natural 
resources had led it to adopt an aggressive foreign policy. Wars are expensive; during 
the Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) England had to raise over 100,000 soldiers and sailors 
and ultimately spent five and a half million pounds on the war effort. The War of the 
Spanish Succession required even more men, costing Britain over seven million pounds 
by the time that nation ended its involvement in 1713. While tax revenue was steadily 
increasing, it still was not growing fast enough to keep pace with expenditures.
1
 
 
 
MERCANTILISM 
 
To meet those rising costs, British leaders shaped government policy to harness 
both public and private resources. Like most Western Europeans of the era these leaders 
firmly believed in mercantilism, a theory grounded on four basic beliefs.
2  
Mercantilists 
believed, first, that a nation’s ownership of gold and silver was the true measure of its 
wealth, and that nations should always strive to increase their holdings of those precious 
metals. A nation could increase its gold and silver specie reserves, and thus its wealth, 
either by mining ore or through international trade. Britain did not possess known gold 
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or silver deposits either at home or in its empire, so it had to depend on its commerce to 
increase the amount of specie and it held along with its ability to project strength. 
Mercantilists believed, secondly, that the volume of world trade and wealth were 
finite. Merchants and treasury officials labored under the assumption that they were 
playing a zero-sum game, i.e., Britain’s commerce, and with it the nation’s wealth, could 
only expand if the commerce and wealth of her rivals were diminished. With that in 
mind, merchants sought to outperform, impede, or co-opt rivals in other nations. British 
traders continually infiltrated Spanish merchant houses so that ten of Cadiz’s 84 
commercial houses were English-owned by 1702.
3  
Privateering fit into the zero-sum 
scenario as an integral offensive strategy. It allowed the state to wage commerce 
warfare while focusing the majority of its naval forces on defending home waters and 
engaging enemy fleets. For every privateer that raided enemy shipping, whether in the 
English Channel or in tropical waters thousands of miles away from home, the enemy 
suffered from a reduced capacity to fund its war effort. In a zero-sum scenario like that 
which the merchant communities perceived themselves in, every gain that British 
privateers achieved came at their enemies’ expense.4 
Third, mercantilists believed that, in order to maximize reserves of specie, i.e., 
gold and silver, all nations should strive for a positive trade balance. While 
manufacturing focuses on production and labor, commerce entails the perennial search 
for gain through the purchase, sale, and transporting of commodities along with ancillary 
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enterprises such as shipbuilding, ship chandlery, warehousing, banking, and insurance.
5 
The Syndicate members, Rogers, and all their supporters all dearly held this belief. They 
also believed that the destruction of Spanish and French shipping would raise England’s 
foreign trade when the war ended. Rogers began his 1712 publication exhorting English 
merchants to expand their markets and increase revenue through establishing trade links 
and colonies, especially in the Pacific. He described a virtuous cycle of increased trade 
leading to increased profit, which then led to increased naval power and so on. Writing 
after his return from the globe-circling voyage, Rogers complained “had a trade thither 
been promoted at the beginning of the war, we might not only have prevented the French 
from bringing through vast sums out of America, but have brought much greater 
ourselves, since we are better provided with commodities for that trade, and have a 
stronger naval force to carry it on.”6 
Fourth, mercantilists believed that the state should enact laws to regulate its 
 
economy to favor its own citizens and companies at the expense of those of its rivals. 
These laws would help the government accumulate reserves of gold and silver by 
fostering a positive trade balance; promote the British merchant marine, insurance, and 
financial sectors to avoid diverting funds to foreigners in order to pay for such services; 
and to develop sources within Britain and its territories of as many resources and 
commodities as possible. 
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Based on mercantilist principles, England’s Parliament sought to promote the 
nation’s economy by enacting a series of Navigation Acts during the second half of the 
seventeenth century. The English, and later, the British government, also sought to add 
to specie reserves by expanding its existing overseas empire. At the time, Britain held 
colonies in parts of Newfoundland, Hudson’s Bay, and the East Coast of the present day 
United States. Britain also possessed immensely valuable sugar islands in the West 
Indies where Jamaica was the main hub in a chain of British islands stretching in an arc 
from the Bahamas down to the Leeward Islands. These possessions put England into 
perpetual conflict with France and Spain. 
 
 
France 
 
France controlled some of the Leeward Islands and Saint-Domingue. The latter 
provided most of the valuable sugar and coffee consumed in metropolitan France and 
was sold to other nations. Thus France’s West Indies colonies were always prime 
wartime targets. Further north, France had carved out a huge swath of colonies from 
Acadia on the Gulf of Saint Lawrence to Louisiana on the Gulf of Mexico, which also 
included parts of Hudson’s Bay and modern Quebec. Throughout the Atlantic world, the 
British and French not only constantly competed in trade, but readily brought their 
colonies and indigenous allies into their conflicts. Governors of British colonies sold 
20  
 
letters of marque to privateers for 100 Spanish dollars apiece and sent privateers such as 
the notorious William Kidd to the West Indies, Red Sea, and Mozambique Channel.
7
 
 
Spanish Settlement 
 
Spain’s Atlantic possessions north of the equator had by 1700 been reduced to 
Florida and the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico in the east, but still included vast 
territories west of the Mississippi River, in Central America, and western and southern 
South America. Spain’s exploration of the Pacific began in 1508, when the Spanish 
conquistadores advanced across Central America. As Old World diseases depopulated 
the Americas and toppled indigenous civilizations, the Spanish expanded to fill the 
power vacuum. On the Pacific coast, fierce indigenous resistance finally checked the 
Spanish push southward into Chile. In the north, the Spanish had gradually extended 
their border to the Baja Peninsula and the American Southwest but the line had stabilized 
there by 1708. Lack of economic incentives to the north and south, coupled with            
a low Spanish population and surprisingly effective native resistance, precluded any 
further attempts to expand at the time. 
 
 
THE SPANISH PACIFIC IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 
 
Such would not be the case in Asia where the peoples shared the same disease 
pool as the Europeans. Smallpox, measles, and other Old World diseases had already 
existed in China for millennia so the introduction of diseases would not trigger 
 
7 
Alexander Winston, No Man Knows My Grave: Sir Henry Morgan, Captain William 
Kidd, Captain Woodes Rogers in the Great Age of Privateers and Pirates (1969), 34. 
21  
 
population collapse on the mainland as it had in the Americas. Under New Spain’s 
administration, the Spanish established and maintained settlements in the Marianas and 
the Philippines archipelagos. 
Edward Cooke, one of the expedition’s officers, described the Pacific as “that 
vast ocean which lies on the west of America, and between it and Asia, east and west, 
and extending from California in the North, to the Terra Australis Incognita in the 
South.” He further classified Spain’s holdings as not only entirely “beyond the Line,” 
but possibly stretching from one “undiscovered polar region to the other.”8 
By “beyond the Line,” Cooke spoke of the unpredictable, insecure state that 
 
existed in the colonial world past a certain longitude. The 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas 
established the western boundary through eastern Brazil and Greenland while the 1529 
Treaty of Zaragoza set the opposite line just east of the Philippines and through New 
Guinea. The two lines effectively divided the world outside Europe between Spain and 
Portugal, but other nations immediately challenged those boundaries when they launched 
their own colonial ventures. 
The oft-quoted adage “no peace beyond the Line” did not exist in any form until 
the French and Spanish employed the term in the 1559 Peace of Cateau-Cambresis, 
which mostly dealt with minor European possessions but also stated that the terms of 
treaties and cease-fires negotiated between nations in Europe did not necessarily apply to 
areas “beyond the Line.” The exact location of the Line was generally vague. It was 
arbitrary and mostly dependent on the cartographer’s opinion. 
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Furthermore, the line itself was a nebulous concept (it had once been the Azores’ 
longitude) although it was longitudinal, as longitude held more political significance than 
latitude. Other empires further confused matters when they unofficially deemed the 
Tropic of Cancer as the latitudinal equivalent by the seventeenth century.
9  
The Spanish 
had used some guile in adopting the Tropic of Cancer since it protected Spain’s weaker 
colonies north of that latitude, where the Spanish military was less able to protect its 
possessions. As the English writer Philip Ayres stated in his 1684 history on  
buccaneers, “That though we had not formally a War proclaimed against the Spanish 
there in the Indies, yet would not they listen to any proposals of Peace with us, beyond 
the Tropick, till about the year 1670.” Before that year, Ayres claimed “there daily 
happened great Acts of Hostility and Depredations on either side, done as well by the 
Spaniards against us, as by the English against them. . . .”10  By 1708, that delineation 
was shifting further south to the equator as rival colonial powers continued to expand 
and began to consider the equator as the southern border to the British Atlantic.
11
 
Colonial forces, including privateers, could still fight savagely long after their 
mother countries had made peace in Europe as the peripheries already had a lawless 
reputation. The Treaty of Whitehall in 1686 attempted to establish peace between 
French and English colonies, even in wartime. It drew the line not latitudinally, but – 
like the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas – longitudinally through the Atlantic declaring that 
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"though the two Countries might be at war in Europe their Colonies in America should 
continue in peace and Neutrality."
12  
That agreement did not last long as the English and 
French in North America quickly returned to fighting with the Nine Years’ War. Rogers 
and Cooke, operating beyond the Line, could do the same even if the war ended while 
they were at sea. And there were other colonial powers that wished to see the Spanish 
knocked down a peg. 
 
 
Portuguese and Dutch in the Pacific 
 
Although the Syndicate’s officers and sailors had incredible freedom while in the 
South Sea, that freedom came with uncertainty and the very real possibility that they 
might not return to Bristol. For British sailors, most of the Pacific was hostile territory. 
Japan was still in self-imposed isolation while the Chinese Qing court ignored the rest of 
the world. In the Central and South Pacific, the Dutch and Portuguese posed the most 
serious threats to Spain’s hegemony. Both usurpers struggled to attain a foothold there. 
The Portuguese established a presence in Timor in the East Indies. They also 
maintained an enclave at Macao on the Chinese mainland. The 1529 Treaty of 
Zaragoza, along with a hefty cash settlement from Portugal, had compelled the Spanish 
to renounce their claims to the Spice Islands and allow the Portuguese to stay there, but 
the Dutch could not be dislodged so easily.
13
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The Dutch were vigilant in guarding their Pacific territories and fiercely resisted 
Spanish attempts to remove them. The Dutch had even been so bold as to go on the 
offensive in 1642-43 and capture several settlements in Chile, including then abandoned 
Valdivia, although they did not have the strength or replacement capability to hold their 
gains for long. 
By midcentury, the Spanish realized they could not overtake the Dutch economic 
position in the Moluccas, and so they abandoned their one spice island, Ternate, in 1663. 
The Dutch also checked the Spanish advance into the East China Sea first by  
establishing a doomed colony on Formosa, and then by cultivating an amiable rapport 
with Japan’s Tokugawa shogunate. The Dutch improved their relationship with the 
shogun, maintaining a small but exclusive presence in Japan after the Spanish trading 
post was driven out in 1630. So long as the Dutch remained on friendly terms with the 
shogun, Spain could not make headway in Japan. 
The Dutch were also no more tolerant of rivals’ entries into the Pacific than the 
Spanish were. The Dutch and Portuguese fought while establishing their Spice Islands 
posts, and the Dutch did not extend much courtesy to the English. When the English 
East India Company established a trading post at Bantam on Java in 1603, the Dutch 
cooperated with them for most of the century. However, Dutch fears of losing their 
clove monopoly won out and so they used indigenous allies to eliminate the post in 
1682. The Dutch, since they were part of the Grand Alliance in the War of Spanish 
Succession, grudgingly allowed their British allies to operate in Dutch ports throughout 
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the Pacific and Indian Oceans. That tolerance had its limits, however, and the Dutch 
painstakingly kept tabs on every interaction with the British. 
 
 
Scots 
One other European power made a concerted effort to challenge Spanish 
hegemony in the Pacific. The Kingdom of Scotland tried to establish a colony at Darien 
on the Pacific coast of Panama in 1698. The relatively poor kingdom spent 
approximately half of its treasury equipping ships and settlers and enlisted the aid of 
former buccaneer Lionel Wafer in establishing the settlement.
14  
It was a disastrous 
venture. Despite some success negotiating with indigenous tribes and escaping Spanish 
notice for months, the principal settlement, New Edinburgh, soon became a wretched 
place. Disease and malnutrition debilitated the colonists. Attempts to reinforce or at 
least resupply the colony met with poor weather, obstructive politics, and sheer bad luck. 
A Spanish blockade proved the final straw and the settlers abandoned the colony in 
March 1700, returning with just one of the five original ships. 
 
 
 
Spanish Economy and Government 
 
These rival encroachments were often accompanied by smuggling, which did just 
as much to challenge Spanish authority as naval expeditions. English and Dutch 
smugglers flagrantly disregarded Spanish regulations in order to trade with the colonists, 
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creating an economic environment that caused both sellers and customers to disregard 
Spanish authority. 
Spain was just as much a mercantilist empire as her English, French, Dutch, and 
Portuguese counterparts. Spanish merchants and officials were rightly concerned that 
rival merchants or smugglers were enriching themselves at Spain’s expense. To the 
Spanish, owning territory and receiving a monopoly on trade were a package deal 
although the Crown struggled so assiduously and futilely to retain the latter. Spanish 
American commerce to Iberia was largely limited to a highly choreographed, heavily 
escorted Flota de Indias, in which an annual treasure fleet carrying silver and colonial 
goods was dispatched to Seville. Despite the official stance on trade outside the flota, 
Spanish merchants cheerfully assisted smugglers. The Spanish Pacific merchants 
labored under similar conditions. 
The many holes in Spain’s economic enforcement were largely due to the 
prevailing trends in the maritime world; the trade networks were gradually becoming 
more international despite official attempts to maintain exclusive trading rights. Spain’s 
territories in the New World were mostly incorporated into two viceroyalties: New Spain 
and Peru. Outside of South America’s Pacific coast, all of Spain’s Pacific territories 
were indirectly administered by New Spain. Under Spanish regulations, viceroyalties 
were not even permitted to trade with each other but that did not stop such transactions, 
and officials in both Mexico City and Buenos Aires tolerated – if not personally abetted 
– the illegal exchange of goods between the two polities.15 
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Furthermore, the monopoly hindered Spanish merchants by ensuring that only  
the most prosperous would survive. Spanish shipping in general had suffered during 
Spain’s long decline. The Spanish crown was stingy with “single register” permits for 
independent merchantmen, making it more difficult for new merchants to succeed.
16   
Ship masters eventually had to bargain for supplies and needed vast personal networks in 
order to survive. The Spanish navy requisitioned the best merchantmen as it became 
hard-pressed to defend Spain’s vast dominions with ever-shrinking resources. As a 
result, only the most powerful merchant houses could survive. As smaller, independent 
merchant houses began to disappear, the surviving merchants became more powerful 
through consolidation and dominated licensed shipping throughout Spanish American 
routes. Those routes became popular hunting grounds for pirates and privateers.
17
 
Privateers often operated in a gray area between legitimate commerce raiding and 
piracy because privateers could (and many did) flaunt the rules and attack the ships of 
neutral or even allied nations. The Spanish did not have the means to enforce their rule 
over the colonies, and lacked the political will to defend their own mercantile policies. 
Many privateers established illicit alliances with English, Dutch, and French governors. 
They even ingratiated themselves into some Spanish colonies and struck accords with 
Spanish officials who maintained enough local power to be caudillos, or the military and 
economic leaders in their isolated communities.
18  
With the local authorities welcoming 
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them as favored business partners and even personal friends, the smugglers went about 
their business largely unmolested. 
 
 
Spanish Manila Galleon Trade 
 
Although there was substantial trade between the Philippines archipelago, 
mainland China, and some of the East Indies, the Spanish Pacific trade was best known 
for the Manila-Acapulco annual trade route that exchanged Chinese silk and Spanish 
silver across the Pacific. The system operated continuously from 1565 until the 
nineteenth century. Unlike the flota, which consisted of dozens of ships, the nao de 
china typically traveled by itself, although there were occasional exceptions.
19  
Crossing 
the Pacific was an arduous journey, lasting four or five months. The naos, usually called 
Manila galleons by modern writers, sailed to 40 degrees latitude in order to catch the 
Kuro Shivo current, which took them to Upper California. From there, they followed the 
coastline until they reached Acapulco.
20  
The return journey was just as grueling. From 
Central America, the galleons headed due west until they reached the Marshall Islands. 
From there, they continued west by northwest until stopping at Guam for resupply. It 
was a relatively easy leg to the Philippines after that. 
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All Manila galleons had to abide by the permiso, which limited the volume of 
merchandise that could be carried. By imposing quotas on Chinese silks, the Spanish 
protected their own sericulture in New Spain and controlled the amount of silver the 
Spanish that went to China.
21  
Every leg of that journey, from the mainland junks and 
smaller vessels gathering their cargoes at Manila, to the Manila galleon departing for 
Guam and on to Acapulco, involved tremendous opportunities to make profits and both 
viceroyalties were heavily invested in it. “The Ships that Trade hither are only 3,” as 
Dampier described Acapulco, “two that constantly go once a year between this 
[Acapulco] and Manila in Luconia [Luzon] . . . and one Ship more every year to and 
from Lima. This from Lima commonly arrives a little before Christmas . . . here she 
stays till the Manila Ships arrive, and then takes in a Cargo of Spices, Silks, Callicoes, 
and Muslins, and other East-India Commodities, for the use of Peru, and then returns to 
Lima.”22 
Officials and merchants in the Philippines did not see compelling reasons to obey 
 
Spanish trade policy.
23  
Like his counterparts in New Spain and Peru, with lax and 
inconsistent enforcement, any Philippine official worth his salt realized that it was better 
to serve the Spanish colonists’ needs and ensure their prosperity than to try and enforce 
rules issued in far off Madrid. With such a small Spanish community – both 
peninsulares and criollos – in the archipelago, local needs trumped imperial 
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bureaucracy. 
Spanish Defense 
Spanish rule on the west coast of the Americas and the Eastern Pacific went 
virtually unchallenged by other Europeans during the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. The rarity and failure of foreign excursions into the Pacific led the Spanish to 
become complacent to the degree that by 1700 their defenses on the west coasts of the 
Americas were virtually nonexistent except for static fortifications. Aside from the 
viceregal escorts and the major cities’ garrisons, the Spanish defended their Pacific 
coastline with unreliable and shiftless militia. At sea they maintained the Armada de 
Mar de Sur, but it could not possibly patrol the entire coast from Mexico to Cape Horn.
24
These limited defense forces operated with little external support. The Spanish 
crown permitted local governors to commission guarda costas in order to protect local 
trade. They were a staple in colonial defense by 1700 as Spain’s military power 
continued to contract. The guarda costas were practically pirates as well, and used their 
sanctioned tasks to further their smuggling and occasional independent raiding. The 
governors could also gather small vessels into small flotillas called armadillas to 
temporarily defend their coasts in emergencies, and then recall them once the emergency 
had passed.
25  
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The Spanish had fought English, Dutch, and sometimes French intruders in the 
Americas for over a century. The Syndicate had access to accounts of these conflicts, 
which was partially why it considered the Pacific as a hunting ground. The Spanish 
displaced other European settlers throughout Spanish America in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, many of whom later lived as hunter gatherers. These buccaneers, 
as they became known, all held a grudge against the Spaniards and were eager to attack 
their oppressors. Logwood cutters and Huguenots joined them in their marauding. 
Buccaneers were tangentially related to privateers, as the seventeenth century English, 
French, and Dutch governments established footholds in the Americas, exploited 
buccaneers’ animosity towards Spain, and gave them opportunities to ravage Spanish 
colonies. Henry Morgan reached the highest point of Pacific buccaneer raids with his 
attacks on Portobello and Panama in the 1660s and ‘70s. 
In March 1680, John Coxon and Bartholomew Sharp assembled a group of 
buccaneers (including Dampier) to raid the Pacific coast of Panama. This raid was 
important because its participants eventually became connected to Rogers himself and, 
by extension, further Pacific exploration. Coxon and Sharp intended to repeat Morgan’s 
success at Panama City in 1671. They planned to disembark on the Caribbean side of 
Panama somewhere around Darien, and then advance overland to the Pacific side via 
canoe. Instead, when they landed near Panama City in April the Spanish reacted with 
uncharacteristic aggression. The buccaneers met determined resistance from a Spanish 
armadilla and gave up the assault. The buccaneers then descended into internecine 
squabbling. Dampier and Wafer broke off and led their followers overland through 
Privateers and Pirates Challenge 
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Darien back to the West Indies.
26  
Dampier remembered this setback and used that 
experience to counsel Rogers. 
While Sharp’s expedition foundered, Edmund Cook (not to be confused with the 
Edward Cooke who sailed with Rogers) took his vessel and persuaded some men to join 
him on his own round of South Seas raiding. Dampier eventually joined that group. 
Cook survived the unproductive venture by carefully sailing near the coastline where he 
could conceal his forces in inlets whenever superior Spanish forces appeared, and by 
cultivating relationships with the Cuna tribes. Those friendships saved his crew from 
starvation when the buccaneers’ stores ran out, and they subsisted on whatever they 
could barter for. Cook died of an illness, leaving Edward Davis in charge. More 
recriminations ensued over their lack of success, with John Eaton and Ambrose Cowley 
splitting from Davis while Dampier remained loyal.
27
 
Davis, Dampier, and the remnants of the buccaneers later joined the French 
buccaneer François Grogniet as he gathered hundreds of English and French buccaneers 
off the Pearl Islands in 1685. Grogniet’s group inflicted severe damage to Peru’s 
commerce as they attacked Spain’s unprotected Pacific shipping, raided Peru’s coast, 
and plundered its isolated settlements. Davis and a group of Englishmen chose not to 
leave Central America but to try to intercept the Manila galleon. When the galleon 
appeared, most of the crew were hunting inland and the heavily laden galleon coasted by 
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unmolested.
28  
This made the already poor morale among the buccaneers worse and they 
eventually dispersed. 
All these expeditions achieved remarkable initial successes against Spanish 
shipping and coastal settlements, but first few setbacks could instantly unravel any bonds 
buccaneers might have had with each other and the groups scattered. 
Davis returned to the West Indies by rounding Cape Horn. Cowley’s homeward journey 
was considerably longer as he circumnavigated the globe, freely trading in Guam and 
stopping in Canton for some time. As his crew dwindled and their ship became 
unseaworthy as it crossed the Indian Ocean, he and the remaining handful of English 
sailors signed on to a Dutch ship at the Cape of Good Hope in order to get home.
29 
Cowley published his experiences, so the Syndicate was almost certainly aware that an 
undermanned expedition would likely meet a similar fate. As the Syndicate members 
prepared its own expedition, its leaders took precautions to ensure that Rogers and his 
crewmen would not be stranded in the Pacific or have to “hitchhike” back to Europe. 
The Syndicate not only gathered larger crews but also assigned more than the usual 
number of officers so there would always be a functioning chain of command regardless 
of sickness or battle casualties. 
 
 
English Charts 
 
In 1700 most of the Pacific remained uncharted. In fact, the coast of modern 
Chile was still largely unexplored when Charles Darwin passed through the region on his 
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own voyage more than a century after Rogers. Drawing the published accounts of 
several English buccaneers, cartographers gradually filled in the gaps of English charts. 
During his 1679-82 voyage to the Pacific, Bartholomew Sharp seized Spanish sea charts 
from ships captured. When he returned home Sharp gave the charts to the government, 
an action which may have influenced his acquittal of charges that he was a pirate.
30 
Dampier, who had sailed with him, would bring his knowledge to the Bristol Syndicate. 
Other, more above-board incursions also added to aggregate English knowledge of the 
South Sea and sharpened collective memory.
31
 
 
Failed British Settlements and Trading Expeditions 
 
As lax as the Spanish colonial system appeared to be, and despite English 
smugglers’ successes, repeated raids into the South Sea ensured that English attempts to 
openly trade in the Pacific had largely met with failure. When John Narborough arrived 
in the region with a cargo of manufactured goods in 1669, he had been dispatched “to 
make a discovery both of the seas and coasts of that part of the world, and, if possible to 
lay the foundation of a trade there.”32 Instead, his shore party was imprisoned and 
Narborough returned to England in defeat. 
While Narborough’s expedition had failed both in the commercial and 
exploratory sense (he did not get north of Chile), he succeeded at least in charting the 
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Straits of Magellan. Even though it was halted and rebuffed, his expedition also showed 
the ineffectiveness of the Spanish lookout system. Upon returning to England, one of 
Narborough’s officers remarked, “. . . we understood the Spanish Ambassador at Court 
had resented our Voyage into the South-Seas, but without any notice taken of it.”33  The 
Spanish arrested a shore party for smuggling and trespassing, sent the sailors to Lima 
where they were tortured and otherwise mistreated until the 1680s, and then the 
survivors were most likely executed.
34  
Nevertheless the English had still freely sailed 
into Spanish waters and had not been spotted until they were in front of Valdivia, one of 
the most heavily fortified ports in the viceroyalty of Peru. Even then, the interlopers had 
completed some private transactions over the course of three days before colonial 
officials reacted. 
Just over a decade later, in 1683, the former buccaneer Charles Swan had 
collaborated with Basil Ringrose to outfit a trading expedition into to the South Sea. 
Upon reaching Valdivia in southern Chile, the Spanish, instead of welcoming and  
trading with the Englishmen,. The group later met with active buccaneers, after which 
the crew turned unruly and the expedition gradually disintegrated, forgetting its original 
commercial purpose and instead began raiding Spain’s holdings throughout the Pacific. 
The Spanish soon ambushed and killed Ringrose in New Spain. Swan eventually tried to 
cross the Pacific and return home, but he met a violent end in the Philippines, caught up 
in indigenous conflicts and with most of his crew deserted. Their commercial expedition 
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had failed due to not only unexpected Spanish hostility, but to the outlawry that many 
buccaneers were prone to.
35
 
 
WAR OF THE SPANISH SUCCESSION 
 
The buccaneer and privateer expeditions in the South Sea, along with the trading 
expeditions, increased in tempo in the years leading to the War of the Spanish 
Succession. By the late seventeenth century, France had emerged as England’s greatest 
imperial and commercial rival. France’s Bourbon king Louis XIV had spent much of his 
reign thus far cajoling, threatening, and sometimes waging war against weaker 
Continental neighbors to gradually expand the borders of his kingdom. Each of his wars 
ended once the economic and diplomatic costs outweighed potential gains, although that 
could change. 
Spain had been in gradual decline for much of the past century as its obsolete 
economy struggled to meet its political and military commitments, but a revitalized Spain 
could spell disaster to Britain. In 1700, a dynastic union between France, the dominant 
continental military power, and Spain with its immense overseas territories in               
the Americas and the Pacific, would drastically alter the balance of world power. Britain 
and her allies would be put at a permanent disadvantage in diplomacy, commerce, and 
warfare as the Bourbons would be able to use their combined resources to grind down 
any military or commercial rival. “The two Crowns of France and Spain being in one 
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Family,” Rogers warned, “whose ambition for an Universal Monarchy has hitherto broke 
thro all Treaties, ‘tis too much to be dreaded . . . .”36 
To prevent this occurrence, a Grand Alliance of the Holy Roman Empire (which 
wanted its own Hapsburg representative on the Spanish throne), most German states, 
England, the United Provinces, and Hapsburg loyalists in Spain launched the War of the 
Spanish Succession in 1701 to prevent the union of France and Spain under a Bourbon 
monarch. 
At the start of the war, British merchants’ fears were confirmed when Spain 
opened its empire to its ally, France, by granting the Asiento, i.e., the right to sell slaves 
from Africa in Spanish America, to the French Compagnie de Guinee et de l’Assiente 
des Royaume de la France. That same year Spain granted another French trading 
company, La Compagnie Royale de la Mer du Sud, a license that made it the only 
foreign company allowed to trade with Spanish settlements on the Pacific coasts of the 
Americas for a period of thirty years.
37  
British smugglers who had operated in Spain’s 
Atlantic colonies for decades feared that they might lose their business to French 
merchants. Rogers soon lamented that “the French not only supply the South Seas, but 
carry all sorts of goods, with negroes, to Portobello, Vera Cruz, Cartagena, and Buenos 
Aires: so that they have outed us both of the public and private trade that we formerly 
had with the Spanish West Indies, which must necessarily stop the fountain of our 
bullion, and affect all the other branches of our trade through the world.”38 
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Protecting existing commerce required the ability to reliably protect sea lanes. In 
1708 the naval war was not going well for Britain. The French, acutely aware they did 
not have the resources to meet the British in pitched battles at sea, shepherded their  
assets and used them only when they were guaranteed victory against vulnerable 
merchantmen with inadequate escorts. The Anglo-Dutch forces, on the other hand, 
vainly tried to draw French naval fleets out to meet in decisive battle. The allies could 
occasionally catch a Bourbon fleet in a vulnerable position, e.g., in 1702 when an Anglo- 
Dutch fleet captured or destroyed fifteen French ships-of-the-line in the harbor at Vigo 
Bay. Those opportunities, however, were extremely rare because the Bourbon warships 
spent so much time in strongly defended ports. The war’s one major naval battle at sea 
before 1708, fought off Malaga in 1704, ended in a bloody draw. Rather than attempt to 
engage the British or Dutch navies in a fleet action, the French instead focused their 
naval effort on a guerre de course strategy, and soon inflicted humiliating defeats on 
British convoys, sometimes within sight of the British shore as at the Lizard and Beachy 
Head in 1707. 
In addition to the French navy, French privateers from St. Malo and Dunkirk 
devastated British commerce. Over the course of the war, French privateers captured 
almost 7000 Grand Alliance vessels. Even more dangerously, the French navy, 
supported by Dunkirk privateers, had tried to transport a French invasion force to 
Scotland in 1708 in order to instigate a Jacobite rebellion.
39  
The landings were aborted, 
but British officials could not escape the fact that French warships and privateers had 
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threatened the British Isles and even had the gall to attempt to restore the hated Stuart 
monarchy. 
The British retaliated by sending out privateers of their own. The British navy 
and privateers, combined, seized a little over 2200 prizes by war’s end, less than a third 
of their enemies’ captures.40 
Privateering was attractive to businessmen in Bristol. There, men who would 
become members of the Syndicate weighed the variables involved in such an enterprise. 
The expenses incurred outfitting a privateer increased exponentially with the distance it 
operated from its home port. Given, for example, the cost of stores, financing an 
expedition to the Caribbean was more expensive than one that cruised in European 
waters, but the profits could also be much greater. Thus for most of the seventeenth 
century, the privateers who made the most money cruised in American waters.
41  
Cooke 
recognized this in his journal on the Pacific voyage stating, “the immense wealth of the 
West Indies, is the bait that has always drawn adventurers into those parts, since the first 
discovery by Christopher Columbus.”42 
The cost of outfitting an expedition to the Pacific was greater than one to the 
Caribbean and Spanish commerce in the Pacific was only a fraction of that in the 
Caribbean and Atlantic. Profits from operations in the Pacific, however, were 
potentially greater because competition from other privateers was virtually non-existent 
and Spanish shipping essentially unprotected. Thus to the businessmen who formed the 
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Bristol Syndicate, the Pacific seemed the logical place to seek their fortunes. Their 
captains and officers also appreciated that the Spanish settlers in the Pacific were hungry 
for trade goods. Rogers possessed a copy of the French mariner (and occasional 
privateer) Jacques Gouin de Beauchene’s account of his 1698 trading voyage to the 
Pacific and from it knew how weak Spanish enforcement of trade regulations was in the 
South Sea.
43  
By 1707, Bristol businessmen began to discuss forming a group to send an 
expedition to the Pacific to both trade with residents along the coasts of Spanish America 
and to prey upon Spanish shipping in the South Sea. The officers and sailors       
involved in this expedition, financed, organized, and dispatched by the Bristol Syndicate, 
would challenge the status quo in the Pacific in three ways. First, even though the 
investors did not plan on it, the potential capture of possessions on the Pacific coast of 
Spanish America could be useful during negotiations aimed at ending the War of the 
Spanish Succession. Even a toehold would be a threat to Spain’s power in the region. 
Second, the regular trade routes that Rogers envisioned emanating from a hypothetical 
new settlement, guarded by privateers and the Royal Navy, would support later 
assertions of the legitimacy of English trade in the region. Third, cataloguing the 
discoveries and refining the regional maps and sailors’ draughts would encourage and 
facilitate expeditions to the area by other British traders and assist Britain in establishing 
additional Pacific settlements. While Rogers made no claim to Spanish territory, he 
appreciated the potential for British trading posts or colonies in the Pacific. 
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The Bristol Syndicate was largely made up of merchants and other landsmen, not 
of mariners who would accompany the expedition. Syndicate members were vital to the 
voyage, both for their financial backing and also because they chose the men who would 
lead the venture and distributed power among those who sailed in the expedition. 
For the Syndicate members to succeed in their endeavor, they would need to tap 
into the labyrinthine interpersonal networks that formed between mariners and members 
of the well-to-do occupations that depended on those mariners. The information, 
relationships, and both familial and personal obligations that traveled across those 
sophisticated connections were essential in maintaining a brisk local, regional, and even 
global trade. Bristol, ideally situated on the Gloucestershire coast, served as a suitable 
foundation for many such networks. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
GOLDSMITHS AND GROCERS 
 
 
 
Very few individuals could outfit a privateering expedition using only their own 
funds, and even those who could afford to would not. Privateering was a high-risk 
business, so prudent shipowners diversified their portfolios by investing in partial 
ownership in several privateersmen at once. In this manner, the owners would not lose 
everything in case the vessel was sunk or captured. Ships were expensive, and 
everything from the ships’ guns to provisions and medical supplies required money. A 
mariner such as Woodes Rogers needed financial backers as well as partners to post the 
bond required to obtain a privateering commission. Far from being simply an 
adventurous explorer, Rogers needed to seek opportunities within an economic system in 
which he was dependent on commercial and personal networks. Privateering in waters 
distant from Europe, required a group effort to finance, and such groups often coalesced 
in a seaport such as Bristol. 
 
 
BRISTOL, COMMERCE, AND PRIVATEERING 
 
At the start of the eighteenth century, Bristol was rapidly expanding its economy 
and with it the wealth of its commercial class that had an interest in ensuring prosperity. 
“From the reign of Anne to the present period the history of Bristol is so intimately 
43  
 
connected with that of the British Empire at large as to present few events of any 
unconnected interest,” wrote the nineteenth-century historian John Corry.1 
Bristol was a hub for both merchantmen and privateers. The surrounding West 
Country merchants had been dependent on the Iberian wine trade and Atlantic cod 
fishermen before colonial markets became more prominent. That shift made Bristol 
merchants gradually become more involved in trans-Atlantic trade.
2  
During the late 
seventeenth century, France replaced the Netherlands as England’s chief commercial 
competitor. Bristol capitalized on these changes in colonial trade and economic rivalries 
to become, by 1700, the third-largest English city and the second-largest port. It would 
decline in relation to Liverpool and Manchester after the mid-eighteenth century, but at 
this point it was the principal commercial hub in southwest England.
3  Bristol’s rise as a 
seaport spurred a burgeoning shipbuilding industry in the city’s dockyards. By the turn 
of the century, Bristol developed a merchant class eager to invest in new enterprises. 
Most investors preferred to purchase shares in multiple companies and ventures that dealt 
with a variety of commodities, e.g., Irish pork, West Indian sugar, or African slaves       
as a way to spread their risk. The merchants not only invested in commodities, but in 
activities including the development of infrastructure (e.g., turnpike construction, 
shipyards, docks, and warehouses) and privateering. In case one venture failed, the 
merchants’ other investments would mitigate their financial losses. Bristol was ideally 
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situated for those who wished to engage in multiple ventures.
4  “You come first to Old 
Wells, and over a bridge, built on both sides like London Bridge, and as much crowded,” 
began a contemporary description of Bristol, “with a strange mixture of seamen, women, 
children, loaded horses, asses, sledges with goods, dragging along all together, without 
posts to separate them.”5 
In 1708, Bristol was a thriving economic center due not only to its strategic 
location in exchange networks, but through its manufacturing capacity as well. The 
city’s robust manufacturing economy drew laborers to Bristol and led to the expansion 
of its infrastructure. Writing a history of Bristol in 1816, John Corry stated that “the 
spirit of improvement has been diffused throughout the empire, and of this spirit Bristol 
has imbibed no inconsiderable a proportion.”6 
Bristol was a major manufacturing center partially because it had an extensive 
hinterland to draw upon for raw materials. Somerset, Gloucester, Dorset, and Poole 
(itself a county corporation) sent their products to the warehouses in Bristol, and from 
there the goods spread throughout England’s overland and coastal trade networks.7 
Trade fairs provided an avenue for Bristol’s economy to integrate with other industries 
as local manufacturers accessed materials from throughout Britain. Copper and brass 
were particularly important because they formed so many accoutrements to 
manufactured goods such as cabinets and desks, as well as industrial products such as 
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stills for West Indian sugar plantations. Metalworking and metallurgy in general played 
a role in Bristol’s economy, and a Bristol Quaker named Abraham Darby leased a blast 
furnace in distant Shropshire, where he developed the first technique for smelting iron 
with coke. Thomas Goldney, who was one of the original Syndicate members, later 
invested in the ironworks after the voyage returned.
8
 
Bristol, in addition to forming a key hub in the Atlantic trade network and in 
 
metallurgy, also developed some domestic manufacturing in the glassware and pottery 
sectors and would, by the end of the eighteenth century, become famous for Bristol blue 
glass.
9
 
Because of its expanding economy, Bristol had grown markedly over the 
seventeenth century and boasted a still-expanding population of approximately 20,000 
by 1700. Parliament tried to alleviate some of the strain on municipal infrastructure by 
passing an act “for cleansing, paving, and enlightening the streets of the city of Bristol” 
in 1699 but that did not address the crushing poverty that accompanied expansion.
10 
While Bristol’s population swelled as the increased industrial sectors attracted migrants, 
there was only so much housing to go around. Slums and shantytowns sprang up as the 
mostly poor migrant laborers were forced to compete for food and shelter. They could 
not consistently depend on churches and the associated eighteen parishes for support. 
The Corporation of the Poor, formed by an act of Parliament in 1696, established a 
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single tax district that encompassed the entire city. Thus residents of all parts of the city, 
not just those in impoverished neighborhoods, shared the expense of providing for 
Bristol’s poor.11  
Bristol’s city aldermen each had four individuals to oversee management of the 
Corporation of the Poor within their ward. These Guardians of the Poor appointed other 
officers to manage the organization’s workhouse and other programs. The Corporation 
of the Poor ultimately consolidated their workings into one larger workhouse. 
Coordinating with Bristol’s industry, the workhouse residents spun cotton in exchange 
for some basic necessities. The Corporation also depended on benefactors aside from 
the clergy; cooperation with the city elite and government was essential. Most members 
of the elite invested in privateers. 
 
 
War and Privateering 
The past century of conflict with Spain and France, which occurred concurrently 
with colonial expansion in the Americas, had given the British merchant marine and the 
merchants themselves the impetus to evolve. This evolution involved the scope and type 
of commodities. From the Middle Ages up until the sixteenth century, West Country 
merchants, including those in Bristol, had been dependent on wine shipments from Spain 
and Portugal at least until the colonization of North America, and that trade was still 
prominent in the eighteenth century.
12  
After 1650, bulk cargoes such as wheat, timber, 
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tobacco, and sugar from America replaced Iberian wine as the mainstay of Bristol 
merchants.
13
 
The wars of the period (the Nine Years’ War and the War of the Spanish 
Succession) severely disrupted trade. In both wars, enemy warships and privateers 
captured numerous British merchantmen and these depredations drove up the cost of 
insurance. In response, British merchants consolidated their ships into fewer but better- 
escorted convoys. Still, the losses continued to mount, insurance premiums rose, and the 
ripple effect meant higher prices for consumers. The Nine Years’ War (1688-1697) was 
difficult enough and Spain was allied to England during that conflict, so the English at 
least had support defending their American trade. The English were more focused on 
Jacobites in Ireland and Scotland and colonial trade was of secondary concern to  
William III and the government. Like most of the ruling class, William had believed 
Stuart sympathizers to pose a far greater threat. 
William’s supporters did not consider the Jacobites to be such a pressing concern 
during the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714). The Spanish were also not allies in 
that war and the English, Dutch, and Portuguese were hard pressed to defend their 
merchant marine as soon as they entered the war. In addition, the sheer length of the 
War of the Spanish Succession meant that England and by extension Bristol’s merchant 
class had to survive with greater risk and with fewer opportunities to trade. French and 
to a lesser extent Spanish privateers created this unstable situation. 
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The French adopted a guerre de course strategy during the Nine Years’ War. 
 
That is, instead of seeking decisive naval battles, between fleets composed of ships-of- 
the-line, the French used frigates and privateers to capture vulnerable English convoys. 
By the War of the Spanish Succession, the French privateering was not just a nuisance, 
but posed a real threat to England’s economy that made its merchant class demand naval 
protection. In addition, geographical scope and duration of the War of the Spanish 
Succession meant that English merchants faced greater risks at a time when Bristol 
merchants in particular suffered after losing access to Spanish markets, the city’s most 
important foreign trading partners. 
The English and their allies were unable to bring about major engagements at  
sea. Instead, they vainly searched for a great naval battle while elusive French privateers 
slipped through the Channel and inflicted great damage on English and Dutch 
merchantmen. Tobacco fleets from Virginia, slave ships from Guinea, and cod fishermen 
returning from the Grand Banks all feared French privateers that could strike at           any 
moment. Just one successful privateer could ruin a merchant’s entire livelihood in 
moments, and some of the merchants who would later hire Woodes Rogers had already 
suffered financial losses at privateers’ hands. To offset their losses, English merchants 
and shipowners increasingly invested in privateers of their own from Dover to Dundee. 
During the Nine Years War, London shipowners, merchants, and landed gentry 
outfitted more than two-thirds of England’s 406 privateers. By comparison, Bristol 
outfitted a mere seven privateersmen. During the next war, investors from other cities – 
including Bristol – joined those from London in privateering. Throughout the War of 
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the Spanish Succession, Bristol shipowners received 205 commissions for 157 
privateersmen. That was out of a total of 1607 commissions for 1343 privateers 
commissioned in Britain and Ireland. Londoners still outfitted approximately half (814 
commissions for 671 vessels) but Bristolians were gaining on them.
14
 
 
THE BRISTOL SYNDICATE 
 
Bristol shipowners and merchants contributed to making Bristol a major port for 
privateers. Understanding that diversification and shared risk were key to survival, 
especially during wartime, a group of like-minded investors in the city formed the 
nucleus of what became the Syndicate. Many Syndicate members either owned or co- 
owned merchant ships and invested in privateers to reduce the risks of war. Privateering 
would enable merchants to not only recoup some of their losses, but also to strike back at 
those responsible for their current economic setbacks. 
Bristol’s location influenced the Syndicate’s plans. Channel ports from Dover to 
the Scilly Isles and across to the Channel Islands flooded that region with privateers 
ranging from small vessels that preyed on French coastal traffic to converted 
merchantmen that attacked enemy shipping there and abroad. In fact, there were more 
Channel privateers than Bristol privateers commissioned during the War of the Spanish 
Succession. From Kent northward, east coast ports sent privateers into the North Sea 
and beyond to attack enemy merchantmen and ships from neutral nations carrying 
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contraband to France and Spain.
15 
Competition was equally keen in the West Indies, 
thus the men who formed the Syndicate looked for opportunities elsewhere, and soon 
settled on an expedition to the Pacific where the element of surprise coupled with the 
lack of competition presented the opportunity of far greater profits. 
Bristol, with is extensive connections to trade with Africa, the West Indies, and 
North America, possessed the resources – sailors, sea captains, and investors – to launch 
such an audacious expedition. The men the Syndicate hoped to attract to the enterprise 
were familiar with the logistics of such a large-scale undertaking, including initial and 
running costs, and so were better prepared than most to outfit a cruising voyage.
16
 
 
Origins of the Syndicate 
Origins of the enterprise are somewhat obscure. Contemporary sources disagree 
on whether Woodes Rogers, William Dampier, or others first developed the idea. In his 
journal, Rogers asserts that he approached some future Syndicate members and proposed 
cruise in the Pacific.
17  
Cooke contends that Dampier persuaded the merchants to outfit 
an expedition.
18  
Historians writing during the eighteenth century have mixed opinions, 
although at least one (Charles de Brosses) credits the Syndicate with the idea. Given 
Rogers’ inexperience, he probably did not author the proposal. Neither did Dampier, 
who did not return to England from his second circumnavigation until late 1707. More 
likely, the Syndicate members had been discussing the possibility of organizing a 
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cruising voyage, and Dampier’s return to the city and the subsequent excitement led 
them to focus on the Pacific as their primary target. 
In early 1707, five men – John Batchelor, Thomas Goldney, James Hollidge, 
Francis Rogers (no relation to Woodes Rogers), and Christopher Shuter – laid the 
foundation for what would become the Syndicate. Their occupations and number of 
shares purchased are listed in Figure 1. At the time, they only had a single officer named 
Alexander White on their rudimentary roster to function as a pilot and translator (he later 
sailed with the expedition as a subordinate). Woodes Rogers and Edward Cooke were 
not yet involved in the enterprise. The proto-Syndicate members calculated that they 
needed to raise a minimum of £3456 to purchase and outfit ships, attract officers and 
crewmen, and post the bonds which were supposed to guarantee that a privateer captain 
would adhere to the laws of war and become a pirate. Initially, the members hoped to 
issue 128 shares at £207 apiece, but soon concluded that it would be difficult to attract 
individuals willing to make such a large investment.
19  
Thus they doubled the number of
shares to 256, halved the price of each, and began contacting their associates in the 
merchant community. 
Figure 1: Original Syndicate Members 
Name Shares Occupation 
John Batchelor 16 Landlord, draper, merchant, shipowner 
19 
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Thomas Goldney 36 Grocer, landowner, shipowner 
James Hollidge 10 Merchant 
Francis Rogers 20 Shipowner, merchant 
Christopher Shuter 30 Grocer, merchant 
Sources: Alfred Beaven, Bristol Lists: Municipal and Miscellaneous (1899), 125-126, 
276. “Articles of Co-Partnership between Christopher Shuter,” BRO 13325/52/a. 
“Creagh v. Rogers,” C 104/36-37, C 104/160-161, NAUK. 
Calendar of Treasury Papers: 1556-7-1696; XXVI:340. 
“Conveyance of Goldney House,” DM 1911/3/1, University of Bristol. 
Kenneth Morgan, “Sugar Refining in Bristol,” From Family Firms to Corporate 
Capitalism, ed. Kristine Bruland and Patrick O’Brien (1998), 146. 
PROB 11/637/109; 11/524/492. 
By the end of the year the Syndicate had expanded to include fourteen additional 
investors. The new members came from a variety of occupations and purchased 
between 4 and 30 shares each, as seen in Figure 2. Edward Cooke provides a complete 
list of the nineteen investors who formed the Syndicate by 1708.
20
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Name Shares Occupation 
Figure 1 Continued
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Figure 2: Additional Syndicate Members by September 1708 
Name Shares Occupation 
Thomas Clement 4 Shipwright 
John Corseley 10 Goldsmith 
Stephen Courtney ≤15 Mariner 
Thomas Coutes NA Merchant, gentleman 
Thomas Dover 30 Physician 
John Duckinfield 10 Merchant, shipowner 
Philip Freke 20 Merchant 
John Grant 20 Distiller 
John Hawkins 10 Brewer, landlord 
Richard Hawksworth 5 Merchant 
Daniel Hickman 10 Ironmonger 
John Romsey 15 Town clerk 
William Saunders NA Merchant 
Nathaniel Webb NA Gentleman, grocer 
Sources: Alfred Beaven, Bristol Lists: Municipal and Miscellaneous (1899), 125-126, 
187, 225, 282. 
“Assignment for 7 Years between Daniel Hickman,” BRO 13325/83. 
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Kenneth Morgan, “Sugar Refining in Bristol,” From Family Firms to Corporate 
Capitalism, ed. Kristine Bruland and Patrick O’Brien (1998), 146. 
PROB 11/563/120; 11/597/173; 11/680/65; 11/691/95. 
 
Wendy Wilson-Fall, Memories of Madagascar and Slavery in the Black Atlantic (2015). 
 
 
 
With at least nineteen members who had a stake in the voyage, Syndicate leaders 
had to organize and coordinate the finances. Each investor had an active role to play and 
could not just drop a sack of guineas into a common pot and reap the rewards later. 
Little is known concerning how the Syndicate functioned. No records indicate how it 
was structured, although it is clear that its members took their cues from Batchelor. In 
correspondence addressed to the Syndicate, the senders almost invariably list him first. 
Records suggest that every member could participate in decision-making, although they 
all seem to have deferred to Batchelor. In government documents such as letters of 
marque, he always signed first while the other Syndicate members lent their support as 
fellow signatories. Batchelor possessed the gravitas in the right circles to remain leader 
throughout the Syndicate’s length of service. 
 
 
Additions and Structure 
 
Membership in the Syndicate changed significantly between its formation in 
1707 and 1708 and the conclusion of the voyage in 1711. All of the initial backers were 
from Bristol and its environs. Five investors who joined later were also from Bristol: 
Lawrence (or Laurence) Hollister, Lewis Casamajor, Abraham Hooke, Edward Hackett, 
55 
and Humphrey Corseley. Both Cooke and the historian Charles de Brosses mention that 
Edward Acton, Thomas Palmer, and “some other London gentlemen” joined the 
Syndicate after the expedition got underway, and the owners’ orders of 1711 indicate 
those additional changes in Syndicate membership, and those changes are reflected in 
Figure 3.
21  
It is unclear how much Acton, a goldsmith, or Palmer, a merchant, each
invested but they were connected to wealthy and powerful individuals in London. The 
document that includes the names of most of the newcomers was a 1711 agreement 
concerning the sale of the prize cargoes and the distribution of the proceeds of the sale. 
At the time these procedures were agreed to, the expedition had returned to Europe from 
the Pacific, was waiting in the Netherlands due to unforeseen complications, and was 
preparing for the final short trip back to England. 
Figure 3: Syndicate Members Who Joined While Expedition Was at Sea 
Name Shares Occupation 
Edward Acton Unknown Banker, goldsmith 
Lewis Casamajor Assignee Merchant, shipowner 
Humphrey Corseley Assignee Goldsmith 
Edward Hackett Assignee Grocer 
Lawrence Hollister Assignee Landlord, merchant, 
21 “Creagh v. Rogers,” C 104/37, NAUK; Cooke, A Voyage to the South Sea, 
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Centuries, 3 vols. (1766), 3:232. 
shipowner 
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Abraham Hooke Assignee Merchant 
Thomas Palmer Unknown Merchant 
Sources: Alfred Beaven, Bristol Lists: Municipal and Miscellaneous (1899), 125. 
William Betham, The Baronetage of England; or, the History of the English Baronets, 
and Such Baronets of Scotland, as are of English Families (1802), 2:14 
“Stokes Croft Educational Foundation and Almshouses,” BRO 30999; “Lease for 99 
years – Lawrence Hollister,” 8976/11. 
“Creagh v. Rogers,” C 104/36-37, C 104/160-161, NAUK. 
PROB 11/506/156; 11/581/129. 
David Richardson ed., Bristol, Africa, and the Eighteenth-Century Slave Trade to 
America, 3 vols. (1986-1990), 1:17. 
Occupations 
Each individual Syndicate member paid for his shares from his personal funds. 
The investors were wealthy, to be sure, but were not landed gentry, and worked for a 
living. The majority of Syndicate members’ occupations reflected Bristol’s growing 
industrial economy. Sir John Hawkins, despite his knighthood, was a brewer and 
collected rents from a number of houses he held throughout Bristol and its environs.
22
James Hollidge, Thomas Coutes, Abraham Hooke, Lawrence Hollister, and William 
22 “Will of John Hawkins of Bristol, Gloucestershire,” Prerogative Court of Canterbury, 
11/691/95. 
Name Shares Occupation 
Figure 3 Continued
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Saunders were merchants. Edward Hackett, Christopher Shuter, and Thomas Goldney 
were grocers (although Shuter is also listed as a merchant and Goldney was a shipowner 
and landlord as well). Like Goldney, John Batchelor, Francis Rogers, and most members 
were at least part-owners of merchantmen or privateers. Daniel Hickman     
earned his living as an ironmonger. John Grant earned his by refining West Indies sugar. 
Thomas Clement was a shipwright by trade and he possessed the connections and 
occupational knowledge to accurately appraise ships and naval stores. He was, however, 
a rather mediocre shipwright, and his shoddy work preparing the expedition’s frigates for 
their voyage led to problems when the ships were in the middle of the Pacific. Philip 
Freke came from an old merchant family, and many business documents do not address 
him specifically, but refer to the whole Freke family as “merchants of Bristol.” Several 
members of the Syndicate, including the latecomer Casamajor invested in ships involved 
in the slave trade. Francis Rogers owned parts of four “Guinea” ships just before,  
during, and immediately after the expedition: the Dispatch, Expectation, Colston Gally, 
William (which was captured in 1710), and Fame Sloop. Lawrence Hollister co-owned 
the Leopard Gally and Africa Gally while the expedition was at sea, and the Sacheverell 
Gally, Attempt Gally, and Grayhound Gally just after the expedition returned.
23
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Privateering 
 
War with France and Spain presented the opportunity to invest in privateering, 
and several Syndicate members did so. Like most who entered the high-risk business of 
privateering, those from Bristol took shares in multiple ships to spread the risk. 
Bristol businessmen had not heavily invested in privateering prior to the War of 
the Spanish Succession and Syndicate members reflected that. Many of them were too 
young to participate in such ventures during the Nine Years War (1688-1697). The 
exception was Thomas Coutes who invested in the 30-gun privateer Charles.
24
 
In the last half of 1702 – Britain declared war on France in May 1702 – several 
 
Bristol businessmen, including at least four future members of the Syndicate, sought 
letters of marquee in order to become licensed to engage in privateering. In 1703, 1704, 
and again in 1706, Batchelor and some non-Syndicate partners received letters of 
marque to send the 18-gun Dorothy on privateering voyages to the West Indies and 
Africa. The ship foundered just before the Syndicate’s expedition set out, taking 
Batchelor’s substantial investments with her to the bottom.25  In March 1708, Syndicate 
members John Corseley, Francis Rogers, and Richard Hawksworth joined one of the 
Freke family and another investor to obtain a license and outfit the 10-gun Hallafield 
Galley as a privateer.
26  
Except for the earlier venture by Coutes, those privateersmen 
that the newer investors funded were small, lightly armed, undermanned ships that 
cruised alone. 
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Founding members of the Syndicate planned a more ambitious operation that 
would take more time and require greater funding. Batchelor and Goldney appear to 
have taken the lead in recruiting investors in 1707 and 1708. Batchelor possessed the 
political and civic standing to attract investors and became the de facto leader of the 
Syndicate. 
Syndicate members Philip Freke, Abraham Hooke, Lewis Casamajor, Francis 
Rogers, Richard Hawksworth, John Corseley, and Lawrence Hollister invested in no less 
than six other privateersmen while the expedition was at sea. Some invested with other 
Bristol merchants while others partnered with fellow Syndicate members. Except for the 
20-gun Fame Galley, the privateersmen they financed were quite small and typically 
possessed small crews and light broadsides; even the Fame carried only 50 crewmen. 
These vessels were most likely meant for local waters, as they were clearly unsuited for 
a cruising voyage off Africa or in the Caribbean or South Sea.
27
 
 
Joint Non-Privateering Investments 
 
Three years after the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession, Thomas 
Goldney became financially involved with William Dampier. He did not invest in 
Dampier’s voyage, but the two were partners in a real estate function. He was thus 
indirectly connected to the voyage and culpable for some of the resultant material losses. 
Despite the fact that Goldney was distantly connected to Dampier, his involvement had 
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led to a lawsuit in 1704.
28  
The fact that no other Syndicate members were implicated in 
that lawsuit suggests that Goldney was the only member of the Syndicate to have even 
ancillary involvement in Dampier’s enterprise. Indeed, most of Dampier’s backers had 
been landed gentry from outside Bristol.
29
 
In addition to privateers, the Syndicate members also invested in business 
ventures on land. Owning an entire “factory” was beyond the means of most tradesmen 
and merchants, so they usually joined others to become co-owners of the business. Even 
though the investors might not have known the first thing about processing sugar or 
brewing ale, they acted as venture capitalists by financing such enterprises. Some 
Syndicate members had previously worked together. In 1704, Shuter, Francis Rogers, 
Freke, and Nathaniel Webb joined other local merchants to form a co-partnership that 
operated a “sugar house.” Bristol had invested heavily in sugar processing and her 
merchants knew there was profit in sating Britain’s sweet tooth.30  The involvement of 
 
the four merchants may have played a role in selecting Carlton Vanbrugh, a sugar 
distiller and London merchant, as an owners’ agent for the voyage. 
Goldney had also been commercially involved with other Syndicate members, 
although his interactions were more unpleasant. Goldney was distantly related to 
Hawksworth’s father, also named Richard, who had entrusted Goldney with the family 
estate while the younger Richard was still a boy. Some of the Hawksworth family’s 
creditors sued Goldney for mismanagement, who denied the charges and proved his 
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innocence. Goldney had also done business with John Romsey’s son-in-law, the 
Collector of Customs, and was investigated for malfeasance in 1707 after the latter’s 
irregular accounting led to some deeply embarrassing legal trouble. Goldney was 
convicted in this case and sent to debtor’s prison in August 1708, just weeks after 
Rogers set sail. Goldney was not released until July 1710 when he posted a £2000 bond 
with the guarantee that he could pay off all his debts in the near future. It is unknown 
exactly how he got the £2000, but Richard Hawksworth acted as a guarantor.
31
 
 
 
Charity Work 
 
In the twenty-first century, state structures assume responsibility for the vast 
majority of social services. In the eighteenth century, however, privately managed 
charitable organizations carried out nearly all those services. At least four Syndicate 
members directly involved themselves in the work of Bristol’s Corporation of the Poor, 
which straddled the boundary between municipal government and private volunteerism. 
A governor and deputy-governor ran the organization, and each city ward had an 
assistant and four guardians. 
Every May 12, the Corporation officers and Bristol’s mayor, aldermen, and 
honorary guardians held court to elect the Corporation’s senior officers for the year. 
Deputy-governors were typically chosen from among the assistants but guardians were 
eligible for any other office. Each ward’s inhabitants elected their guardians via popular 
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P.K. Stembridge, The Goldney Family: A Bristol Merchant Dynasty (1998), 15. 
62  
 
vote.
32  
Batchelor, Goldney, Hackett, and Hollidge all appear on the member list of 
founding guardians in 1696.
33  
Refusing to accept the office when appointed had 
consequences and anyone who shirked their duty was fined an amount commensurate 
with the office, which is what happened to William Saunders when he declined to 
become the group’s treasurer in 1710. Batchelor served as the organization’s governor 
from 1703 until 1704 as did Hawkins in 1706. William Saunders’ kinsman Peter was a 
benefactor in 1701 and 1706. Hackett (1699), Batchelor (1701) and Hawkins (1706) 
also contributed money to the Corporation.
34
 
The city workhouse expanded its activities to include healthcare. Most 
importantly, in 1696, the workhouse established St. Peter’s Hospital, the first hospital- 
workhouse combination to be established outside of London. Dover served as its first 
physician. Despite his eagerness to increase his social standing and rub shoulders with 
the Bristol elite, Dover did not seem to be overly concerned with gaining immense 
wealth through his career as a physician since he devoted much energy and time to 
charitable works. If he received compensation for his time at St. Peter’s, he would have 
only received ten pounds annually and even then only to pay his assistants. In his 
treatise on medicine, published towards the end of his life, Dover insisted that “every 
Physician be content with a Gain proportionate to the Condition of the Patient, and his 
own Labour.”35 
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Syndicate members were involved in non-medical charities as well. Hollidge 
served as the master of St. Stephen’s Ringers in 1707. Originally established as a bell- 
ringer’s guild in the Tudor era, the Antient Society of St. Stephen’s Ringers had, by the 
eighteenth century, lost most of its bell-ringers and became more of a social club that 
collected funds for any charitable act it found interesting.
36  
Nathaniel Webb donated 
£20 to St. Thomas’ Parish “to the poor, at Michaelmas [September 29], yearly, for 
 
ever.”37  Thomas Clement had also been president of the Gloucestershire Society (1699), 
followed by John Corseley (1706). That organization had a history stretching back to 
1658 and functioned much like a guild except devoted to charity for the entire 
surrounding county instead of Bristol’s county corporate.38 
 
Politics 
 
Many Syndicate members participated in local government. Bristol’s city charter 
provided for a mayor, 30 councilors, and twelve aldermen. These 43 individuals formed 
a Common-Council. Other offices included two sheriffs, a high steward, town clerk, 
chamberlain (basically the treasurer), and sundry minor officials. Unless otherwise 
specified, the terms of office were for one year. Several members of the Syndicate 
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served in these positions, basically donating their time because the positions paid little in 
salaries.
39
 
The Common-Council, Bristol’s main governing body, managed the day-to-day 
affairs of municipal government, implemented laws, and elected most officials every 
year. The mayor (not to be confused with the Lord Mayor) presided over all meetings of 
the Common-Council. Bristol’s officeholders expected him to attend functions related  
to the Corporation of the Poor and Society of Merchant Venturers, and encouraged him 
to attend every public ceremony and to preside over every major celebration. The 
position commanded enormous prestige. Three Syndicate members served as mayors of 
Bristol. Batchelor was mayor in 1699. After leaving that position he served as an 
alderman and maintained close friendships with other officeholders. Sir John Hawkins 
was mayor in 1701. William Saunders’ kinsman Peter Saunders had also served as 
mayor in 1703; even though William had not dabbled in politics, his family’s reputation 
enhanced his own. Five years later Hollidge was mayor when the expedition set out in 
1708. 
The Common-Council also elected councilors to fill most vacancies created by 
officials’ deaths or resignations. Given elitist nature of British politics, it was not 
uncommon for officials to keep re-electing each other indefinitely. Thirteen Syndicate 
members served as councilors at some point before the voyage: Batchelor (1690-1711), 
Clement (1705-1722), Humphrey Corseley (1678-1684, 1688-1690), Philip Freke (1702- 
1729), Grant (1688), Hawkins (1690-1723), Hollidge (1696-1710), Hollister (1684- 
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1688), Hooke (1702-1712), Francis Rogers (1700-1707), Romsey (1684-1688), Shuter 
 
(1699-1730), and Webb (1703-1709).
40
 
 
Aldermen directly coordinated charitable activities with the Corporation of the 
Poor and had some further administrative duties. With the mayor, they elected one of 
the councilors to replace any alderman who died or otherwise vacated his office. One 
alderman also functioned as the council’s recorder for as long as he held the office. 
Each alderman represented a different ward in Bristol. Three Syndicate members held 
the position: Humphrey Corseley (1688), Batchelor (1702-1711), and Hawkins (1702- 
1723). 
Romsey was elected Town Clerk following the death of the previous clerk in 
1676 and, aside from four years in debtor’s prison (1703-1707) due in part to a family 
quarrel, would serve until his own death in 1721.
41
 
The Syndicate was equally well-represented among non-elected city officials, 
many of whom held Crown-appointed offices. Five Syndicate members had been 
sheriff, tasked with assessing and collecting tax revenue throughout the city. Shuter in 
1702, Webb in 1705, Abraham Hooke in 1706, Freke in 1708, and Clement in 1709. 
Hollidge served as chamberlain in 1710, while the expedition was away.
42
 
 
The Crown appointed a Lord Lieutenant to serve as his personal representative in 
a shire and the lord lieutenant could, in turn appoint one or more deputies. The deputy- 
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lieutenant was a non-political and unpaid, honorific position whose holder represented 
the Crown-appointed Lord Lieutenant at ceremonial functions.
43  
Humphrey Corseley 
was deputy-lieutenant of Bristol in 1694. John Romsey’s son-in-law, John Sansom, Jr., 
served as the Crown-appointed Collector of Customs in Bristol from 1700. Despite 
multiple scandals (including the one that implicated Goldney), Sansom remained in 
office over a decade later.
44
 
 
Merchant Venturers 
 
Several Syndicate members were not government officials but donated to and 
participated in administering non-profit organizations. Such activity was a stepping 
stone to a higher social position. Whilst holding political office, several Syndicate 
members joined the Corporation of the Poor or the Merchant Venturers; Hawkins, 
Webb, Hooke, Hawkins, and Shuter did not become benefactors or officers in the 
Corporation of the Poor until years after they had left public office. Freke also did not 
become Master of the Society of Merchant Venturers until after serving as sheriff of 
Bristol. Furthermore, most of the Syndicate members engaged in charitable works 
concurrently with their service in the Common-Council. 
The Society of Merchant Venturers was a, if not the preeminent social and 
commercial organization in Bristol. Established by royal charter in 1552, the Merchant 
Venturers originally functioned as a guild and demanded that all Bristol merchants were 
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either Merchant Venturers or had completed a seven-year apprenticeship to a member of 
the organization. It ran a school for the children of mariners as early as 1595.
45 
Beginning in 1694, the Society fought a long political battle against the Royal African 
Company and successfully ended the Company’s monopoly in England’s slave trade in 
1698.
46  
The Society would also manage Bristol’s docks until 1848. The organization 
still functions as a club for Bristolian businessmen and industrialists who have made 
significant contributions to Bristol’s economy. Today it manages several schools, 
provides scholarships, and performs community services throughout the Bristol area. 
By 1708, the Society had begun granting memberships to individuals who – 
while not necessarily merchants – contributed to a variety of local charities and public 
works projects. That same year, a merchant named Edward Colston designated the 
Society to oversee the operations of his namesake Colston’s Hospital Foundation that 
accommodated and educated 100 impoverished boys beginning in 1710.
47  
This was the 
first trust the organization was asked to manage, but its portfolio steadily expanded 
during the eighteenth century.
48
 
Although the Society was a membership by invitation group, those invitations 
could be obtained by donating to the group. John Hawkins donated £30 in order to gain 
entry. Individuals who completed a seven-year apprenticeship under a Society member 
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could basically purchase membership for a nominal fee. Even though it was rare, it was 
also possible to be inducted gratis if the candidate had sufficient support of the 
organization’s more influential members. 
Merchant Venturer officers were elected annually. Those officers included two 
wardens and a “master.” The latter presided over meetings and was responsible for 
seeing that the wardens fulfilled their assigned duties.
49  
Both master and wardens were 
supposed to “supporte the Affaires thereof And to oversee rule and governe the saide 
Misterie [mastery, or senior members and officials] and Comynaltie [commonalty, 
which was everyone else].”50 In short, they were tasked with enforcing Society 
regulations and etiquette among all the members and apprentices at meetings. Hollidge 
served as master in 1700 and 1701. Batchelor followed in 1706 and 1707. 
The charter stipulated that there should be no more than two wardens every year. 
Any warden was also expected to assume the master’s duties if the latter died in office. 
Hollidge was the first Syndicate member to be elected warden in 1695. Several others 
followed him: Batchelor (1698), Hooke (1702-1703), Freke (1704), and Francis Rogers 
(1705). 
The Merchant Venturers had some minor offices as well. They had a treasurer 
tasked with keeping track of dues, debts, and finances in general. William Saunders’ 
kinsman Peter served as treasurer from 1700 to 1704. A clerk recorded all Society acts 
and regulations, and was required to make full reports on all the organization’s activities. 
A beadle sent out summons for meetings, kept track of absent or tardy members, 
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maintained order, and collected fees which he then sent to the treasurer. Finally, the 
Society’s administration had an office of twelve assistants to do whatever the master, 
wardens, and treasurer asked of them. There are no records of Syndicate members or 
their relatives holding those other positions. Elections were held every November 10, 
which was the anniversary of the Society’s charter. Once chosen, the officers took an 
oath before Bristol’s mayor and aldermen.51 
Judging from the dates in office, either in politics or within charitable and 
occupational organizations, it appears that some of the Syndicate members had been 
philanthropists before engaging in politics. Batchelor served as a warden in the 
Merchant Venturers the year before he was elected mayor, and he kept up his charitable 
donations (£50 to the Corporation in 1701) while in office.
52  
When his term as mayor 
ended, he became the Corporation of the Poor’s governor. Hollidge, Webb, and Freke 
followed a similar pattern by engaging in charitable acts either before or simultaneously 
with their political careers. 
 
 
Religion 
 
If charity marked a common characteristic for members, religion did not. The 
majority of investors were members of the Church of England, but anyone with capital 
to invest was accepted. Lewis Casamajor was a Huguenot. Abraham Hooke was an 
English Dissenter involved with the Lewin’s Mead Society of Protestant Dissenters.53 
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Three of the Syndicate members: Goldney, Hackett, and Francis Rogers, appear in the 
Society’s minutes. Goldney and Hackett held positions of authority. Goldney 
distributed charitable funds while Hackett served as the church’s publisher and 
announced marriages that occurred within the Society.
54
 
While Hollister is not listed in the minutes of the Society of Friends, his 
 
ancestors are described as Quakers and his relatives appear on the lists. The Quaker 
connection might seem unusual, but not in Bristol which boasted the highest number of 
Quakers per capita in England. Due to higher accountability within the Society of 
Friends, Quakers traded with each other within an internal network. Since there were 
Quaker merchants in Portugal, the West Indies, and British North America, their 
network prospered and that prosperity in itself bred resentment among non-Quakers.
55 
Despite official documents prohibiting religious oppression, there was an inescapable de 
facto attitude that discriminated against Quakers. 
There were few ways for Quakers to advance in civic life outside the Society of 
Friends. The Corporation of the Poor at least accepted Quaker members, but the Society 
of Merchant Venturers did not allow Quakers to join until 1720 unless the Society could 
find a loophole through personal connections.
56
 
Even offering city office to Quakers may have had an ulterior motive; Quakers 
 
refused, on religious grounds, to take any oath including those required to assume office. 
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Anyone who refused, for any reason, to take the oath of office could be fined. Romsey 
had used his office to generate revenue in that manner when Bristol’s treasury was 
draining. He realized that Quaker norms prohibited them from taking oaths. Goldney’s 
father, also named Thomas, was fined £200 for refusing to take the oath to join the 
Common-Council in 1685.
57  
Since that legalized extortion was Romsey’s idea, it is 
remarkable that he and Goldney set aside their history and collaborated in a mutually 
beneficial arrangement. 
 
 
Londoners 
 
The Syndicate did not limit its membership to residents of Bristol and welcomed 
investors from other areas. Two Londoners, Edward Acton and Thomas Palmer, became 
involved after the voyage set out. Edward Acton had been born to the second son of the 
Baronet Acton, of Aldenham in Shropshire. Due to the laws of primogeniture, Edward’s 
father was not entitled to any of the baronial estate. Thus his father became a mercer, an 
occupation (a mercer bought and sold fabrics) that provided the Actons access to the 
merchant community. Like many of the Bristolians, Acton’s father held minor 
administrative positions except in London instead of Bristol. Throughout his active life, 
he served as common councilman in Cheap Ward, was a governor of Bridewell and 
Bethlehem hospitals, Commissioner of the Lieutenancy for London, and steward of 
Bridewell. Edward himself became a goldsmith and banker on Birchin Lane. Edward’s 
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younger brother John, who functioned as the Duke of Manchester’s deputy collector, 
also worked at London’s customs house.58 
The Actons also had familial connections to the East India Company, and those 
relations greatly aided the Syndicate near the end of the voyage. Edward Acton relied on 
his family ties to feed inside information to the Syndicate from the time the expedition 
called at Cape Town until it returned to England. His brother Richard was an 
administrator in the East India Company (he later became a factor in Bombay). He also 
had an uncle named Roger Carter who worked for the EIC as captain of the Indiaman 
Dartmouth.
59  
Acton went further during the expedition’s final journey home to even 
provide updates on events as they occurred to Francis Rogers. Although Acton did not 
specify the day, he dated one of his letters “past 7 a Clock” and wrote that he was 
currently at East India House “under pretense of business” and eavesdropped on an EIC 
committee meeting. Given the personnel involved, Acton suspected the EIC officials 
were talking about the expedition and of legal actions to be taken against the Syndicate. 
Even as the meeting progressed, Acton took notes and promised the Syndicate that he 
would make further inquiries.
60
 
 
Like the Bristolians, Acton possessed wealth but no noble title. Acton’s 
characteristics: wealthy but not titled; working in industry or trade; and participation in 
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local politics and charities (or at least connected with those who were involved) closely 
resembled most Syndicate members’ civic lives. 
Thomas Palmer, like many other Syndicate members, was part of an occupational 
or industrial organization. In his case, the Company of Merchant Taylors, a London 
organization chartered in 1327, that possessed prestige similar to that of the Merchant 
Venturers.
61  
The Merchant Taylors were one of the “Great Twelve” livery companies,
and all Lord Mayors of London had to be chosen from one of those organizations. By 
1708, none of its members worked as a tailor and it had become a mercantile, social, and 
charitable organization. 
The two Londoners lent significant support to the project. Acton provided vital 
information to the Syndicate from the EIC while Palmer used his business connections to 
London and Amsterdam merchants in order assist the Syndicate when the expedition 
returned. The remaining backers, however, hailed from Bristol and participated in 
Bristol’s institutions. 
John Batchelor 
Four of the Syndicate members in particular deserve some further description due 
to the roles they played in funding or organizing the expedition: John Batchelor, Thomas 
Goldney, Thomas Dover, and Stephen Courtney. All four of them reflect the  
Syndicate’s commercial nature. Batchelor owned only sixteen shares in the Syndicate, 
yet he was the glue that held the enterprise together. In addition to serving as its leader, 
61 “Will of Thomas Palmer, Merchant Tailor of London,” PROB 11/761/370, NAUK. 
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Batchelor drew upon a network of business acquaintances when conducting Syndicate 
business. Other Syndicate members – ship-owners, merchants, and community leaders – 
were acquainted with a variety of groups, but Batchelor was involved in every network. 
Those who engaged in charity, the Society of Merchant Venturers, commerce, and local 
politics all would have rubbed shoulders with Batchelor. In addition, he had contacts in 
London through which he recruited Edward Cooke as an expedition officer and may 
have recruited the two London additions to the Syndicate. 
Thomas Goldney 
With 36 shares, Thomas Goldney was the largest investor in the Syndicate. 
Despite the seemingly humble occupation of grocer, Goldney had accumulated property 
and assets that made him a moderately wealthy landowner. He owned a valuable 
country home in Wiltshire, just outside Bristol’s city limits and collected rents from 
several houses in Gloucestershire.
62  
He was also a member of the Quaker community
which included several other wealthy businessmen. Illustrating how capricious 
mercantilist wealth could be, Goldney’s fortunes continually rose and fell, eventually 
landing him in debtor’s prison. Since he invested the most in the enterprise he benefited 
the most upon its return. 
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Thomas Dover 
Though successful in commerce and politics, most Syndicate members did not 
have experience at sea. The exceptions were Dover and Courtney, both of whom had 
gone on overseas trading voyages before joining the Syndicate. Dover’s primary 
occupation was practicing medicine, but he had made several voyages to the West Indies 
between 1702 and 1708 and included “captain” in his signature on some of his 
correspondence. His insistence on being appointed to a position of command rather than 
a surgeon suggests he might have led men at sea before.
63
 
 
Dover first became involved with the Syndicate through his medical practice, but 
soon became a major investor in the voyage, and was one of two investors who 
embarked on the expedition. Born into a Cotswold farming family, Dover studied 
medicine at Oxford and then at Cambridge, where he received his medical degree. 
When his father died in 1696, Dover moved to Bristol where he had no shortage of 
patients. Through his practice and his residence in the Queen’s Square neighborhood, 
the most fashionable part of the city, Dover socialized with city leaders and members of 
the merchant community.
64
 
Dover’s patients included members of Bristol’s merchant community. In his 
 
medical treatise The Ancient Physician’s Legacy to his Country, he recalled treating a 
Thomas Hackett for typhus. At the time of his treatment, Hackett was an apprentice 
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grocer, but by the time he died in 1752 he had become a bona fide merchant. This 
Thomas was also related to the grocer Edward Hackett, who joined the Syndicate after 
the expedition put out to sea.
65  
Finding a niche in the merchant community was 
important if one wished to advance up the social ladder regardless of profession or 
occupation. 
Furthermore, Dover considered travel essential to a physician’s experience as it 
presented opportunities to treat ailments and injuries that he would rarely encounter in 
Britain, and in variable conditions that would force him to improvise using limited 
resources. “Such as pursued their Studies at Home,” Dover stated, “could not (allowing 
they have had the Advantages of an Academical Education) improve themselves equally 
with those that spend many Years Abroad . . . .”66 
He proved to be an able surgeon on the cruising voyage, especially considering 
the finite medical supplies and cramped, poorly ventilated working conditions, but 
proved a mediocre leader; from Rogers’ and Cooke’s descriptions, Dover was a distinctly 
uninspiring figure prone to generating a passive aura of discontent. He never               
got along with Rogers and indirectly created a rift between his officers and those of other 
ships.
67
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Stephen Courtney 
 
Courtney was the other Syndicate member with experience at sea. There is no 
evidence that he had commanded a ship prior to joining the Syndicate, but he is almost 
invariably described as a mariner. Whatever his experience as a mariner, it was enough 
to secure him command of the Dutchess. Neither Dover nor Courtney possessed 
firsthand knowledge of the Pacific, however, and so the Syndicate would need to rely on 
William Dampier, a disgraced mariner who had just returned from a cruise in the Eastern 
Pacific that most observers judged to be a fiasco. 
 
 
Principal Shareholders 
The enterprise that the Syndicate planned would be expensive. A 1711 financial 
account lists expenses in fitting out ships, purchasing supplies and weapons, and 
obtaining requisite legal documents as totaling £26,496. The Syndicate raised that sum 
by selling 256 shares with the price of each share at 103 pounds, ten shillings. This was 
during an age when five pounds was enough to warrant mentioning in a will, and when 
most Britons rarely possessed a single guinea coin.
68
 
 
The Syndicate members are listed in descending order of the number of shares 
owned. The principal investors were Goldney (36), Dover (30), Shuter (30), followed by 
Freke (20), Grant (20), and Francis Rogers (20). The intermediate contributors consisted 
of Batchelor (16), Romsey (15), John Corseley (10), Duckinfield (10), Hawkins (10), 
and Hollidge (10). The minor shareholders were Hickman (5), Hollister (5), and 
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Clements (4). Hickman died while the expedition was away, leaving Hooke, Freke, 
Casamajor, and Humphrey Corseley to manage his investment on behalf of his estate. 
Except for Hollister, the five Bristol investors who joined the Syndicate while the ships 
were away either inherited their shares or purchased shares from original owners. 
There are fifteen shares unaccounted for, although that may be explained by the 
fact that Coutes, Webb, Saunders, and Courtney are not shown possessing shares, and 
neither are the London backers. The first three had likely either sold or consolidated 
their shares with those owned by other members’. As for Courtney, he was still at sea 
when the list of investors was drawn up and distributed so he is not included in the 1711 
owners’ orders. Part of his payment came from the shares he earned as an expedition 
officer, and he is described as contributing “considerably to the expence of the voyage, 
and took a share in it, that he might see how it was managed, and be able either to 
prevent miscarriages, or, at least, to make a faithful report of them.”69 
 
By spring of 1708, the Syndicate was organized and had raised sufficient capital 
to pay the legal and administrative fees. Then it could start on the construction and 
outfitting of ships, and recruiting the officers needed to make the expedition a reality and 
not just a concept on paper. 
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CHAPTER IV 
OUTSET AND RECRUITING 
 
 
By the start of 1708, the Syndicate had secured enough funds to begin 
assembling the vessels, men, supplies, and legal documents needed to carry out its plans. 
 
 
OBTAINING AND PREPARING SHIPS FOR SEA 
 
The first priority was purchasing or constructing ships, fitting them out with 
masts, rigging, and ordnance, and stocking them with naval stores and provisions  
ranging from salt pork to cider. The Syndicate’s procurement of two ships, the Duke and 
Dutchess, went smoothly. The Duke was a new ship while the Dutchess was probably 
second-hand but in good condition. The Duke’s hull alone cost £1310, and the  
Syndicate saved money on the hull by contracting with its own Thomas Clement who 
was a shipwright. The smaller Dutchess’ hull ran the Syndicate a correspondingly 
cheaper £850.
1  
The hulls purchased, the Syndicate needed to reach into its commercial 
networks to fit out the ships. 
Both hulls were double-sheathed with copper to ward off barnacles and 
shipworm. This was expensive but significantly increased the ships’ durability. Indeed, 
both ships survived the voyage and returned to England with their hulls in reduced but 
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functional condition.
2  
In 1703, Dampier’s ships, St. George and Cinque Ports, did not 
have as effective protection below the waterline and both became so worm-eaten that 
Dampier had to abandon them. He would have been remiss if he did not advise the 
Syndicate to invest in sheathing. 
The Syndicate expedition’s rigging, armament, and supplies cost still more, as 
did its pinnaces and other boats. It cost £8198 to complete and fit out the Duke; £4990, 
12s for the Dutchess. All bills were accounted for, even for unspecified items as 
inexpensive as four shillings and sixpence. Financial records include the names of all 
creditors and vendors including those of Syndicate investors and expedition officers who 
provided items themselves or did so through relatives. Following the expense report in 
the Syndicate’s account book, there are individual payment sheets for every Syndicate 
member listing items he supplied and who was responsible for making payment.
3  
After 
 
paying these expenses, there remained an initial £12,000 reserve for both the Syndicate 
and expedition officers to draw from for running costs and extra supplies. Any 
additional expenses were carefully catalogued and that created some controversy later, 
when the expedition’s officers spent more money refitting in Cork than the Syndicate 
was comfortable with.
4
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Rogers, Cooke, and the Syndicate described both ships as “frigates,” a term used 
at the time to describe a variety of ships which had a poop deck and forecastle above and 
separate from a gun deck that ran from stem to stern.
5 
Both the Duke and Dutchess were 
three-masted, square-rigged ships with a dedicated gun deck, although the exact number 
of decks was never specified.
6
 
The expedition’s two frigates each carried several boats that could be used for a 
variety of essential tasks. Since the frigates were too large to risk sailing or anchoring 
close to shore, they used boats to keep them supplied with wood and fresh water, to 
conduct trade with locals, and to ascend rivers, as when they raided Guayaquil later.
7
 
Both ships were significantly more powerful than the Bristol Channel vessels that 
most Syndicate members customarily funded. These ships were not converted 
merchantmen, but warships dedicated to seeking out and bringing down prey. The 
heavier weight in guns came with higher costs. The Duke packed a 30-gun, 180-pound 
broadside while the lighter Dutchess boasted 26 guns. Even the smaller consort 
outmatched Dampier’s previous flagship, St. George, in terms of sheer firepower; the St. 
George’s 22 guns were five-pounders while the Syndicate’s ships both carried six- 
pounders.
8
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Officer Recruitment 
While work proceeded on the Duke and Dutchess, the Syndicate sought and 
engaged senior officers to oversee preparations for the voyage, assist in recruiting 
seamen, and ultimately to lead the expedition at sea. Competent ship captains were 
necessary for enforcing discipline and ensuring that crewmen stayed on task. Syndicate 
members offered potential captains attractive financial incentives that included high 
wages and shares in the profits of that voyage.
9
 
 
William Dampier’s previous voyages to the Pacific had contributed to the 
Syndicate’s decision to select that region as the focus of its enterprise. Edward Cooke 
claimed that Dampier came up with the idea for a Pacific voyage. “. . . . Captain 
Dampier never gave over the project,” wrote Cooke, “‘till he had prevail’d with some 
able persons at Bristol to venture upon an undertaking, which might turn to a prodigious 
advantage.”10  Notwithstanding Cooke’s effusive praise of Dampier, the latter probably 
depended on those “able persons” to have already organized a South Sea voyage of their 
own design. 
There is little evidence aside from Cooke’s statement to suggest Dampier was the 
mastermind. It is more likely that the Syndicate members consulted journals from South 
Sea buccaneers and used Dampier’s old publications as yet more evidence that the 
Pacific was a suitable destination. It is also plausible that Cooke added the section 
praising Dampier after the voyage ended. The compliments may have served as a means 
 
9 
David Starkey, “Incentivisation of British Privateering Crews” in Naval Leadership 
and Management, 1650-1950, ed. Helen Doe and Richard Harding (2012), 135 
10 
Edward Cooke, A Voyage to the South Sea and Round the World in the Years 1708 to 
1711 (1712), 1:Introduction. 
83  
 
of attracting readership to Dampier’s own account of the voyage if he chose to write one, 
and that Dampier would have heaped as much praise upon Cooke in return and 
encouraged readers to buy Cooke’s account. It was not uncommon for authors of the 
period to mutually support one another in this manner. That never fully materialized 
between Cooke and Dampier, however, as the latter died before he could publish 
anything after the expedition returned. 
Born into a tenant-farmer’s family in Somersetshire in 1651, Dampier had 
escaped a life of grinding poverty when apprenticed to a Weymouth master mariner in 
1669. Following a single voyage to Newfoundland, Dampier ended his apprenticeship 
and joined the East Indiaman John and Martha for a voyage around the Cape of Good 
Hope to Batavia and back. He next enlisted in the Royal Navy, was assigned to the 
Royal Prince as an able seaman and saw combat in the Third Anglo-Dutch War (1672- 
74) before illness led to his being invalided out of the service.
11
 
 
Once recovered, and still in his twenties, Dampier served briefly as a clerk at a 
Jamaica plantation owned by his father’s landlord. He did not get on well with the 
landlord’s representative, left the plantation, and moved to Mexico where he fell in with 
logwood cutters and smugglers around the Bay of Campeche. Much of their activity 
involved stealing caches of logwood, mostly mahogany, that the Spanish had previously 
harvested. During this time Dampier became acquainted with buccaneers who had taken 
up logwood cutting so they would not starve, and who shared a resentment towards 
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Spain whose colonial officials periodically attacked their logwood camps, confiscated 
the logwood awaiting transport, and drove off the men who had illegally harvested the 
timber. Damper retuned to England in 1678, married a woman (only recorded as 
“Judith”) from the Duchess of Grafton’s household, and settled on a modest Dorset 
estate.
12
 
Dampier soon grew bored with country life so a year later set out on a Jamaica- 
bound merchantman in 1679. He originally intended it to be a single voyage in which he 
would sell tools and sundry supplies to the logwood cutters, but he soon fell in with 
buccaneers and embarked on a buccaneering career with John Coxon, Bartholomew 
Sharp, Charles Swan, and others that resulted in his first circumnavigation of the world 
between 1683 and 1691. Returning to England, Dampier published A New Voyage 
Round the World (1697). The book caught the public’s imagination and led to his  
receipt of a commission in the Royal Navy and command of the frigate Roebuck with 
orders to explore the east coast of Australia.
13
 
 
Dampier’s leadership of that voyage should have served as a warning of what not 
 
to do in the South Sea. The 1699-1701 expedition met with nigh unmitigated disaster. 
The Roebuck wrecked off Ascension Island in 1701 and her crew waited for several 
months before a passing Indiaman rescued the survivors. Upon his return to England, 
the scientific community and readers of his Voyage to New Holland (1703) appreciated 
Dampier’s collection of flora samples and descriptions of places visited. This did not 
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stop the Admiralty from charging him with a variety of offences, convicting him of one 
(mistreatment of an officer), and barring him from further service in the navy.
14
 
Dampier was nevertheless able, in 1703, to obtain command of the privateersman 
St. George, with which he preyed on Spanish ships in the Pacific. During the voyage, 
Dampier again acted in a manner that should have warned against employing him in a 
position of authority. He lost his ship, his letter of marque, and his freedom when the 
Dutch captured and imprisoned him in the East Indies. When released, he and the 
remaining crewmen had to repeat what many South Sea buccaneers had done before and 
earned his passage home onboard a Dutch fluyt. By the time he reached England in June 
1707, Dampier had lost or driven away all but 27 of his original crew of 185. 
One of Dampier’s resentful officers who had deserted, William Funnell, obtained 
his release from a Dutch East Indies jail, signed onboard a Dutch merchantman, and got 
back to Britain a year before his former commander.
15  
In his account of the voyage, 
Funnell depicted Dampier as an ineffective leader. Funnell did not describe Dampier as 
cruel or vindictive, but stated he was far too passive and inconsistent. Several times in 
his journal, Funnell described the constant disagreements that gradually turned into 
acrimony and resulted in the expedition’s dispersal. When he returned to England and 
read Funnell’s account, Dampier quickly countered by publishing his own rambling 
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account of events in an attempt to restore his reputation (mostly by attacking his sailors’ 
integrity).
16
 
The first five Syndicate members started buying cannon in February 1707 and 
provided the financial and administrative foundation for their cruising voyage in 
March.
17  
They were already drawing up plans for two ships then and Dampier did not 
return until June (and his Vindication was not published until later that year), so it is 
highly unlikely that he directly inspired them at all, much less convinced them to venture 
into the South Sea. The first mentions of the Pacific in Syndicate sources are in January 
1708. Other British mariners, however, were already encouraging voyages into the 
Pacific throughout 1707; Dampier said as much and he contributed by providing the 
latest intelligence of the region. As the list of Syndicate members grew, Dampier 
probably realized that he could offer his services to them. Indeed, in late 1707, he ended 
his rebuttal of Funnell’s account by stating that he was “ready to Satisfy any Committee 
of Merchen” who wished to learn more about the Pacific.18 
He was in dire need of employment, too. By January 1708, Dampier had little to 
 
show for the previous three and a half years of privateering aside from looming debt. In 
his 1766 history of South Seas exploration, the historian Charles de Brosses suggested 
Dampier “might still have an opportunity of retrieving his circumstances, or, at least, of 
 
 
 
16 
William Dampier, Captain Dampier’s Vindication of his Voyage to the South-Seas, in 
the Ship St. George (1707), 1. 
17 
Loose leaf letter from Syndicate to Mr. Welch, dated February 21, 1707. “Creagh vs. 
Rogers,” C 104/36; Bundle No. 76, Alexander White’s obligation to sail. “Creagh vs. 
Rogers,” C 104/161 Pt. 1. 
18 
Dampier, Vindication, 8. 
87  
 
acquiring a tolerable subsistence. It was with this view that he addressed himself to the 
merchants of Bristol . . . .”19 
Perhaps members of the Syndicate also thought that making Dampier pilot under 
the command of a superior officer would allow their expedition to draw on his 
knowledge of the South Sea, but deny him the power to repeat his past actions. If so, 
they miscalculated. Despite the opportunity to learn from Dampier’s errors and 
experiences, commanders of the Syndicate expedition repeated several of them during its 
voyage. By mistreating some indigenous peoples, the Syndicate privateers almost made 
themselves pariahs in the local communities. In addition, bickering among the 
expedition officers, caused in part by Dampier, led to delays that cost the flotilla the 
element of surprise in a crucial action. 
Whatever its reasoning, the Bristol Syndicate decided on January 24, 1708 to 
offer Dampier the position of pilot (or sailing master) and some unique payment options 
including one-sixteenth of the owners’ shares from any net profits.20  Dampier only 
knew one member of the Syndicate personally (Thomas Goldney) and had no business 
connections to the rest of the group. Dampier’s appointment was a positive factor in the 
short term as it may have attracted up to an additional fourteen new investors to the 
enterprise. Despite his poor performance, Dampier was the only living Englishman to 
have completed two circumnavigations of the globe. 
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It was probably fortunate for Dampier that the Syndicate expedition departed in 
1708, because in that same year, another publication echoed Funnell’s attacks on 
Dampier’s character. Written by midshipman John Welbe, an eight-page diatribe 
countered Dampier’s defense and accused him of “ungenerous, false, and barbarous 
Usage to his Ship’s Crew.”21  Sold for one penny a copy, the low price guaranteed 
Welbe’s account circulated throughout the maritime communities. 
With Dampier signed on to serve as a pilot, the Syndicate needed to recruit a 
strong leader to both command the expedition and to control Dampier. That leader 
needed also to be an experienced mariner with enough business acumen and social 
standing to be acceptable to the merchant backers. Syndicate leaders thought Woodes 
Rogers met these criteria and, in April 1708, offered him overall command of the 
expedition. 
Woodes Rogers came from a prominent merchant family. The Rogers family 
was originally from Poole, a minor Channel port in Dorset. The elder Woodes Rogers 
(his father) had some local influence, becoming a Freeman of the Borough of Poole and 
voting in at least one election. The Poll Tax lists of 1690 classified him as a “mariner,” 
implying somebody who earned his living from the sea in a command capacity.
22 
Reflecting the increasingly extensive trade networks, Rogers achieved success shipping 
Atlantic cod from Newfoundland to Europe. His trading networks also extended to the 
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Red Sea and West Africa.
23  
As Atlantic trade increased with shipping, the Rogers 
family moved to Bristol, where the elder Woodes took advantage of the networks he 
developed through years of commerce. 
In 1697, the younger Woodes was apprenticed to John Yeamans, a member of an 
old and well-connected Bristol family.
24  
Beginning as grocers in the fifteenth century, 
the Yeamans had become pillars of the community a century later. William Yeamans 
first appears in extant records as master of the Society of Merchant Venturers in 1657. 
His son, Robert Yeamans, held the position in 1662. Knighted by 1669, Sir Robert 
Yeamans served as mayor of Bristol in 1669. Ever since King William III created 
Bristol’s Court of Conscience in 1689, a Yeamans had always served as the court’s 
registrar and Robert held that position as the Syndicate made its preparations.
25  
By 
1707, he was also the Royal African Company’s agent at Bristol, which was the same 
organization that the Society of Merchant Venturers had litigated against just several 
years before over control of the slave trade.
26  
During the turn-of-the-century wars, the 
Yeamans co-owned two privateers with John Batchelor: the Anna (1692) and Don 
Carlos (1703). Thus the Yeamans and Rogers families possessed shared acquaintances 
that included members of the Syndicate.
27
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Rogers’ apprenticeship with Yeamans provided him entry into the commercial 
world. A typical apprenticeship lasted seven years. At eighteen, Rogers was already 
several years older than most starting apprentices, but it is likely that he had already 
learned some of the trade from traveling with his father. 
As the Rogers family fortune increased, the senior Rogers purchased property in 
Queen’s Square, the same neighborhood that John Batchelor, Thomas Dover, Sir John 
Hawkins, and Christopher Shuter also called home. The Whetstone family lived two 
doors down from the Rogers. Sir William Whetstone, then a captain in the Royal Navy, 
and his first wife Sarah had two sons and two daughters. The eldest daughter (also 
named Sarah) and Woodes married in January 1705, a year to the month after her father 
was promoted to admiral. Soon after, Whetstone’s influence allowed Rogers into 
“liberty of the city,” including the right to vote in local elections.28 
 
The Rogers needed Whetstone as a patron because young Woodes lacked 
leadership experience. Furthermore, Whetstone’s service in the navy directly advanced 
the Rogers’ interests, particularly since Whetstone previously commanded a ship-of-the- 
line that escorted Poole fishermen who plied the Grand Banks for Atlantic cod.
29  
The 
elder Rogers, however, did not enjoy his family’s elevated status for long. During a 
winter voyage in 1705-06, he died at sea. The estate passed to the younger Woodes, 
who at 25 years old was the eldest of three children.
30
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Rogers invested part of his inheritance in business ventures ashore. In 1706, he 
entered into a partnership in one of Bristol’s pottery works, which brought him to the 
attention of other individuals, including Dampier, who sought to attract venture capital.
31
 
Like many from the Syndicate, Rogers had previously invested in privateering 
and was undeterred by losses suffered during the War of Spanish Succession. In 1707, 
Rogers became co-owner of a letter of marque with two Bristol merchants and Lewis 
Casamajor, a Syndicate member. After arming the 130-ton Whetstone Galley and 
loading her with £1000 worth of trade goods, they sent her to West Africa to trade for 
slaves, ship that “human cargo” to Jamaica, and return to England with sugar; the 
notorious Atlantic “triangle trade.” Unfortunately for the owners, the Whetstone Galley 
never reached Africa but was instead captured by French privateers.
32
 
 
Just weeks after commissioning the Whetstone Galley, Rogers obtained a letter of 
marque for the Eugene Prize that he co-owned with another merchant from the 
Whetstone Galley debacle. She was a small vessel with eight guns and a crew of twenty, 
and was tasked with patrolling local waters. With her tiny broadside, a paltry six-barrel 
gunpowder supply, and just one cutlass and musket for her crew to share, she did not 
present an imposing threat to any enemy shipping. Rogers and his partner did not gain 
financially from their investment, but the Eugene Prize may have frightened off enemy 
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privateers that lurked off Bristol and thereby enhanced their standing among local 
merchants.
33
 
Rogers’ apprenticeship to John Yeamans, marital connections, and investment in 
the pottery works and privateers provided him with contacts who could mobilize the 
supplies, finances, and political capital needed to get an expedition funded and under 
way. 
In addition to his contacts, Rogers had enough experience at sea to command a 
cruising voyage. The Syndicate made him captain of the Duke and ostensible 
commander-in-chief of the cruising voyage. With Rogers in place, the Syndicate 
appointed one of its own members, Thomas Dover, “second captain,” i.e., second in 
command. In addition to what he received in that position, Dover was promised an 
additional £423 per year to act as the expedition’s chief medical officer.34 
 
Command of the smaller Dutchess went to Stephen Courtney, one of only two 
Syndicate members – the other being Thomas Dover – to sail with the expedition. Little 
is known of Courtney’s career except that he was a mariner. For his second in 
command, the Syndicate recruited Edward Cooke. 
An experienced but unlucky privateer, Cooke had been captured twice during the 
war, resulting in financial losses that he hoped to recoup by joining this new enterprise.
35 
As Cooke described it, he had first commanded the twenty-gun galley Mead when four 
Dunkirk privateers set upon her within less than a mile from Beachy Head. He was 
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wounded and lost both his ship and his freedom. The French released him after several 
months and he promptly returned to London, where his previous backers generously 
gave him command of a new Bristol galley. While cruising in the Mediterranean, two 
larger French warships cornered Cooke off Oran. Again, he lost his ship and cargo. The 
French captain who accepted Cooke’s surrender allowed him to keep his personal items 
and privateer’s commission, but that was small comfort to someone who had met with 
two great misfortunes in such a short time.
36
 
These setbacks in European waters made the South Sea attractive to Cooke. 
Though presented with additional opportunities to command privateers in European 
waters, he elected to go to the Pacific saying, “considering the great hazards I must run, 
if concern’d again, the sea swarming with privateers . . . being acquainted with 
Alderman Batchelor, and several other gentlemen that were the owners of the Duke and 
Dutchess, I promis’d to go in one of those ships, and proceeded accordingly.”37 
 
 
Letter of Marque 
 
Recruiting the captains was an essential step because a letter of marque, i.e., 
documents authorizing privateering, had to include the names of the vessel, its owners, 
and its commander. Such a license to attack enemy ships was required before sailors 
could be recruited. With the ships and their commanding officers arranged, the 
Syndicate applied for and received letters of marque for the Duke and Dutchess signed 
by Prince George of Denmark, Queen Anne’s consort and Lord High Admiral of 
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England. On April 28, he signed a commission for each ship, specifying that Rogers 
would command the Duke and Courtney the Dutchess. The privateers were 
commissioned “to cruise on the coasts of Peru and Mexico, in the South Seas, against 
her Majesty’s enemies the French and Spaniards, and to act jointly, as belonging to the 
same owners, merchants in Bristol.” This wording was designed to assure the Dutch and 
British East India Companies that the expedition would not violate the companies’ 
monopolies on commerce in the Western Pacific and Indian Oceans.
38
 
 
With the commissions signed, the Syndicate set to recruiting the other officers 
and men to crew its ships. 
 
 
OFFICERS 
 
Lower-ranked officers (the equivalent of wardroom officers and warrant officers) 
were recruited from the Syndicate’s social circle. Each ship needed an agent to represent 
the Syndicate’s collective interest in the expedition while at sea. The agents recorded all 
expenses incurred and trade conducted during the voyage and cataloged any valuables 
captured by the privateers.
39
 
Carlton Vanbrugh represented the Syndicate onboard the Duke. The Bristol 
 
grocer William Bath served as his counterpart onboard the Dutchess. Syndicate 
members had done business with each man in the past and trusted them. Carlton 
Vanbrugh appears to be an odd choice, having been at least partially responsible for 
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Syndicate member Thomas Goldney’s incarceration in debtor’s prison, and Vanbrugh 
himself going bankrupt shortly before sailing with the expedition.
40
 
Some of the other officers had previous experience with the Syndicate. 
Alexander White, the Dutchess’ pilot and linguist, had a long association with Syndicate 
members. When the Syndicate first began discussing a potential cruising voyage in 
1707, White was tentatively chosen to serve as a ship’s captain because he had lived in 
La Plata (present day Buenos Aires) for several years and was not only fluent in Spanish, 
but in several indigenous South American languages as well. John Vigors of the Duke, 
whose title was “Dover’s ensign ashore,” was probably related to the Vigors who co- 
owned the privateer Robert and Francis with John Corseley and Francis Rogers in 1703. 
The Duke’s purser and steward John Finch was a London-based oil wholesaler while 
ashore, making his position one of the few that most Syndicate appointees were qualified 
for.
41
 
 
Even the lieutenants, who were supposed to command gun crews and maintain 
discipline onboard, were selected more for their business connections than their nautical 
experience. Robert Frye, chief lieutenant onboard the Duke, was related to a Bristol 
haberdasher. The Duke’s second lieutenant Charles Pope came from a prominent family 
of ship-owners whose members engaged in privateering during both the Nine Years’ 
War and the War of Spanish Succession, including ships co-owned with members of the 
Batchelor and Hollister families. And at least two midshipmen might help the 
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expedition resolve or entirely avoid legal troubles as they were “young Lawyers 
design’d to act as Midshipmen.42 
Some of the appointees had family as well as business ties to Syndicate members.  
Dover recruited his kinsman Samuel Hopkins to serve as both an assistant             
surgeon and his personal lieutenant, a rank the Syndicate never defined. Hopkins was an 
apothecary. Apothecaries provided a valuable service by filling physicians’  
prescriptions despite not being allowed to administer medicine themselves. Hopkins was 
probably connected to the Syndicate not just through Dover. Apothecaries often 
came from the merchant class since grocers’ experiences with dry goods and herbs (used 
for poultices and unguents) often granted them some informal medical knowledge.
43  
This close relationship indubitably contributed to the Syndicate’s decision to appoint 
Hopkins as an officer for the voyage despite the latter’s complete lack of maritime 
experience.
44
 
Dover must have been especially persuasive because Hopkins might have earned 
up to £4000 a year through his practice if he remained ashore.
45  
Though Rogers was not 
a Syndicate member, it is likely that he influenced the selection of his younger brother 
John as the Dutchess’ second lieutenant. In addition, Robert Frye probably owed his 
appointment as chief lieutenant onboard the Duke to his distant relative Rogers. 
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Finding petty officers was more difficult, as the carpenter’s mates, armorers, and 
cooks needed specialized knowledge. While the accountants and grocers thrust into 
leadership roles might learn how to command at sea after several weeks, many of the 
petty officers’ positions required technical skills that could only be learned by practicing 
those vocations over many years. Since most petty officers were on a lower rung of the 
social ladder, few were known to Syndicate members. There were some exceptions, 
however. Simon Hatley, appointed third mate in the Dutchess, came from a family of 
haberdashers that owned property in Oxfordshire. His apprenticeship to a pilot in his 
youth brought him into contact with Syndicate members who owned or co-owned 
merchantmen.
46
 
Some other petty officers, including John Ballett, followed their officers from 
previous voyages. Ballett was on Dampier’s last expedition and was one of the few who 
had stood by Dampier despite the setbacks. Ballett elected to continue with Dampier for 
another cruising voyage without even knowing they were going to the Pacific. The 
Syndicate approved of Dampier’s choice and put him on the Duke’s roster as both third 
mate and surgeon’s mate.47  This was not uncommon for the time period, as crewmen 
 
often formed attachments to officers they trusted, and who followed them to other ships. 
In order to recruit more petty officers and especially seamen, the Syndicate needed to 
reach beyond its personal network. 
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RECRUITING CREWMEN TO SERVE “BEFORE THE MAST” 
With the principal officers in place and some of the lesser ranks filled by walk- 
ons and business associates, the Syndicate needed to fill the remaining petty officer 
vacancies and find enough seamen to make the ships operational. The Syndicate realized 
it could not exclusively rely upon Bristol for sailors. In June, it sent Courtney             
and some assistants to recruit in Portsmouth. It also dispatched Hatley to recruit in 
Ireland and, a month later, sent Humphrey French to assist him.
48  
Two other recruiters 
are listed in the Syndicate account books without identifying with whom (Courtney or 
Hatley) or where each man worked. The Syndicate instructed its two principal recruiters 
to hire whatever crewmen they could find regardless of background or experience. The 
Syndicate trusted Courtney because he was a member and a mariner by trade, and Hatley 
because members knew him personally. The Syndicate’s recruiters had a formidable task 
ahead of them, as experienced seamen were in short supply and competition for         
their services keen. 
 
In 1708, the Royal Navy needed to man 103 ships of the line, 63 frigates, eight 
sloops, and 36 miscellaneous auxiliary vessels, including bomb ketches, storeships, and 
yachts utilized for official duties. This vast array of ships was divided between the 
British Isles and its far-flung colonies. Since naval vessels required large crews to run 
effectively, each ship presented a substantial drain on manpower.
49
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The merchant service also needed to man its ships. Whether an Indiaman  
hauling Persian carpets from Bengal, a slaver transporting slaves from West Africa to 
America, or a lugger carrying Cheshire cheese, Whitehaven coal, or Yorkshire wheat 
along the English coast, a merchantman required a core of skilled sailors to keep the ship 
running and simultaneously provide on-the-job training to the landsmen. So far, 
Bourbon warships and privateers had wreaked havoc on the merchant service and 
removed thousands of sailors from the labor pool. Over 1300 British merchantmen were 
captured during the war, and each lost ship meant a lost crew.
50
 
Any loss to manpower was felt, as every dead or missing British sailor was one 
less sailor who could serve onboard a warship, merchantman, or privateer. These losses 
could be staggering at times, especially when Britain was embroiled in such a prolonged 
war. Some events, such as a major naval defeat or natural disaster, were keenly felt. In 
1703, for example, the Admiralty estimated there were approximately 65,000 qualified 
seamen left in the reserve manpower pool. In November of that year, a terrific storm hit 
England that killed, by contemporary estimates, between 10,000 to 12,000 seamen.
51  
It 
 
was a catastrophic loss. Foreign sailors signed on as they always did and partially 
replaced those losses; indeed, ship crews tended to be multinational. Those numbers, 
however, did not meet the unquenchable demand for experienced sailors. Furthermore, 
the Navigation Act of 1660 already mandated significant quotas for crew nationalities in 
the merchant service; merchant crews had to contain at least three-quarters Englishmen 
(and an English master) although privateers and warships were exempt. 
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The government sought to alleviate effects of the chronic manpower shortage on 
the Royal Navy. On the eve of the War of Spanish Succession, Parliament passed the 
Piracy Act of 1700 to make it easier for British authorities to arrest and try pirates. The 
act also allowed some pirates to renounce their ways and join the navy.
52  
Two years 
later, the war had begun and the navy’s need for skilled crewmen was still so pressing 
that buccaneers and others with checkered pasts were accepted into the service and given 
a clean slate.
53
 
The Royal Navy also tried to make up for the shortfall in personnel through 
impressment. Privateersmen were obliged to transfer up to one-half of their company to 
passing warships if required. That was one of the reasons why privateer captains sought 
enormous crews.
54  
Any merchantman was also a valid target for a short-handed warship, 
and all outbound merchantmen from Britain were required to relinquish up to one-
quarter of their complement if asked. In an August 1701 issue of the London Post Boy, 
the paper’s correspondent in Weymouth reported “our Vessels are fearful of putting to 
Sea, least their Men should be impresst, for which reason no Collier comes in . . . .” 
Colliers and some others were eventually protected, but press gangs haunted maritime 
communities. A series of emergency recruiting acts in 1703, 1704, 1705, and 1708 
allowed press gangs and parish officials to impress any able-bodied indigent men, or 
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vagabonds, to serve as landsmen and marines.
55    
Also in 1708, impressment was made 
illegal in the colonies so the navy concentrated its press gangs in the British Isles, 
making a seaman’s life in Bristol a risky one.56  The Admiralty also pressured the Crown 
into giving it recruitment precedence over those of other services; at least one-third of 
privateer complements had to be unskilled landsmen. In this manner, the Crown 
prevented too many skilled sailors from avoiding naval service by enlisting onboard 
privateers.
57
 
As a result, when the Syndicate sought experienced mariners in 1708 it faced stiff 
competition from the navy, the merchant marine, and other privateers. The earlier 
expedient of sailing to the West Indies with a skeleton crew and filling out their 
companies with experienced seamen in Jamaica was no longer possible after the 1702 
reprieve given to all English buccaneers. Enough men accepted this route to 
respectability to create an acute manpower shortage in the Caribbean. Knowing it would 
be difficult to recruit sailors in the West Indian colonies, the Syndicate sought to fill its 
crews before leaving the British Isles.
58
 
 
The shortage of trained seamen and competition for their services forced the 
Syndicate to offer greater incentives. Its members, many of whom had owned or co- 
owned ships, were aware of the multitude of factors that led seamen to sign onto a ship’s 
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company. Weighing their options, sailors considered relative pay, hazards, workload, 
and rations before committing to join a ship’s company. 
Naval wages were generally lower than those in the merchant marine, and 
remained static between 1647 and 1797.
59  
Those wages, however, were at least 
guaranteed and a sailor had legal recourse in case he did not receive the wages due him. 
Naval service also brought with it the prospects of prize money. Like privateersmen, 
navy men received prize money when a captured merchantman or her cargo was sold. 
Navy men also received prize money when their warship captured or sank an enemy 
warship. Those who signed onto a warship’s complement during this conflict also 
received two months’ wages as a signing bonus, and any who were wounded or killed 
received compensation ranging from pensions to legal counsel and quarters in the Royal 
Hospital for Seamen at Greenwich.
60  
Dependents of those who died or were killed while 
in the service were also entitled to compensation. 
Seamen also had to consider the kind of discipline they would face. A warship 
had a strict hierarchy from the captain down to the other officers and ratings. Officers 
swiftly meted out discipline to offenders and corporal punishment was the norm. Sailors 
who committed minor infractions were struck with a rope’s end while thieves and 
brawlers were given lashes or tied to a grating, fed only bread and water, and left 
exposed to the elements. Punishments were painful but limited and sailors had the right 
to appeal to Admiralty authorities once ashore. Severe punishments such as flogging 
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around the fleet and hanging were only administered after a court-martial ashore. 
Despite lurid tales of sadistic officers arbitrarily ordering men whipped, most penalties 
were comparable to what criminals received on land.
61
 
In addition to discipline, seamen considered the possible shipboard conditions 
under which they would labor. The Royal Navy’s ships usually had substantial crews 
that spread routine work among more individuals thereby lessening the work required of 
any individual seaman. Though less arduous than service in a privateer, service in the 
Royal Navy could be more hazardous. Privateers usually avoided fighting vessels of 
equal or greater strength, while Royal Navy vessels sought combat with enemy warships 
and kept fighting even after sustaining heavy casualties. 
The Navy intended to keep its sailors in fighting shape and provided enough 
calories to sustain adult men with physically active lifestyles. Its rations guaranteed 
meat at least four times a week, which was better than what Britons of similar 
socioeconomic status could hope to receive on land. The food was repetitious and its 
sometimes variable quality inspired crude jokes, but sailors did not usually complain 
unless their staple foods were replaced with local substitutes (e.g., bread replaced with 
rice), and they never griped about the portion sizes.
62
 
Prospective recruits also considered the merchant service, which offered some 
advantages but no guarantees. A merchant sailor had to contend with unscrupulous 
employers who might deny him pay. Indeed, protections for merchant sailors’ fair 
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wages were not adequately codified until 1729.
63  
A sailor was more likely to receive a 
substantial sum at the end of the voyage because merchants offered high wages during 
wartime – by 1700, merchant sailors could expect 50 or 60 shillings per voyage – but all 
that was moot if his captain refused to pay him.
64  
Wages were established for seamen 
serving in the Royal Navy, but those entering the merchant marine could often negotiate 
a more favorable wage, and a skilled haggler might live a relatively comfortable life. 
Again, however, that was dependent on his captain’s honesty. As Richard Steele wrote, 
“and were not also the Wives and Dependents of our own Mariners (for Want of their 
dearly earn’d Pay) become an insupportable Burthen to the Parishes of St. Katharine’s, 
Shadwell, Southward, &c.”65  Injured or killed merchantmen were not legally entitled to 
any compensation. 
Merchant captains were notorious for excessive punishment, as they were 
completely unaccountable while at sea. With relatively small crews on merchantmen, 
captains found themselves absolute arbiters with few officers to curb their excesses. 
There was no legal recourse for unjustly punished sailors. It was not uncommon for 
exceedingly cruel merchant captains to be singled out and brutally murdered by pirates 
who captured merchantmen. In some cases, the captain’s crew gave him up to the 
marauders.
66
 
 
 
63 
Richard Blakemore, “The Legal World of English Sailors, c. 1575-1729” in Law, 
Labour, and Empire: Comparative Perspectives on Seafarers, c. 1500-1800, ed. Maria 
Fusaro et al (2015), 117. 
64 
Michael Lewis, The Navy of Britain: A Historical Portrait (1948), 323. 
65 
Steele, An Essay Upon Trade, 14. 
66 
David Cordingly, Under the Black Flag: The Romance and the Reality of Life Among 
the Pirates (1995), 133-134. 
105  
 
Compared to the other services, the working conditions onboard merchant ships 
were abysmal. Merchantmen tended to run with skeleton crews and their paymasters 
were interested in profit over their crews’ welfare. As a result, merchant crews were 
routinely overworked. Food was another downside to joining the merchant service. 
Sailors commonly spread horror stories regarding food served onboard, and such tales 
circulated around taverns where seamen congregated.
67
 
To make matters worse, merchant sailors had to contend with the possibility of 
impressment into the navy. An unlucky sailor, thinking he only had to endure a single 
voyage on a merchantman, might find himself impressed into a warship’s company for 
the next few years. All merchant crews knew the risk of being captured by the enemy, 
but at least Bourbon warships tried to not damage merchantmen and their cargo. 
Privateering had some advantages when compared to the Royal Navy or to the 
merchant service, although it was always a gamble. Service in a successful privateer 
with an honest captain could result in a significant “payday” at the voyage’s conclusion, 
but an unsuccessful voyage could result in no pay at all. As a partial remedy, Parliament 
passed the “Act for the Management of Trade to America” (commonly referred to as the 
Prize Act of 1708) to regulate prize money. It ended the Crown’s right to one-tenth of 
total profits.
68
 
 
Exactly what an individual crewman was to receive depended on the contents of 
the ship’s articles he agreed to when he joined the privateer. If, for example, the articles 
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provided for it, he could, in addition to shares in the distribution of prize money, receive 
compensation for grievous wounds and his family be given a lump-sum in case he died 
while at sea. There was also, of course, the small but plausible chance that a privateer 
might seize an immensely valuable ship and give each crewman a handsome profit.
69
 
The articles also applied to officers serving onboard privateers. With larger 
 
crews than merchantmen, there was a need for more intermediate ranks and structure, 
much like onboard a warship. That created intermediaries between the crew and captain, 
and allowed officers to mitigate unfairly harsh sentencing. In addition to allotment of 
shares and compensation, the articles functioned as a sort of constitution that all officers 
and crewmen agreed to follow when signing on. Such rules addressed issues ranging 
from drunkenness and gambling to cowardice in the face of the enemy. The articles also 
defined punishments which could be administered for specific infractions.
70  
In order to 
attract recruits, punishments were relatively light and their enforcement could be lax. 
No sailor wished to sign onto a privateer’s company if the articles called for keelhauling 
or hanging. It was also impossible for privateer captains to inflict severe punishment for 
trivial infractions as the articles bound captains as well as ratings.
71
 
Unlike merchantmen, privateersmen needed much more than a skeleton crew. 
Privateer captains needed enough crewmen to carry prizes by boarding and to sail any 
captured ships to port. Like sailors in the Royal Navy, privateer crewmen shared a 
workload among many hands. The quality of food onboard privateers varied widely 
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depending on the type of voyage. During an extended cruising voyage, like the 
Syndicate planned, the quality of food often depended on immediate circumstances, 
ranging from fresh produce early in the voyage, to foul water and rancid biscuit when 
there was no opportunity to resupply later on.
72
 
Like their counterparts in the merchant service, privateers always had to worry 
 
about impressment into the navy, at least in European waters. Regardless, all privateers 
possessed several intangible advantages that their competitors did not. Privateers 
seemingly made their own rules, allowed more initiative to crewmen, and promised 
better working conditions. They participated in the war but were only expected to target 
lightly armed merchantmen and not to engage warships. 
Based on these factors, it would seem that service on the Duke and Dutchess 
would be more attractive than in either the Royal Navy or the merchant marine thereby 
facilitating recruitment of mariners. 
The Syndicate’s recruiting efforts, however, were handicapped because its 
recruiters were forbidden to tell potential crewmen where the expedition was headed or 
how long a sailor could expect to be away from Britain. The recruiters aside from 
Courtney might have even been ignorant of the destination themselves. The goal was to 
avoid letting the Spanish know that the Duke and Dutchess planned to attack their 
shipping in the Pacific. All the recruiters could say was that they were looking for 
volunteers for a cruising voyage with no specific destination. This presented a problem, 
as cruising voyages meant a prolonged period at sea and far away from home. Rogers 
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described such voyages as “but an indifferent Life at best.” Even though the 
commission specified the South Sea, the recruiters either would not or could not show it 
to anyone, or got creative with their instructions to recruit sailors by any possible means. 
Most privateersmen preferred to operate closer to home where voyages were short and 
fresh water and provisions more readily available. It was always difficult to recruit 
sailors for a voyage to Jamaica or the Slave Coast, where yellow fever might decimate 
European crews.
73
 
Despite its handicap, the Syndicate had some advantages relative not just to the 
other services, but compared to the privateers with whom they were competing for 
seamen. Cruising voyages, unlike most privateering activity, offered some guaranteed 
compensation. Since they took a much longer time to complete, sponsors offered 
monthly wages so the sailors would not risk the possibility of returning home empty- 
handed so long as they did not desert. The Syndicate offered sailors a choice for 
payment, either entirely in shares of the profits from the voyage or in a fifty-fifty split 
between shares and monthly wages. The number of shares, along with the monthly 
wage, was dependent on the crewman’s rank. For example, the lowest landsman was 
offered one and a half shares of the voyage’s total proceeds, or three-quarters of a share 
and one pound and two shillings wages for each month. More experienced men and 
those with specialties such as a cooper were offered either five shares, or two and a half 
shares with a monthly wage of one pound and ten shillings.
74  
The recruits did not know 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
Woodes Rogers, A Cruising Voyage, 7. 
74 
Cooke, A Voyage to the South Sea, Introduction. 
109  
 
exactly where they were going – most probably assumed to Africa or the Caribbean – 
but they knew they would be undertaking a lengthy voyage. 
The expedition’s articles were straightforward, and all recruits were required to 
sign them and select their payment plan. First, the owners were responsible for all costs 
involving the ships, guns, supplies, and ammunition. Second, all profits were to be 
divided so that the owners received two-thirds of the proceeds while the officers and 
crew divided the remaining third. Most privateers offered 25 percent of total proceeds to 
the crew, so this was slightly better.
75  
Third, any supplies taken from prizes and 
consumed by the privateers (e.g., food and naval stores) were partially reimbursed with 
the owners paying one-third the value of the supplies into the proceeds to be distributed. 
Fourth, any officer or crewman killed or “so disabled, as not to get a Livelihood” was 
entitled to compensation for himself or for his next of kin. Fifth, a pay chart clearly 
defined how much each officer and crewman would receive.
76
 
The Syndicate purchased enough food and liquor, including Gloucestershire 
redstreak cider, to last sixteen months, but experienced sailors knew extended cruises 
often resulted in crewmen being “oblig’d to depend upon Chance or the Enemy’s 
Courtesy for Provisions.”77  The Syndicate knew that Dampier’s last voyage quickly ran 
out of stores, as it had been stocked for only nine months.
78
 
 
In addition, the Syndicate stocked extra medical supplies. Remarkably for an 
expedition of its size, the Syndicate hired six medical officers. The presence of certified 
 
75 
Starkey, “Incentivisation of British Privateering Crews,” 137. 
76 
Cooke, A Voyage to the South Sea, Introduction. 
77 
Woodes Rogers, A Cruising Voyage, 7. 
78 
Funnell, A Voyage Round the World, 2; Bryan Little, Crusoe’s Captain, 50. 
110  
 
physicians and apothecaries not being assigned other duties so they could focus on 
preventive medical care rather than treating only wounds and other serious injuries was 
rare. Thus the Syndicate’s crewmen could anticipate being well cared for.79 
Once they signed on, the sailors were encouraged to stay onboard by the offer of 
free rations and 25 shillings per month from the time the sailors entered “Service of the 
said Ship, or Ships.”80  To qualify for the extra pay, the crewmen had to remain onboard 
one of the ships. On June 15, the Syndicate’s two frigates were towed out into the 
Severn estuary so it was more difficult for sailors to desert.
81  
The sailors also benefited 
from this arrangement as it would protect them from “crimping.”82  Port communities 
were notorious for dishonest publicans and innkeepers (the crimps) giving sailors free 
drinks. Once the unsuspecting seaman passed out, the establishment’s owner kidnapped 
him and later sold him to a merchant captain looking for new crewmen. Moreover, the 
specific cruising voyage was exempt from impressment because it technically operated 
in the Americas and was protected by act of Parliament. Any press gang that took the 
privateers in any location at sea would have to pay a £20 fine per head.
83
 
 
The Syndicate enjoyed some success with its recruiting efforts. Combined with 
the hand-picked senior officers, the two ships had a combined complement of 225 
officers and men by August 1. They would receive more once they sailed to Cork and 
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collected Hatley’s recruits. As the new hands were being sorted out, the Syndicate 
gradually readied its ships and put the new hires to work stepping the masts and stowing 
stores in the holds. With the officers and men mostly in place, the commission secured, 
and the ships nearing ready to put to sea, it was time for the Syndicate to issue final 
instructions to expedition leaders.
84
 
 
SHIPBOARD GOVERNANCE 
 
Most important were the Syndicate’s instructions concerning governance of the 
expedition. First the leaders appointed officers to serve as a “General Council” and 
instructed the group to meet regularly to discuss policy and plan any “Attempts, Attacks, 
and Designs upon the Enemy, either by Sea or Land.”85  Ships’ captains could deal with 
minor offenses, but any crewman was entitled to a review of his case by the Council. 
Dover was named “president” of the Council, and he never tired of using that title as a 
prefix in correspondence. His only unique power as president was to cast a tie-breaking 
double vote “in Case of an Equallity.”86  Rogers, Courtney, and Dover were each 
authorized to call a Council meeting. Records never indicated which of the three 
officers called for meetings; every account simply stated that the meeting occurred and 
on which ship. 
In the interest of unity, records of the meetings reported only the decisions made 
and did not include the number of votes cast on each issue. All Council members, 
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regardless of how they voted, signed every agreement. Since the Council was supposed 
to run the expedition, its members did not want to give the impression that they followed 
any one leader.
87
 
There was another motive for creating the Council aside from making decisions 
or administering discipline. The Syndicate knew that weakly governed privateers had a 
predilection to become pirates. It was not sufficient to simply appoint charismatic and 
forceful officers; the officers themselves sometimes needed to be put in check. 
Dampier’s painful experiences throughout his other voyages highlighted the necessity 
for a Council, and the Syndicate must have realized that concentrating too much 
authority in the hands of one officer – and especially an inept one – was a guarantee for 
disaster. 
This created a complicated state of affairs in which the Council made most 
decisions governing the expedition while Rogers was designated “commander-in-chief” 
and given responsibility for directing all actions undertaken onboard or by the two ships. 
In the meantime, Dover was the chief administrative officer and both captains were 
required to act as instructed by Council. 
A subcommittee consisting of Council members was appointed for each ship that 
would make decisions for each ship should the Duke and Dutchess become separated. 
The Duke’s ten-man committee included Woodes Rogers, Dover, Dampier, and 
Vanbrugh. The six-member committee for the smaller Dutchess included Courtney, 
Cooke, and John Rogers. The Syndicate made sure to balance the mariners with other 
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officers, including the owners’ agents (Carlton Vanbrugh from the Duke and William 
Bath from the Duchess).
88
 
The individual ships’ committees would only meet if the ships were separated. 
The ships were never apart for long during the voyage, thus there is no indication that 
the ship committees ever met. 
Rogers and the rest of the General Council, regardless of station, were all 
expected to conduct themselves at a high standard. Officially, the Syndicate forbade the 
privateers from trading with allies for anything other than basic necessities and the Duke 
and Dutchess were to act “only as Private Men of War, and not as trading Ships.”89  But 
the Syndicate, or at least its officers at sea, considered the possibility of future trade with 
the Spanish in the South Sea. That could only happen if a British settlement were 
established there and if the Spanish were not brutalized or tortured, as many buccaneers 
had done in the past. There was nothing to be done about the settlement, but the 
Syndicate and Council could mandate certain behavior among the crewmen. The 
Syndicate’s general orders for Rogers and the Council to prevent “all Animosities, 
Quarrells, and Mischiefs at Sea” clearly applied to external parties, as the Council 
(including the two Syndicate members onboard) would invariably interpret those orders 
in such a manner to include prisoners and local Spanish and Indian populations.
90
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But the Council’s effectiveness would be tried later. With the ships more or less 
outfitted, the officers chosen, the letters of marque signed and received, and enough 
crewmen to get started, all the expedition needed were orders to set sail. The Syndicate 
anticipated a long voyage and had prepared accordingly. Now it was time to proceed 
with the venture. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
AND THEN AT ELEVEN IN THE FORENOON UNMOOR’D 
 
 
 
The packet which brought orders to establish the General Counci also contained 
final instructions to expedition leaders.
1  Rogers’ orders were to make sail for Cork on 
the first fair wind after the crews and ships were in sufficient condition. The orders 
detailed the expedition’s objectives; the capture of an Acapulco galleon – the trans- 
Pacific galleon bound from Mexico to Manila, laden with Spanish pesos and silver 
bullion – was the expedition’s primary target. Once the privateers captured the galleon, 
the Syndicate expected its two ships and the prize to retrace their outbound route and 
return to England via Brazil, the West Indies, and Virginia. Syndicate members had 
business contacts scattered around the Atlantic, and Rogers’ instructions included a list 
of merchants in Virginia, Barbados, Jamaica, Montserrat, and Nevis to deal with should 
the expedition need repairs or supplies, or had prizes other than the galleon to sell.
2
 
The crewmen might not have been ready to sail on July 14 because the 
 
expedition remained in Bristol for two more weeks. Or, having heard rumors of a 
French 46-gun warship prowling the Irish Sea, the Council may have elected to not set 
out alone, but to seek safety in numbers by sailing with a group of ships. Whatever the 
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case, the Duke and Dutchess joined a group of ships that weighted anchor and headed to 
Cork on August 1, 1708.
3
 
Two days later, on August 3, the convoy spied a large ship some distance away 
but she fled when the Dutchess altered course to approach her. Rogers wrote that the 
false alarm had “happen’d well for us, since had it been real, we should have made but 
an indifferent fight, for want of being better mann’d.”4  Despite the privateers’ 
inexperience, or perhaps because of it, they actively sought an engagement with a clearly 
superior foe. Some of expedition’s officers (nobody claimed responsibility) were 
already showing signs of poor judgment. 
 
 
CORK 
 
The expedition’s primary reason for stopping at Cork was to take on experienced 
crewmen. The two ships did not possess many more than twenty veteran sailors between 
them when they left Bristol, while the remaining 200 or so crewmen were woefully 
inexperienced. The expedition lost approximately 40 men immediately after arriving in 
Cork, many to desertion and, others – who Rogers dubbed “Ordinary fellows” – were 
dismissed as unfit for service at sea or for being malcontents.
5  
The fact that so many 
men deserted after such a short voyage did not bode well for the future when the 
expedition would, inevitably, reach hostile waters far from any friendly port. 
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Fortunately for the expedition, petty officer Simon Hatley had, with the 
assistance of Noblett Rogers, a Cork merchant and brother to the Syndicate member 
Francis Rogers, recruited as many as 150 qualified seamen in the Irish port. The exact 
number of recruits is unclear because the account Hatley submitted to the Syndicate said 
only that he was owed exactly £30 as part of the expedition’s “prime cost & outset.” The 
expenses included everything from his personal lodgings and meals to payment to 
the sailors who enlisted. The muster sheets specified neither the date nor the port in 
which seamen signed on.
6
 
While Syndicate members considered the current level of manning acceptable, 
they did order Rogers to recruit whatever additional men he could, and should the 
expedition lose so many men that it became shorthanded, to “make up their Deficiency 
by ye first Oportunity.”7  Acting on those orders, Rogers signed on additional recruits 
while the ships waited to join a convoy leaving Cork bound for the West Indies. During 
that time more sailors applied to join the expedition than it could accommodate, and 
Rogers ordered his recruiters to “stop the rest till we were ready, our ships being 
pester’d.”8  The Duke and Dutchess – which had arrived in Ireland with a combined 225 
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sailors – left with 334. To make room for the large number of personnel, Rogers 
offloaded a portion of the naval stores and delivered them to Noblett Rogers.
9
 
Rogers’ orders in Bristol contained instructions on what to do in Cork, including 
joining a West Indies-bound convoy under the protection of the 42-gun Royal Navy 
frigate Hastings. Syndicate leaders who issued those orders did not anticipate the 
expedition being delayed for weeks in Cork. Nor did the members in Bristol anticipate 
the additional £2000 spent in Cork for various stores and maintenance. Despite the 
Syndicate’s legitimate concerns at the delays and expenses, Rogers and the Council had 
done exactly as instructed. The expedition waited to sail with the Hastings, and Rogers 
followed the Syndicate’s standing orders to resupply whenever possible. This was not 
the last time during the voyage that Syndicate members became upset at Rogers for 
following its standing orders.
10
 
On September 2, the Duke and Dutchess finally departed Cork in a convoy that 
included the Hastings and twenty merchantmen. Joining the convoy may have also been 
a ruse to lead observers ashore, particularly Bourbon spies, to think that the two 
privateers were headed for Madeira and from there to the West Indies, the 
Mediterranean, or West Africa. 
The convoy proceeded westward past Ireland for several days without incident. 
Since the green crewmen were slowing down their ships and the rest of the convoy, the 
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expedition was “oblig’d to break Measures” with the convoy on September 5. That 
same day, the expedition’s officers also decided it was time “to discover to our Crew 
whither we were bound” and to give any of the crewmen who did not wish to go to the 
Pacific the opportunity to leave the expedition and join the Hastings or one of the 
merchantmen in the convoy.
11  
Any man who took the opportunity to transfer to another 
ship would still be at sea for months, but at least he would be in familiar waters instead 
of isolated in the Pacific. No one, not even a sailor who complained that his wife would 
be obliged to pay 40 shillings because he would not be present to tithe at his parish that 
year, left the voyage.
12
 
Later that day, expedition officers sent their last letters and dispatches to England 
to the Hastings and departed from the convoy. It would take weeks for the mail to reach 
Bristol by way of two Atlantic crossings, but it was better to utilize an available courier 
right away than to hope the expedition would happen upon a homeward bound ship that 
could deliver its letters in less time. 
The Duke and Dutchess did not depart alone, but were joined by the Crown 
Galley, a merchantman, headed for Madeira. After several days of embarrassingly poor 
sailing, the expedition began to look like a proper squadron. Rogers seemed to expect 
this because he claimed that the initial confusion was “usual in Privateers at first setting 
out.”13 
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SWEDISH SHIP 
On September 9, just one week after setting out from Cork, the Council held its 
first official meeting at sea. All members attended and agreed to make for Madeira “to 
furnish our selves with Wine, Brandy, and other Necessaries wanting on board both 
Ships for the Men.” In case the two ships somehow became separated, they were to 
rendezvous at the Cape Verde Islands. If they missed each other there, the Duke and 
Dutchess were to meet at Ilha Grande, 3000 miles to the west and approximately 60 
miles from Rio de Janeiro. If, after several weeks, the expedition still did not reunify, 
the individual ships were to proceed to the South Sea on their own.
14
 
 
At 6 a.m. the next morning, lookouts spied a sail and the privateers altered course 
to pursue the vessel. After a nine-hour chase, the Duke finally closed within range of 
what proved to be a Swedish merchantman bound for Cadiz. The Duke fired a warning 
shot that forced her to heave to. Sweden being a neutral party in the War of the Spanish 
Succession, its ships were immune to capture unless carrying contraband to a belligerent. 
When some of the Swedish sailors, having imbibed much of their ship’s liquor in 
anticipation of the privateers confiscating it, drunkenly claimed their ship was 
transporting gunpowder and naval stores, Rogers organized a search for contraband. 
Finding no conclusive evidence of illegal cargo, Rogers gave the Swedish captain a 
dozen bottles of cider in exchange for cured meats, and the ships continued on their 
respective ways.
15
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Some of Rogers’ men grumbled that he should have seized the vessel. Informed 
that a few of the grumblers even talked of mutiny, Rogers and the senior officers quickly 
armed themselves and some loyal crewmen and clapped ten of the “mutineers” in irons. 
In addition, one of the ringleaders was “soundly whip’d for exciting the rest to join him.” 
Still facing a disgruntled crew who, like the mutineers, thought the Swedish ship should 
have been sent to England as a prize, Rogers addressed them saying that seizing such a 
large ship would require more crewmen to operate it than the expedition could spare. 
Furthermore, if a prize court ruled that the ship was not a legitimate prize, it would cause 
serious legal problems once the privateers returned to Britain. That explanation 
“pacify’d the major part” of the crewmen and the expedition proceeded onward.16 
Two days later, some of the mutineers in irons named other ringleaders,  
including Rogers’ boatswain, Giles Cash. Rogers immediately ordered Cash clapped in 
irons because Cash could be especially dangerous if he backed a mutiny. This was both 
because he was a petty officer, and because he was popular with the crew. Cash’s 
insubordination presented a clear problem beyond his behavior; he was the boatswain 
and so was responsible for shipboard discipline. An insolent petty officer, particularly in 
Cash’s position, might have served as a catalyst for unrest among the crew and become 
exponentially more dangerous after the expedition found itself alone. 
When a crewman “with near half the Ship’s Company or Sailors following him” 
approached Rogers and demanded that Cash be set free, Rogers and the other officers 
responded by having Cash’s supporter whipped as an example. Rogers later wrote, 
16 
Ibid.; David Cordingly, Pirate Hunter of the Caribbean: The Adventurous Life of 
Captian Woodes Rogers (2011), 46. 
122  
 
“This Method I thought best for breaking any unlawful Friendship amongst themselves’ 
which, with different Correction to other offenders, allay’d the Tumult; so that now they 
begin to submit quietly.”17 
To prevent another mutiny, the captain of the Crown Galley advised Rogers to 
completely remove Cash from the expedition. Rogers had Cash transferred to the Crown 
Galley, which would take him to Madeira in irons. The other unnamed petty officers 
who were complicit in the mutiny were reinstated and that quelled most of the 
resentment. This incident never came up again during the voyage or afterward, but it 
illustrated how Rogers and the other officers quickly dealt with challenging situations. 
They swiftly delivered punishment and removed any figure that mutinous crewmen 
could rally behind. In this situation, it seemed the Syndicate had chosen its officers 
wisely. 
 
 
CANARIES 
 
Although the expedition planned to stop in Madeira with the Crown Galley, the 
pursuit of the Swedish ship had taken the privateers off course, making it more efficient 
to stop at the Canaries rather than reverse course and tack against contrary winds with a 
green, inexperienced crew in order to get to Madeira. While the Canaries were a 
Spanish possession, they had a special relationship with other belligerents including 
Britain that allowed ships to resupply there. Headed southward, the expedition parted 
from the Crown Galley and continued toward the Canaries. After considering the liquor 
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supply, the lack of warm clothing for the crew, and the prospect of journeying through 
cold climates, the Council decided it would be best to top off the ships’ liquor casks. 
Rogers had previously observed that despite the lack of decent cold-weather clothes, 
“good liquor to sailors is preferable to clothing.”18 
On September 18, the expedition arrived in the Canaries and captured its first 
 
prize – a 15-ton barque – between the islands of Fuerteventura and Gran Canaria. When 
the privateers closed with the small vessel, the San Felipe y San Diego surrendered 
without a fight.
19  
Her cargo included wine, rum, clothing, snuff, foodstuffs, and about 
£12 in Spanish currency. She also carried 30 passengers who, upon learning their 
captors were British and not Barbary corsairs, actually rejoiced.
20
 
As the expedition dropped anchor off Tenerife the next day, the Duke’s owners’ 
agent Carlton Vanbrugh insisted on going ashore at La Oratava in order to negotiate 
ransom of the prize. The Council acquiesced to his request and, against its better 
judgment, allowed him to broker a deal for the release of the captured San Felipe y San 
Diego. Instead of a ransom from the owners of the prize, the privateers received a 
message from British merchants and a consul, informing them of an agreement with 
local officials allowed resident British merchants to continue trading in the islands and 
British ships to take on water and provisions despite the war. In return, Spanish ships 
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engaged in inter-island trade were exempt from seizure by British warships and 
privateers.
21
 
The British traders walked a fine line, especially since they were guests in enemy 
territory. As the British vice-consul wrote in a hastily written letter, “we must inform 
you that her Majesty [Queen Anne] is graciously pleas’d to allow a Trade between her 
Subjects and the People of these Islands.” The letter then demanded that the prize vessel 
be restored or else, “Mr. Vanbrugh will not be permitted to go off, and there will be 
extravagant reprisals made upon our estates and persons.”22 
After a day-long series of frustrating proposals and counter-proposals between 
the Council and Canarian businessmen, Rogers threatened to bombard La Oratava and 
successfully concluded negotiations. The British merchants returned Vanbrugh, 
purchased the prize barque, and ransomed the captives for 450 pieces of eight. Part of 
that sum also reimbursed the Spanish ship-owners for the cargo that the expedition kept 
for its own use. The expedition waited at anchor throughout the next day as the 
merchants discussed the particulars. It was just as well that the account was quickly 
settled, for the Council also wanted to leave soon; the Duke and Dutchess were already 
the subjects of local gossip. The Spaniards in the Canaries were curious about the 
expedition’s ships, especially the double-sheathed hulls, and speculated that the Duke 
and Dutchess were following a five-ship French expedition that had passed through the 
Canaries a month before. They did not suspect the Duke and Dutchess were headed for 
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the Pacific.
23  
To speed the privateers’ departure, the merchants donated five pipes of 
wine, a hogshead of brandy, and some delicacies. The merchants clearly desired to be 
rid of the privateers.
24
 
The privateers threatened to disrupt the merchants’ precarious position again 
when, as the expedition departed from the Canaries on September 22, it gave chase to 
another sail, again in protected waters. Their quarry got away in the night, but it seemed 
the expedition’s leaders had learned nothing from their political gaffe with the earlier 
prize. Capturing such vessels might be profitable in the short-term but it had the 
potential to lead to financial disaster for the Bristol Syndicate. The privateersmen 
wanted to get prize money, but that would easily be offset if the Canarian merchants 
filed a lawsuit against the Syndicate. The Syndicate was guaranteed to take the costs of 
the lawsuit out of the final profits and would most certainly seek recompense from the 
expedition’s officers. The expedition’s officers needed to carefully consider how their 
actions might affect their employers at home. This would not be the last time wronged 
parties threatened to take their grievances directly to the Syndicate.
25
 
 
The Council met two days later and approved all the actions taken by the ships’ 
officers in negotiations at the Canaries. It did, however, acknowledge that Vanbrugh had 
been “much in ye wrong” by getting himself arrested, although it declined to specify 
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what offenses Vanbrugh had actually committed.
26  
To deal with situations such as these 
was precisely why the Syndicate insisted on forming the General Council back in July. 
All the senior officers from both ships were not only supposed to meet regularly, but 
were required to review any major events. In this case, the Council acted precisely as it 
was instructed. Its members met, discussed what had happened in the Canary Islands, 
and reprimanded Vanbrugh for some vaguely defined infraction. All Council members 
signed the record of the meeting thereby presenting a united front to any seamen who 
might criticize the release of the prize. 
 
 
CAPE VERDE 
On September 25, the expedition crossed the Tropic of Cancer. As per maritime 
tradition, the crew gathered the sailors who had never been south of that invisible line 
and the more seasoned crewmen “duck’d the Men in both Ships, according to Custom, 
who had not before pass’d the Tropick.”27  Different nations’ practices varied over the 
centuries, but the ceremony always involved an experienced sailor dressing like 
Neptune, the Roman god of the seas. Each uninitiated crewman was then hoisted by a 
rope and lowered into the ocean. Those who wished to avoid dunking bribed Neptune 
either with liquor or with money. The ceremony provided a welcome diversion and 
fostered camaraderie as the more inexperienced sailors were accepted into the ship’s 
company. The ties were strengthened further the next day, when the Council sold some 
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of the cargo taken from the San Felipe to the sailors by auction. Those who purchased 
some of the “loose Plunder” now had something tangible to show for their work.28 
The expedition reached the Cape Verde Islands on September 30, anchored off 
Sao Vicente, and spent the next several days performing minor repairs and sending 
parties ashore to refill water casks. Three days into its stay, the expedition dispatched its 
linguist, Joseph Alexander, with a letter to the deputy-governor of the Cape Verde 
Islands who was on the nearby island of Santo Antao. In the letter, the Council invited 
the Portuguese official to come onboard the Duke for dinner and discussion. He 
accepted the invitation and islanders rowed out to the expedition to barter.
29
 
Alexander was also given a list of supplies to purchase while ashore. He made 
the necessary purchases but did not himself return to the Duke. Rogers contacted the 
deputy-governor and sought his help in locating Alexander. The official promised to put 
Alexander by the waterside if he were found, but did not deliver him before the Council 
met on October 7 and approved leaving Cape Verde without the linguist.
30  
It is likely 
that Alexander decided to remain on Cape Verde, where his linguistic skills would open 
opportunities for him that were certainly more appealing than the unappetizing food, 
exposure, disease, and violence he would likely face if he remained with the privateers. 
The expedition would later miss his work as a translator, especially when it ran into 
problems with the Portuguese in Brazil. 
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At the same October 7 meeting, the Council also revised seven rules regarding 
plunder. Members agreed that concealing plunder for more than 24 hours, drunkenness 
while in action, hiding in order to avoid fighting or work, and refusing to obey 
commands would be punished by forfeiture of the offender’s shares. Such a penalty was 
common among privateers and pirates in order to foster trust among crewmen.
31
 
The modifications that made all accounting public also provided for searching 
every sailor after seizing a prize. Any sailor who refused to be searched would forfeit 
his share and his captain would have the right to order additional punishment for 
insubordination. Each ship would contribute two officers and two sailors to search the 
men, in full view of the assembled companies. In order to prevent distrust between 
crewmen of the two ships, each agent was required to keep a public account of prize 
money and the officers were to update the books as soon as possible after each capture.
32
 
 
Theft virtually always resulted in harsh penalties on any vessel from a Guernsey 
schooner to a Royal Navy man o’war. The articles decreed that any man who deserted 
his assigned post during an engagement would also forfeit his share from any prizes 
taken during the action. The one exception to this was if a man left his post to join a 
boarding party (e.g., a surgeon’s mate leaving his post in sick bay to fight). Many 
privateer captains drew a distinct line between ship’s plunder and cabin plunder, the 
latter of which often contained valuable items such as silver dinner services and 
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paintings.
33  
Officers regularly divided cabin plunder among themselves and did not 
share it with the crew. The Council revised the definition of “plunder” several times 
throughout the voyage, but its members did not create a new definition for cabin 
plunder. They did vote to give Rogers and Courtney, the two ship captains, each five 
percent of profits made from selling cabin plunder after which the remaining sum would 
be shared by the entire crew. Experienced seamen knew that underhanded dealings 
surrounding cabin plunder were common, so the Council helped to prevent a major 
cause of unrest during the voyage. The Council wanted “to make both ships’ companies 
easy.” The Council also decided that, as an incentive for alert lookouts, the sailor who 
first spied a “Prize of good Value, or exceeding 50 Tuns in Burden” would be rewarded 
with twenty pieces of eight.
34
 
With the rules revised, the expedition set out across the Atlantic to Ilha Grande 
on October 8. Two weeks later, on October 22, long-simmering tension between 
Edward Cooke and his second mate William Page exploded. When Page disobeyed a 
command from Cooke, Cooke struck him, Page hit back, and the two brawled until some 
crewmen forced Page into a boat and sent him to the Duke, where Rogers put him into 
the “bilboes” (leg irons) to serve as an example. Page was fortunate to serve on a 
privateer and not on a Royal Navy warship, as Admiralty law severely punished petty 
officers who struck their superiors. Shortly afterward, Page asked permission to visit the 
head and relieve himself, and granted permission and released from irons, he leaped 
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overboard and tried to escape to the Dutchess, but the ship’s boat quickly retrieved him 
and Rogers promptly clapped him in irons again. The crew had been without a 
legitimate prize since setting out from Bristol and the frustration felt by crewmen turned 
into unrest, which manifested itself in insubordination.
35
 
On October 25, the Dutchess’ officers dealt with more unrest as two midshipmen 
 
accused their pilot Alexander White of encouraging men to desert. Not only that, but he 
had also insisted on immediately dividing spoils despite the Council’s accord. The case 
was referred to the full Council, its members decided his actions were “leading to ye 
Detrimnt of ye voyage,” and ordered him confined in irons until the Dutchess’ captain 
Courtney ordered his release.
36
 
In a move designed to stop the spreading unrest, Rogers accepted William Page’s 
apology for insubordination and ordered the well-liked petty officer released from leg 
irons on October 29. Four days later Rogers dealt with the first violation of the new 
rules governing plunder when two Duke crewmen were caught hiding some clothes 
taken out of the Canaries prize. Rogers did not order the forfeiture of their claim to any 
share of captured property, but instead ordered them put into leg irons until they 
apologized and promised to never conceal plunder again.
37
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BRAZIL AND ILHA GRANDE 
The expedition crossed the Atlantic without additional unrest among the officers 
and crewmen. On November 18 the privateers reached Ilha Grande, found a suitable 
anchorage, and the next day sent two work parties ashore to find a watering hole that 
Dampier knew the general location of from his previous visit to the island. Meanwhile, 
a Portuguese boat approached the Duke and informed Rogers that French privateers had 
recently passed through the area, probably en route to mainland Brazil. Fearing the 
arrival of Spanish or French warships, the privateers hoped to complete filling their 
water casks quickly and be on their way.
38
 
On November 20, strong winds and heavy rain prevented the ships from sending 
boats to the watering hole. When one of the Dutchess’ crewmen attempted to jump 
overboard and swim ashore, he was chased down and clapped in irons. Seven of his 
friends and mess-mates showed sympathy for him by volunteering to be put in irons 
alongside him. Courtney considered this tantamount to mutiny. In his view the 
crewmen were undermining his authority, so he ordered them put in irons for the next 
several days at the end of which he ordered two of the alleged “mutineers” whipped and 
four others released after they each apologized for his behavior. The seventh crewman 
remained in irons for the duration of the stay off Ilha Grande.
39
 
 
The rain continued for two days during which the Council ordered Cooke and 
Lieutenant Charles Pope to go to Angra dos Reis, three leagues from the anchorage, and 
there to give the Portuguese governor some butter and cheese along with a letter stating 
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the expedition’s peaceful intentions and a request to turn over any deserters who might 
jump ship during the privateers’ stay. 
It was dusk when the pinnace carrying Cooke and Pope approached the town. 
Suspicious of the approaching vessel silhouetted against a darkening sky, the villagers 
fired upon it with muskets before realizing the privateers meant them no harm and 
ceased firing.
40  
Village leaders apologized profusely explaining they had mistaken them 
for enemies such as the French privateers who they reported had “plunder’d them, and 
taken away the Plate and Ornaments, which might be the reason why their Houses were 
no better furnish’d; as also their not being satisfy’d [knowing], whether we were Friends 
or Enemies.”41  Villagers informed Cooke that the governor was absent but that he was 
expected back any day. The shore party returned to the anchorage, and the next day the 
expedition set about filling its water casks and making needed repairs. 
The next few days passed without incident. The townspeople helped the 
privateers fill their water casks and find timber in case they had to conduct hull repairs 
later, while many local traders rowed out to the ships at anchor and bartered. Relations 
with the Portuguese were friendly and amicable until two Irish crewmen deserted the 
night of November 25. 
At four o’clock the next morning, the Duke’s lookouts spied a canoe a short 
distance away. The privateers normally would not have cared about a stray canoe, even 
at such an early hour, but the officers suspected the two missing crewmen were in it. 
When the canoe did not respond when hailed, Rogers ordered the Duke’s yawl and 
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pinnace to intercept it. Acting on impulse and without authority, Vanbrugh seized 
command of the pinnace before any other officer climbed onboard, and set out in pursuit 
of the canoe. As the two boats closed the distance, and no one in the canoe responded to 
a warning shot, Vanbrugh ordered his crew to open fire with their muskets. The canoe 
then stopped, and the pinnace crewmen learned they had mortally wounded one of its 
occupants.
42
 
It turned out that the canoe was carrying a Portuguese friar, several of his Indian 
slaves, and £200 in gold that he planned to bury in a safe place. Rogers did his best to 
calm the rattled clergyman and convince him that the privateers had intended no harm, 
but the friar resented both being fired upon and the disappearance of his gold sometime 
during the commotion. None of the privateers admitted having any of the gold and even 
the friar acknowledged that it had probably just been lost overboard. The privateers let 
him and his slaves go, hoping that would be the end of the incident even though the friar 
threatened to file a grievance with the relevant authorities in Portugal and Britain. Their 
attention focused elsewhere, expedition leaders delayed formal discussion of Vanbrugh’s 
actions until the ships departed from Ilha Grande.
43
 
 
The two deserters were found that evening near the shore, begging to be picked 
up after spending a terrifying night in the jungle. They had bargained with locals to 
carry them to mainland Brazil, but missed meeting at the designated rendezvous and had 
to spend the darkening hours in the jungle surrounded by strange and noisy wildlife that 
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kept them from sleeping. Cooke reported that “they hail’d the ship at midnight, begging 
for God’s sake to be brought aboard, or they should be devour’d.” It would have been  
an amusing story for Rogers and the other officers if they were not under such terrible 
strain after the shooting. When the deserters returned to the Duke, they were put in irons 
until morning, then flogged and released from further punishment.
44
 
Fortunately, relations did not sour with the rest of the Portuguese. The locals 
 
seemed to have understood the firing at the canoe was an unfortunate accident and not a 
deliberate murder. The absent governor also returned the next day and graciously 
extended a formal invitation to all the officers and men to visit the settlement as official 
guests. The privateers returned the hospitality and entertained Portuguese officials 
onboard the Duke.
45
 
The privateers found the locals most willing to trade with them. At first the Duke 
 
and Dutchess stood off shore and locals came out to barter, but soon, with the governor’s 
blessing, the Britons went ashore and visited the settlement’s markets and missions. 
Natives residing at most missions engaged in agriculture and some industry under the 
direction of Roman Catholic friars, often producing a surplus they could trade. 
Convinced that the local Indians were lazy and irresponsible, Rogers approved of the 
system that made them virtual slaves.
46
 
At a meeting on November 29, the Council addressed Vanbrugh’s actions on the 
26th. It removed Vanbrugh as the Duke’s owners’ agent for his seizing control of the 
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pinnace and firing on the canoe carrying the Portuguese friar.
47  
The Council drafted a 
memorandum stating that “the commanders and officers of the ship[s] Duke and 
Dutchess . . . and the rest of the companies of the said ships, protest against the unadvis’d 
action of the above-said agent, for proceeding without any order of the captain of         
the said ship, and acting contrary to what he was shipp’d for.”48 
In other words, Vanbrugh was supposed to be an accountant and not a fighter, 
and he was certainly not supposed to take command of a boat without orders. In another 
meeting the next day, the officers voted that Vanbrugh be physically removed from the 
Duke entirely because they found his very presence dangerous. He switched positions 
with William Bath, the owners’ agent onboard the Dutchess. Since the two agents only 
traded places, Vanbrugh remained a member of the Council. While the Syndicate 
appointed the agents, and the agents could not be replaced unless they were dead or 
incapacitated, the Council was within its rights to transfer them between ships if its 
members saw fit.
49
 
As crewmen alternated between cleaning the ship and waiting out inclement 
weather, several more Portuguese came onboard to sell rum, sugar, and other supplies. 
During the same November 29 meeting in which the Council members censured 
Vanbrugh, they decided to pay the Portuguese for supplies by trading some of the cargo 
they had previously removed from the Canaries prize. In exchange for some cloth, the 
Portuguese gave them livestock and corn. To reflect the expedition’s arrival into more 
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exotic territories, it supplemented its cider and wine stores with cheaper and more 
widely available rum. The officers even bartered for several turkeys, the small number 
of which indicated they were almost certainly destined for the officers’ mess.50 
On December 1, a brigantine bound for Rio de Janeiro stopped at Ilha Grande. 
Seizing the opportunity to communicate with their backers at home, Rogers, Dover, and 
Courtney bartered some trinkets to the ship’s master for a promise that he would carry a 
letter and some other dispatches to Portugal, where he would put them into the hands of 
someone who would convey the messages to Bristol. Rogers and his colleagues also 
wrote three additional copies of each document to be sent via different conveyances 
should any be met with an obstacle so as to guarantee the Syndicate would receive at 
least one copy.
51
 
 
In their joint letter, the three officers described in detail Cash’s attempted mutiny, 
then noted how all the other officers were “in perfect unity” and although Rogers had  
had doubts about his crews’ quality when they left Cork, said “that we never knew ships 
Companys better agree, & quieter than we now are.”52 
 
CAPE HORN 
 
On December 3, the expedition left Ilha Grande and headed south. During its 
time at Ilha Grande, the Council decided to enter the Pacific by rounding Cape Horn 
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rather than via the Straits of Magellan. Its decision was influenced by the journal 
published by Gouin de Beauchene who described sailing westward through the Straits in 
1699 and returning to the Atlantic by rounding Cape Horn two years later. Gouin’s 
description of weather conditions at the tip of South America reinforced the Council’s 
decision to not sail through the Straits, as “from this place [Port Galand on the Atlantic] 
to the Entrance of the South-Sea there’s nothing but extraordinary high Mountains on 
each side, from whence come very impetuous and frightful Torrents, and Scarce any 
place for Anchorage to be sound, of one Day without either Rain or Snow.”53 
Rogers, who owned a copy of Gouin’s journal, stated that it and “other Journals 
convince[d] me intirely that the best way to the South-Sea is round Cape Horne, the 
Route we pursu’d in our Voyage.”54  Although Rogers did not identify any of the “other 
Journals” they probably included Captain Wood’s Voyage Through the Streights of 
Magellan (1699) by John Wood, commander of a ship in John Narborough’s 1669 
expedition that had also passed through the Straits and survived only due to help from 
the indigenous Patagonians. Even then, two crewmen had died from exposure and 
eating bad food.
55
 
Rogers also might have read the 1699 memoir Voyage Round the Globe in which 
William Cowley reported that, “We steered S.W. by W. resolving not to sail through the 
Magellan Streights when making the Land of Terra del Faogo, but finding great 
ripplings in the water near the Streights of Lemaire, and fearing some danger, we 
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resolved to sail about all; that is, thro the passage that Capt. Bartholomew Sharpe did 
discover in the Year 1681.”56 
The buccaneer Basil Ringrose mentioned Sharp’s voyage in his own 1685 
publication Bucaniers of America, which was also widely read. The passage that Sharp 
discovered was the route around Cape Horn, and that is what the expedition’s Council 
elected to use. Though a longer route, it was much safer than the alternative. 
The Syndicate expedition’s trip south to Cape Horn was mostly uneventful 
except for some personnel changes. Some of the men who the Syndicate selected as 
officers and mates performed poorly enough to date that Rogers and other Council 
members thought changes were necessary. On December 7, Rogers demoted one of the 
boatswain’s mates and replaced him with a skilled sailor who had shown that he was 
more suitable for the position than the man he replaced. Three days later, the two ships 
exchanged two other boatswain’s mates; the Dutchess wanting to remove a mutinous 
crewman. On December 20, Vanbrugh came back over from the Dutchess as well to re- 
assume his previous duties as the Duke’s owners’ agent. 
Gales and steady rains slowed the expedition as it sailed southward from Brazil. 
Rough seas also caused one of the Dutchess’ crewmen to fall from the mizzen-top and 
fracture his skull when his head hit the deck. The ship’s surgeon could not help him; he 
died and was buried at sea.
57
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On December 23 the expedition reached the Falkland Islands but did not drop 
anchor there due to poor weather, though Cooke wrote that the islands “look’d very 
pleasant; and we saw abundance of Ducks and small Fowl, besides Shoals of Fish.”58 
The following day, the expedition experienced the first of two portentous events 
that almost wrecked its chances of any success in the Pacific. First, the privateers spied 
a sail in the evening and gave chase for nearly two full days before losing her in a 
squall.
59  
This would have a great impact on the expedition, because its lost quarry 
promptly reported the expedition’s presence to Spanish authorities. This did not change 
the Council’s decision to continue, however, and life returned to normal enough for a 
New Year’s celebration with punch. 
The second event was a gale on January 5. When the storm broke, crewmen 
reefed sails and tried to ride it out but the Dutchess nearly foundered. Only the rupture  
of a cabin bulkhead saved her when it provided an outlet for the water she was taking on. 
The Dutchess’ crew escaped with some minor injuries but every scrap of clothing in  
their sea chests had been soaked through. Once the storm had passed, Rogers and 
Dampier inspected the Dutchess and found her crew “in a very orderly pickle, with all 
their Clothes drying, the Ship and Rigging cover’d with them from the Deck to the 
Main-Top.” But the ever-present sea spray and generally damp weather, made drying 
clothes virtually impossible. Two days later, crewmen began to fall ill from exposure. 
This added to the toll that other illnesses were taking on the crew at this point. 
On January 7, one of the Duke’s landsmen died after a two-week-long illness. A week 
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later, one of the Dutchess’ crewmen died of scurvy. That did not bode well because it 
was a sign that the privateers were starting to run out of fresh provisions with no means 
to obtain more. Despite leaving with sixteen months’ supplies, those estimates had been 
calculated for 225 men and not 330. The expedition had been gone only five months and 
was already feeling the pinch. The limes and other produce from Ilha Grande were either 
gone or spoiled. The privateers needed to find more supplies, and find them 
quickly.
60
 
Sometime, amid the sickness, cold, and damp, Rogers and company found 
themselves in the Pacific Ocean. Some sources estimate the expedition rounded Cape 
Horn on January 11, although Cooke calculated that the expedition passed Tierra del 
Fuego on January 17. Rogers’ first indication that he was in the Pacific came on January 
20, when the ships’ companies saw “high Land bearing E by N- dist. About 10 Ls. Being 
the Land about Port St. Stephen’s in the Coast or Patagonia in the South Sea.”61 
 
The Atlantic phase of its journey completed, the expedition was now in the South 
Sea. There were no more friendly Portuguese missions to trade with or British convoys 
to sail with for protection. The privateers were now entirely on their own in a hostile 
ocean. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
THE JUAN FERNANDEZ ISLANDS 
 
 
 
With its entrance into the Pacific, the expedition headed north to reach waters 
regularly trafficked by merchantmen, their main targets. While en route, the Council 
took stock of the ships’ supplies and discussed how to replenish them. The expedition 
had to balance its need to interdict shipping routes while ensuring that it stayed supplied 
and had attainable objectives. At the same time, the privateers could not deviate from 
their main objective, the Acapulco galleon. They would have to steadily move 
northward in time to meet the outgoing treasure ship. 
 
 
CHILE 
 
As the expedition sailed northward in January 1709, Woodes Rogers and Edward 
Cooke took to their journals once again to describe the new terrain they had never before 
encountered. Sailing along the coast of Chile, Rogers wrote that “the Proximity of the 
Mountains on one side, and of the Sea on the other, makes it colder than otherwise it 
would be; but it has Warmth enough, to make it one of the best Countries in America.”1 
Cooke had not been impressed with Patagonia, describing it as “one of the most 
 
wretched and miserable [places] on the Earth.” North of Reloncavi Sound, on the other 
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hand, appealed to him and he extolled it as “being one of, if not the wealthiest and most 
delightful province[s] in the universe.”2 
Cooke echoed Rogers’ sentiments regarding Chilean soil. Both reported that 
Chile’s temperate climate made it possible to grow European crops and raise European 
livestock. In his journal, Cooke gushed that “the soil is exactly like that of the happiest 
part of Europe, and produces every thing in perfection of our growth.” He then 
continued, “the Spaniards who come from other parts of America, are almost apt to think 
themselves in their own country.”3 
Cooke then continued with detailed descriptions of the seasons (based upon 
information that he later obtained from captive Spaniards), the wide variety of produce, 
and other items that might have been of interest to merchants. Cooke stated that hemp, 
for example, did not grow anywhere in the Americas except for Chile. Hemp was a vital 
component in naval stores since it was used to produce the ropes necessary for ships’ 
rigging. He also commented on the “most delicious wines” that the indigenous 
population drank “to a prodigious excess.”4 
 
Like many other get-rich-quick images that persisted in American travel journals, 
Cooke claimed that gold lay in rivers and creeks, and anyone could extract it with no 
more trouble than “taking up and washing it from the mixture of earth and sand, being 
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what we call gold dust.”5  In this way, he was similar to other travelers of his time with 
his outlandish claims of easily accessible wealth and impossibly fertile soil. 
Despite the bountiful farmland, the expedition could not benefit from any of it 
because the ships needed to stay away from the coast to avoid being spotted from shore. 
As their supplies ran short and sheer weariness began to set in, the crew suffered. The 
off Tierra del Fuego had weakened many of the men, particularly those in the Dutchess. 
Illness bred more work for the remaining healthy crew, and the added fatigue not only 
worsened health but also made shipboard accidents more likely. It was easy for tired 
men to lose their grip when working aloft and plummet into the sea or onto the hard 
wooden deck. The expedition needed to make landfall somewhere, and the ideal place 
for that was the Juan Fernandez Islands. 
The Duke lost her armorer’s mate on January 21. The following day, one of the 
Dutchess’ crew died from illnesses related to the soaking her crew received earlier that 
month. On January 26, two more men from the Dutchess died and thirty more came 
down with scurvy while others were still sick from other causes.
6  
This mirrored most 
other Pacific expeditions. The Atlantic crossing usually did not involve malnutrition 
because the ships’ stores typically lasted until their crews reached an accessible port, 
such as the Canaries or Cape Verde, where ships could replenish their provisions. The 
Pacific, on the other hand, offered little sustenance to those unwelcome in those waters. 
The Syndicate ships might have eventually been lost because none of their navigation 
charts agreed on the Juan Fernandez Islands’ precise location. 
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Fortunately for the expedition, it was already very close to the islands and had 
decent navigators. The privateers did not have to wait very long to find safe harbor and 
put the sick ashore. Nonetheless, another Dutchess crewman had to be buried before the 
ships safely arrived and dropped anchor on February 2.
7
 
 
JUAN FERNANDEZ 
 
The Juan Fernandez Islands are located approximately 400 miles off the Chilean 
coast. At the time, its three volcanic islands were called Mas a Tierra, Santa Clara, and 
Mas a Fuera. With favorable winds, a ship could set out due east from the islands and 
reach Valparaiso in four days.
8  
They were the site of an abandoned Spanish colony and 
a favorite haunt for buccaneers and privateers. 
Bartholomew Sharp, Basil Ringrose, John Watling, Edward Davis, and William 
Dampier had all used the Juan Fernandez Islands as a stopping point or forward 
operating base. The remaining vegetables and livestock from the failed colony suited 
their foraging lifestyle. Sharp had described his stay in 1680 as a mostly pleasant 
experience until his crew accused him of hoarding and general incompetence, voted him 
out of command, and put him in restraints. He favorably described the islands as “a very 
refreshing Place” that gave his crew enough provisions to continue hunting for prizes.9 
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The islands’ location suited privateers; they were close to coastal shipping lanes, 
but far enough offshore that the Spanish could not mount an immediate response from 
the mainland. Furthermore, as other British privateers had noted, the islands might 
possess some of the most defensible terrain. Several bays contained safe anchorages and 
were suitable for landings, and the islands possessed enough high ground to give any 
defender a commanding view of all approaches. This defensibility was one of the  
factors behind previous castaways surviving for so long, and a properly equipped and 
maintained garrison might have constructed an unassailable fortress. “Either of these 
Bays may be fortified with little charge,” wrote Dampier on Mas a Tierra, “there is no 
coming into these Bays from the West end, but with great difficulty, over the 
Mountains.”10 
 
Selkirk 
 
The Syndicate expedition, prompted by deteriorating health conditions, quickly 
made a landing. Its shore party consisted of Dover, the chief lieutenant Robert Frye, and 
six sailors. As the party approached Mas a Tierra, it saw an unusual goatskin-clad 
individual curiously observing them from shore. The strange man, a Scot by the name of 
Alexander Selkirk, had been marooned there since 1704 and was living proof of 
Dampier’s failures as a leader, since Selkirk had been one of Dampier’s sailors and 
marooned indirectly due to Dampier’s ineffectiveness. 
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Selkirk had sailed with Dampier in 1703, serving as sailing master of the Cinque 
Ports. When the captain of that vessel died, Selkirk clashed with his successor, Thomas 
Stradling. When the ship left Juan Fernandez, Selkirk elected to remain on the island 
until another English expedition picked him up. He also may have stayed because the 
ship was not seaworthy.
11
 
Unlike the literary Robinson Crusoe figure that he later inspired, Selkirk was not 
left with only the clothes on his back and some flotsam, but also had his sea chest and 
some tools. At first Selkirk subsisted on seal meat and some vegetables – cabbages and 
turnips – that had been planted by previous Spanish colonists and by members of 
Bartholomew Sharp’s expedition when it visited the islands in 1680. Selkirk also had 
access to pimiento and pepper trees so his seasoned meat was more palatable than the 
salted meats that most sailors ate as staples.
12
 
 
Perhaps the most significant difference between Selkirk and Crusoe was 
opportunity; Selkirk could have left the island at several points during his stay while 
Crusoe was isolated with no chance of escape. The Spanish had come by periodically to 
water and revictual, although Selkirk “resolv’d rather to converse with his goats, than be 
beholding to that nation for his deliverance from that prison.”13 
The Spanish, for their part, reinforced Selkirk’s mistrust. The one time he had 
 
revealed himself to a Spanish shore party, the Spaniards shot at him and chased him 
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through the undergrowth. By that time he had conditioned himself to the rough terrain 
and the Spaniards gave up the chase, leaving him in a state of long-term distrust. 
When she first anchored at Juan Fernandez, the Dutchess flew a French ensign 
because the privateers were worried that the Spanish had stationed a garrison there. This 
was a standard privateering ploy, but it had also served to further confuse Selkirk.
14
 
The privateers invited him onboard, but Selkirk hesitated and inquired if a certain 
unspecified officer was on one of the ships. This officer had clearly not been on friendly 
terms with Selkirk. Upon hearing that the officer was indeed onboard, Selkirk “would 
rather have chosen to remain in his solitude, than come away with him, ‘till inform’d  
that he did not command.”15 
The “certain officer” referred to was either John Ballett, the Duke’s surgeon, who 
 
had served alongside Selkirk during Dampier’s 1703 disaster or Dampier who, as the 
commanding officer would have had much more opportunity to abuse or annoy 
Selkirk.
16  
As for how Dampier felt about Selkirk, he seemed to have harbored no 
animosity after all those years and so vouched for Selkirk’s seamanship. 
After years of abject loneliness, punctuated only by sheer terror when pursued by 
the Spanish, it took Selkirk time to adjust to the expedition’s arrival and he only 
gradually increased contact with the new arrivals. When invited for dinner the first 
evening ashore, Robert Frye made the difficult climb through the rocks to reach 
Selkirk’s isolated hideout. Over the next several days, Selkirk began interacting with 
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progressively larger groups. On their part, the visitors accepted his feelings and gave 
him time to decompress between social events. The shore party had also invited Selkirk 
to visit their ships but gave him the option of returning to shore in case he felt pressured. 
Selkirk returned the courtesy by giving the visitors some of his domesticated goats. For 
men who had recently completed a grueling trip around Cape Horn, the fresh meat was a 
boon. 
Selkirk found camaraderie in the officers’ mess and grew accustomed to human 
interaction once again. The expedition’s strategy of slowly reintegrating him into its 
society was prudent. Thrusting Selkirk directly from his secluded hideout and into a 
ship’s company would have backfired. He had lived in solitude for years, and throwing 
him head-first into intimate and physically constraining working environments could 
have triggered a defensive demeanor in Selkirk. To further entice him, the expedition 
assured Selkirk that he would not enter the expedition as a common rating, but rather as 
a mate on the Duke and ultimately assume a position of command. 
Thus reassured and given time to adjust to regular human contact, Selkirk agreed 
to join the expedition. After being alone with no one to talk to, Selkirk had forgotten 
how to speak coherently. It took him some time after he began living onboard ship to 
regain fluency. 
 
 
LOBOS 
 
The expedition remained on Juan Fernandez from February 2 until February 14. 
During the privateers’ time on the island, Selkirk, eager to help his newfound shipmates, 
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prepared a stew of vegetables and goat meat that helped the sick to recover from scurvy. 
Of the approximately fifty crewmen who were ill when the expedition put in to Juan 
Fernandez, only two perished from the affliction during their stay. The expedition’s 
coopers made new barrels which were filled with fresh water. This replaced the remains 
of the water last replenished three months ago at Ilha Grande and long since gone foul. 
The crewmen also hunted enough seals to produce eighty gallons of oil for lamp oil and 
candle wax, although the messes often used it as an alternative to butter in which they 
fried their rations.
17  
When it came time to depart, Selkirk did not have to leave the 
island and join the expedition. However, given his skills as a sailing master, expedition 
leaders maintained their standing invitation and he felt it was time to leave his home of 
the past several years. 
The privateers’ next destination was the island group Islas Lobos de Afuera, 
2000 miles to the north, off Peru’s Illescas Peninsula and just a short distance south by 
southwest from the port of Paita. In the event of being separated, both ships were to 
head for Lobos independently. The first arrival was instructed to “set up two Crosses, 
one at the Landing-place nearest the farther end of the Starboard great Island going in, 
with a Glass-Bottle hid under ground 20 Yards directly North from each Cross, with 
Intelligence of what has happen’d since parting, and what their further Designs are.”18 
 
Before reaching Lobos, the Council again revised its “Affair of Plunder” on 
February 17. It appointed eight officers as managers of plunder, who were instructed to 
search everybody who returned from a prize. The only other people allowed to be 
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involved in sorting plunder were the commanding officers. Being so far away from 
Britain, the Council members were concerned that perceived unfairness in the 
distribution of spoils might lead to conflict. To avoid dissention, the managers were to 
search every man who had a chance to hide any plunder. The last thing the Council 
wanted was to repeat Sharp’s experience as his crew had turned on him over alleged 
inequity in dividing plunder. 
The expedition’s officers also revised their tactics to fit geographical conditions 
in the area. They ordered the Duke’s pinnaces outfitted with swivel guns so they might 
chase small vessels into shallow waters that the frigates dared not enter. While cruising 
for prizes, the pinnaces could sail the shallow waters close to shore while the Duke and 
Dutchess cruised approximately seven leagues (about 25 miles) from the mainland to 
avoid detection. 
The Syndicate’s orders allowed Rogers and the Council substantial leeway in 
selecting their own objectives. Finding no vessels to attack where they were, the 
Council decided to cruise northward in pursuit of prizes entering or leaving the regional 
shipping hub of Guayaquil. The Council also decided to raid the town itself if the 
opportunity arose. 
All the officers and men were eager to start plundering. On March 10, there was 
a terrible commotion as the expedition took to the boats and rowed after a collection of 
sails, only to find that they were chasing white rocks and sea foam. “Our Men begin to 
151  
 
repine,” Rogers noted in his journal, “that tho come so far, we have met with no Prize in 
these Seas.”19 
Conditions onboard the Duke were tolerable at this point. The fishing was good 
and the weather, along with morale, had finally improved despite the lack of captures. 
The Dutchess was another story, however, and Cooke wrote that he had to put three of 
his crewmen in irons. They had hoarded some meat for themselves instead of sharing it 
among the crew. Courtney ordered two of the hoarders to be “whipp’d and pickled.” 
That is, they were flogged and then had brine water lathered on their bloody cuts. The 
brine disinfected open wounds but stung smartly. The other officers intervened to 
prevent him from doing the same to the third offender.
20
 
Noting that they had not encountered any traffic since the Falklands, expedition 
leaders concluded that the Spaniards were staying in port because of Lent. The officers 
then agreed that it made no sense to cruise for prizes when there was little chance 
finding any and agreed instead to attack the town of Guayaquil. To prepare for such an 
attack, the expedition headed for Lobos as planned, and there to construct a vessel for an 
amphibious attack on Guayaquil. While en route to Lobos, scurvy began to take a toll 
on crewmen and officers. 
On March 15, the expedition’s luck finally turned for the better when the small 
16-ton vessel Asuncion mistook the frigates for French privateers and sailed straight up 
to the Dutchess. The Spanish bark was quickly captured but proved to have nothing 
onboard but an eight-man crew, cargo – mostly plantains – worth only £5, and £50 in 
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silver for purchasing flour at Cheripe. More importantly, the crew had some valuable 
news. The French expedition the privateers had heard about in the Canaries had left the 
Pacific six months ago. As far as the Mestizo captain was concerned, no English 
interlopers had been in the South Sea since Dampier in 1703 and the Spanish Lake was 
secure. 
The quarry that had eluded the expedition on Christmas Eve, off the Falklands, 
was commanded by the French privateer Alain Poree. The St. Malo mariner had  
reported the presence of the British privateers to Spanish authorities at the nearest port 
(probably Valdivia), but they were not particularly alarmed and did not dispatch vessels 
to warn officials elsewhere of the presence of the British ships. Given the languid pace 
of colonial communications networks, most of the Spanish coastal settlements and traffic 
remained completely unaware of Rogers’ presence.21 
Of personal interest to Dampier and Selkirk, the captives informed them the 
Cinque Ports from their old expedition had foundered. Stradling and the surviving 
handful of crewmen had been prisoners in Lima for the past four years, and in harsh 
living conditions. Selkirk could have felt validated at this new revelation, as Stradling 
had indeed brought his part of the last expedition to a bad end.
22
 
The Syndicate privateers named this, their first prize, Beginning. She was not 
 
much of a seizure, but it was good to finally have an unmitigated success after months of 
frustration. There was no acrimony, no lost opportunity, no flirting with outright piracy, 
and no diplomatic tightrope act as at the Canaries. The Council decided to place Cooke 
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in command of the Beginning (soon afterwards replaced by William Stretton) while the 
expedition put into Lobos on March 16. 
The expedition immediately set about building a boat and conducting repairs on 
the island. It did not intend to stay there long because Lobos had no source of fresh 
water and lacked edible vegetation. The only wildlife consisted of seals that loitered 
ashore. The expedition needed to move on quickly before it ran out of supplies, so the 
crews quickly began replacing worn masts, careening the Duke and Dutchess and 
cleaned their hulls, and converted the tiny Beginning into a warship. After transferring 
guns, supplies, and crewmen, she boasted 32 crewmen and four swivel guns. The 
privateers did not repair all the ships at once, but rotated them so there was always an 
escort to act as a lookout and defend the group at a moment’s notice. 
Once brought ashore, the sick began to recuperate. The fishing was plentiful and 
the seals provided some fresh meat. However, a Spaniard in the company suddenly died 
of an illness contracted after eating a seal liver. Seal liver contained so much vitamin A 
that it could be toxic, especially to individuals in poor health. The Spaniard’s already 
weakened condition, combined with the vitamin A toxicity, was likely too much for his 
body to metabolize.
23  
The prisoners had warned the privateers to avoid liver and Rogers 
 
forbade anyone else from eating those organs. Nevertheless, despite this incident the 
expedition’s health improved and scurvy began to abate.24 
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The privateers’ luck improved further on March 26, when the Dutchess and 
Beginning returned from a local voyage with the 50-ton Santa Josefa in tow. The 
expedition renamed their second prize Increase and put Selkirk in command. Like the 
Beginning, the Santa Josefa was out of Guayaquil and carried little cargo other than 
timber and cocoa, the latter of which was immediately distributed among the crewmen. 
Cocoa, although valuable as a cash crop, was also a popular drink in those waters 
because it was readily available and most merchantmen out of Guayaquil carried some. 
Recounting the 1703 expedition, William Funnell wrote that “living near a Month upon 
Chocolate, it made us very fat, and we found that it kept us very well in Health. 
Whether, if we had lived upon it much longer, it would have done us hurt, I know not; 
but I venture to believe it would have increased our Fat too fast, and so have made us 
unhealthy.”25 
The Increase was converted into a hospital ship and much of her lower decks 
were cleared to make more room for the sick men, with the extra planks from the 
dismantled partitions spread around the other ships. All the sick, along with two 
surgeons, were transferred to the Increase once the expedition was ready to sail. 
So far, both of their prizes had set sail from Guayaquil. Prisoners taken with 
their second prize, however, brought news that made the privateers shift their primary 
target to Paita. The late Viceroy of Peru’s widow had been scheduled to leave for 
Acapulco in a 36-gun galleon, and would stop at Paita for resupply. While that 
particular ship was already too far away to chase down, the prisoners also informed their 
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captors that another opulent prize was fitting out in Paita, and that yet another richly 
laden ship, bound from Panama, would be there in a few days. Paita was a common 
meeting place for ships engaged in trade with Lima, Panama, and the Pacific coast of 
Mexico. The Council met on March 29 and voted to cruise off Paita, but to keep 
Guayaquil as a secondary objective. 
That same day, soon after the Council meeting, the expedition left Lobos for the 
waters off Paita, leaving three crewmen buried: two Spaniards and a Dutchman. 
Knowing that their success relied on stealth, the Council members published an order 
that forbade everyone from the captains down to the landsmen to speak with the 
prisoners regarding the voyage. 
On April 1, the privateers saw no action but observed a red tide. As the fish 
congregated for spawning, they also drew predators such as swordfish. Despite the 
sudden influx of fish, the privateers had little luck replenishing their supplies. “For 
some Days we here observ’d the Sea look’d as red as Blood in several places,” Cooke 
wrote, “and saw many large Sword-Fishes, but could take none . . . .”26 
On April 2, the Duke’s pinnace under Frye captured the galleon Ascension. 
 
Displacing 400-500 tons, she carried dry goods, livestock, timber, some wealthy 
passengers, and 72 slaves. Coasting in friendly territory and with well-to-do passengers 
who expected better meals, the Ascension carried fresh provisions such as mutton and 
cabbage, which the privateers eagerly devoured. The Council placed Frye in command 
of the new prize and the Duke had her first capture of the voyage. 
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The very next day, the Beginning captured the 35-ton coastal merchantman Jesus 
Maria y Jose carrying timber, pitch, and candles from Guayaquil. After assessing the 
assortment of silver pesos and gold paper, dust, and nuggets, the managers estimated 
£100 in currency and specie. The prize crew also confirmed the earlier rumors that a ship 
was indeed carrying the Bishop of Chokeaqua with 200,000 pieces of eight. He was 
supposed to have sailed on the Ascension but she had sprung a leak in Panama. Not 
wanting to delay his journey, the bishop had boarded a French ship but was still bound 
for Paita, so the expedition might yet capture him.
27  
The expedition then set out its 
forces to cover a wider area, with its armed ships on the alert in case the rumored fat 
prizes came in or out of Paita. So far the British had not lost a single man to enemy 
action. Their prizes, in fact, had not even put up a fight. Most struck their colors at the 
first warning shot. 
With this latest capture, the expedition was meeting with not just middling but 
startling success. Most privateers averaged two or three prizes a year. The Syndicate’s 
ships had been gone for not even a full year and had already captured four, not including 
the disputed prize off the Canaries. The privateers’ four legitimate prizes had been taken 
over the span of several weeks. Now that the expedition was in enemy territory, with 
unsuspecting and vulnerable coastal shipping within reach, it seemed that the privateers’ 
fortunes could only rise on success after success. 
Just as morale reached a high point and the expedition enjoyed heady triumphs, 
the infighting that privateers were infamous for appeared. Vanbrugh, who had earlier 
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caused a commotion on Lobos by threatening one of his shipmates, landed himself in 
even more trouble. Shortly after leaving Lobos, he completely burned his bridges in the 
Council by “having lately abus’d Capt. Dover, as he said.”28  Upset at Vanbrugh’s 
behavior, the Council met to consider disciplining him. Vanbrugh exacerbated his 
situation when he offered to vote with Rogers in all things in exchange for Rogers’ 
voting for clemency, which Rogers perceived as the bribe it was. The Council also 
considered a pre-engaged vote to be a breach in trust, as Vanbrugh was an owner’s agent 
and entrusted with at least part of the expedition’s fate. The aggregate effect of all these 
infractions resulted in a Council review on April 7. Vanbrugh was not just removed 
from the Duke for a short sentence, as had happened previously, but formally expelled 
from the Council on April 10. The Council members were technically not allowed to do 
so, but they felt removing him was more important than obeying protocol. The 
apothecary Samuel Hopkins, Dover’s lieutenant and relation, assumed Vanbrugh’s 
responsibilities as agent. Hopkins was a wise choice because he was close to Dover and 
so represented the Syndicate’s interests by extension.29 
 
At the same Council meeting, the officers also decided to “approve of all the 
Proceedings and Transactions since our leaving the Island of Grande . . . and acting in all 
cases for the best of our intended Voyage to this time.”30  Although it might seem self- 
serving, this statement of approval was meant to preclude any recriminations that would 
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follow should the voyage turn sour. Dampier had done no such thing in 1703, leading 
some of his officers to publish damning accounts. By endorsing all their decisions since 
Ilha Grande, Rogers, Dover, and the other officers had also agreed to not bring up those 
decisions with which to slander each other in the future. Such a statement approving 
past actions was one component in following the Syndicate’s original instructions to 
maintain “an entire Amity Respect & Agreemt” among the officers.31 
As the expedition steadily sailed northward, the temperatures climbed and the 
officers knew they were running out of fresh water. On April 12, the Council met and, 
after factoring in their ships’ water supply and consulting the captive Spanish pilots, 
decided to make for the port of Guayaquil as originally intended. The Council wanted to 
seize the rich prizes around Paita but could not wait much longer. Despite the 
expedition’s recent successes, dehydrated sailors were of little use and Guayaquil 
promised not just plunder, but sweet water and fresh food. 
 
 
TARGET: GUAYAQUIL 
 
While the expedition had taken two valuable prizes, it looked ashore for even 
greater plunder. Privateers often sacked coastal villages and even fair-sized port cities. 
With approximately 2,000 people, Guayaquil was then—after Callao and Valparaiso— 
the third largest port on the Pacific coast of South America. Its economy was based on 
processing and exporting cocoa and on serving as a regional shipping hub. 
Manufactured goods, olive oil, and copper all made their way through its port and 
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customs.
32  
It also served as a trading hub between Peru and Mexico. Merchants in 
Mexico imported quicksilver (mercury) from Spain and sold it – with astonishingly high 
mark-ups – to physicians who prescribed it as a cure for syphilis and to refiners who 
used it to purify silver extracted from base ore. Peru also produced quicksilver and 
many Mexican refiners sought to clandestinely purchase the much less expensive 
Peruvian quicksilver. Punishment for dealing with illicit merchandise, Rogers noted, 
meant exile or jail time. Rogers remarked “yet notwithstanding the severity us’d against 
private traders, by the viceroys and corregidores, there are some that use it, who have no 
mercy shew’d them if caught.”33 
The Spanish viceroyalties prohibited the purchase or sale of English and Dutch 
goods. Ignoring the law, rescatadores purchased goods from merchants on mainland 
North America and sold them in small quantities throughout Peru. Wholesale merchants 
could not purchase large quantities because they needed to possess certificates from 
Seville indicating that their inventory came from the flotas or other galleons. These 
small packets of illicit merchandise often trickled through Guayaquil. Failure to produce 
a clean bill of goods, Rogers explained, would result in “worse punishment, unless they 
have a good interest in the viceroy, which costs dear to purchase, and preserve; so that 
the trader makes little profit, but where the chief officers have a feeling: yet tho’ these 
mercenary viceroys are so severe on others, they themselves employ the corregidores to 
negotiate a trade for them by a third hand.”34 
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More honest residents also made a living by building ships, and thus the town 
contained valuable naval stores and other materials that Rogers’ expedition desperately 
needed after the arduous passage into the Pacific.
35  
As a matter of fact, Guayaquil 
possessed the only shipwrights on Peru’s Pacific coast legally allowed to build ships.36 
 
Rogers noted that Guayaquil possessed “several sorts of good timber, which makes it the 
chief country of Peru for building and repairing ships; there’s seldom less than 6 or 7 at a 
time on the stocks before the town of Guayaquil.”37 
Jesuits, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Augustinians each ran an establishment in 
the town, including both a hospital and a convent. This collection of priests, friars, and 
nuns served five churches that catered to a diverse population that represented Spain’s 
colorful and oftentimes blurry racial hierarchy. Each of these establishments also held 
funds obtained from donations and offerings from attendees and pilgrims. 
As president of the real audiencia, Juan de Sosaya officially administered the 
region from his seat at Quito. He enjoyed running a relatively quiet region, especially 
compared to the constant, sustained warfare that marked Iberian coastal cities. Since 
Sosaya had paid 20,000 pesos for his appointment, he must have anticipated opportunity 
for both legitimate and illicit profit in running the region.
38  
Sosaya also supervised 
Guayaquil’s corregidor, Don Ieronimo Bosa y Solis y Pacheco, a native of Tenerife, 
who directly presided over the settlement. 
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In order to reach Guayaquil, ships traveling from the south (as the Syndicate 
ships were) needed to sail north from Paita, round Cape Blanco, anchor at Punta Arena 
or Isla Santa Clara in the Gulf of Guayaquil, and wait until high tide enabled them to sail 
up the Guayas River.
39  
From the mouth of the Guayas, it was 40 miles north to 
Guayaquil, but only when measured in a straight line. The winding estuaries practically 
doubled the distance.
40
 
Upon reaching the river, navigators found easy sailing so long as they stayed on 
the main waterways. When ocean-going ships ascended the river for seven leagues they 
reached the island of Puna, where the river turned into an estuary and became too 
shallow for ships. The island’s sole village rested on its extreme northwestern corner 
and provided a valuable service, as many of the inhabitants were skilled pilots who 
intimately knew the local waters. From Puna village it was seven more leagues to the 
older section of Guayaquil.
41  
In 1709, townspeople used small boats or a half-mile long 
 
wooden bridge to link this riverside section to the newer residential portion of town that 
nestled in the lowlands to the south, farther away from the river. This division of 
Guayaquil resulted from a 1687 buccaneering raid led by François Grogniet that virtually 
destroyed the original settlement, and led officials to construct much of the new        
town inland and almost entirely avoid building on the eastern bank. The almost island- 
like position of the new portion of the town and its garrison of several hundred militia 
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rendered Guayaquil safe from attack so long as it controlled chokepoints along the 
approach to the town. 
Despite the defenders’ advantage, Guayaquil was an attractive target for Rogers 
and the Council, who had learned that the previous corregidor had accumulated 300,000 
pieces of eight, despite earning only 2000 annually in his salary. Rogers had also heard 
that the previous Viceroy of Peru, who had died in 1705, had left an immense estate 
worth eight million pieces of eight in cash and property to be distributed among his 
heirs. Spanish officials had a history of padding their salaries through kickbacks, “ the 
seizure of property from convicted criminals, and trading privately themselves.”42 
Rogers summed his view of the area up in his journal, saying “there’s no country 
naturally more rich, nor any people more terribly oppres’d.”43 
Once Guayquil was chosen as a target, the privateers had to plan how to attack it. 
 
The planning phase illustrated not only how eager the Council was to launch an 
aggressive assault, but how unprepared it was for such actions. 
 
 
Approach into Guayas River 
 
The Council met on April 12 and appointed Rogers, Dover, and Courtney to lead 
the attack. The three officers decided to divide their forces giving each command of a 
party of approximately 70 raiders. Dampier and Thomas Glendale commanded the 
artillery pieces and 21 men that the raiders would bring ashore as an attached, non- 
independent force to act as a reserve. Within those units, each group of ten men was led 
 
42 
Rogers, A Cruising Voyage, 107. 
43 
Ibid. 
163  
 
by a trustworthy sailor who answered to the senior officers. In total this resulted in 
between 201 (according to Rogers) and 238 (according to Cooke) officers and men 
assigned for the raid in seven boats. The remaining crewmen, along with most of the 
Council (including Cooke), were to guard the ships and prisoners.
44
 
Rogers, Dover, and Courtney were given full initiative to devise their strategy on 
 
the spot.
45  
None of these three officers had any experience fighting on land. At this 
point, their only plan was for the ships to stand to in open water, approximately 36 
leagues from Guayaquil. The ships’ boats were to transport the raiders up the Guayas 
River undetected until they reached Guayaquil itself. Once the boats were away, the rest 
of the expedition was to cruise in the gulf for 48 hours, at which time they were to make 
for Punta Arena and await further instructions from the raiding party.
46
 
The Council also agreed on the handling of captured goods, stating that “all 
bedding and cloaths, gold rings, buttons, and buckles, liquors and provisions . . . with all 
sorts of arms, except great guns for ships, should be allow’d as plunder, to be equally 
divided to every man aboard, or ashore, according to his whole shares.”47 
In addition, it decreed that any prisoners taken should be exchanged to obtain the 
 
return any of the crewmen captured by the Spanish. Crewmen were instructed to report 
all precious metals, gemstones, and pearls so long as they were not part of the prisoners’ 
personal possessions or clothing. 
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At the conclusion of the raid, the expedition’s accountants would inventory and 
appraise the value of the plunder taken and divide it into equal shares. The accountants 
were empowered to reward men who had displayed conspicuous skill or bravery in the 
action with extra shares above the number previously assigned and, likewise, to punish 
men who had displayed cowardice, drunkenness, or brutality towards prisoners by 
denying them shares. Any attempt by a crewman to conceal valuable items taken during 
the raid would be “look’d upon as a high misdemeanour, and severely punish’d.”48  That 
 
punishment could be as high as forfeiture of any share in the group proceeds from the 
raid, depending on how much was concealed. 
The organization of the raid and the method of handling anticipated plunder 
settled, the expedition ships entered the Gulf of Guayaquil on April 14 and spent the 
night there. It almost lost the element of surprise the next morning when lookouts spied 
a French-built merchantman, the Havre de Grace, as she exited the Guayas River. There 
was little wind, so the expedition needed to improvise. It sent two boats (one from each 
ship) towards the quarry in an attempt to surprise her. The boat crews were so confident 
after a month of unbroken successes that they were scarcely prepared. Neither boat had  
a swivel gun and, between the two crews, only ten muskets and four pistols with a 
limited amount of powder. 
Privateers were notorious for deceiving their quarry by flying neutral or allied 
colors, or simply by pretending to be harmless fellow sailors who merely wanted to hear 
the latest news. In this case, the privateers ran up Spanish colors and feigned friendship 
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and camaraderie as they approached the Havre de Grace. They intended to close the 
distance, with each boat settling on opposite ends of the ship. If all went to plan, the 
boat crews would carry her by boarding before the Spanish suspected them of being 
enemies. 
The men on the Duke’s boat, however, fired their musket volley far too early. 
 
With both sides caught unprepared, the privateers and Spanish fought a sharp, disjointed 
action. The expedition’s boats had been caught out of position and undergunned while 
the Spanish tried to repel them with partridge shot from only six mounted guns. The 
Havre de Grace initially drove off her attackers and tried to put out to open water, but 
when the Dutchess got close enough to fire on the ship and the boat crews closed to 
within several hundred feet to prepare for another boarding action, the Spanish struck 
their colors.
49  
It had been a sloppy fight lasting several hours when it should have been 
over in minutes. While the privateers had only suffered two dead and three wounded, 
Cooke noted that “one of the dead men was Mr. John Rogers, our second lieutenant, and 
brother to Capt. Rogers, who behav’d himself very well during the action.”50 
When the Council met later to discuss the entire encounter, Rogers and Courtney 
 
each denied having ordered the boats to launch the attack in such an unready state. The 
two boat commanders, Frye and Cooke, were criticized for acting so hastily but in the 
end the Council did not blame anyone in particular for the near failure of the operation. 
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Yet the poor preparation and lack of coordination between the boats were signs of 
systemic problems which would reappear with grave consequences later.
51
 
The Havre de Grace carried 29 passengers, 29 crew and servants, and 74 
slaves.
52  
The privateers had just missed a second opportunity to capture another Spanish 
bishop and his retinue, who had arranged for passage on the Havre de Grace but instead 
took an overland route ten days before. However, the other passengers were worth a 
healthy ransom. Between the passengers and captive Spanish officers, 31 of whom had 
the honorific “Don” in front of their names, they possessed substantial personal wealth 
and standing.
53  
The Havre de Grace’s cargo mostly consisted of textiles and clothing, 
although she had a number of pearls as well. She also provided the immediate benefit of 
500 hundredweight of jerked beef and 40 bushels of corn. The Council placed Cooke 
onboard with a prize crew.
54
 
While the privateers assessed their prize, they still remained on the lookout for 
more prizes. The next day, the Duke’s boats chased down an unnamed 15-ton bark that 
carried a small cargo of soap, cassia, fistula, and leather, along with some flour for 
provisions. Not wishing to divert prize crews to such an insubstantial vessel and 
certainly not willing to let the bark go adrift, the privateers elected to transfer her cargo 
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and crew to their own ships, and scuttle her.
55  
The privateers then gathered the dead 
from the previous day’s action, read the proper prayers, and buried them at sea. Rogers 
had not been able to grieve the loss of his brother John who was among the dead as he 
had spent the previous day assessing the prize, but now he finally had time to mourn. 
Recounting the burial, Rogers opened up a little more and wrote that “all our officers 
express’d a great concern for the loss of my brother, he being a very hopeful active 
young man, a little above twenty years of age.”56  With his brother’s death, Rogers not 
only suffered a deep personal loss; he also lost an ally in the expedition’s Council. As 
infighting increased, Rogers would miss his brother’s presence and support. 
Following their encounters with the last two prizes, the expedition pressed ahead 
to launch its attack on Guayaquil before the inhabitants were alerted to their danger. 
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CHAPTER VII 
 
THE RAID ON GUAYAQUIL 
 
 
 
With the fight against the Havre de Grace behind it, the expedition proceeded 
with its original plan to attack Guayaquil. That battle, and the subsequent actions 
against Spanish shipping, placed the privateers between two conflicting goals. Before 
the privateers left Bristol, the Syndicate instructed the expedition’s general Council to 
exploit every opportunity that arose to make or take money. And yet, at the same time, 
the privateers were told to exercise enough restraint that local Spaniards would be 
willing to trade with British merchants, namely the Syndicate members, after the war’s 
end. In short, the crewmen needed to successfully raid like buccaneers but without the 
wanton violence and cruelty, which were two of the principal weapons in the 
buccaneers’ arsenal that made them so effective. 
The privateers needed to act quickly if they were to have the element of surprise 
on their side. On April 17, Woodes Rogers read an “Encouragement” to the crewmen of 
the Duke and Dutchess. Written by Rogers, Thomas Dover, and Stephen Courtney, it 
impressed upon the sailors the importance of their behavior during the attack on and 
occupation of Guayaquil, informed them in no uncertain terms that brutality and 
concealing plunder would not be tolerated, and outlined why not everybody was going to 
participate in the attack. The Council explained that the expedition needed to maintain a 
rally point in case the assault failed, and that the over 300 prisoners in the expedition’s 
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custody needed to be guarded. Most were put in restraints while eight, deemed too 
dangerous to be left onboard ship, would accompany the landing force.
1
 
At 10:00 p.m. on the same day that Rogers addressed the crewmen, the 200 or so 
attackers began boarding seven of the ships’ boats for Guayaquil.2  The plan was to first 
slowly and carefully approach Puna Island (not to be confused with the Puna Altiplano  
in present day Bolivia and Peru). They planned to reach the island at 11 o’clock on the 
night of April 19, to rest a few hours, then send a 40-man vanguard to attack the island’s 
only village before dawn the next morning. With surprise on their side, the landing party 
expected to capture the village quickly. Once that was accomplished, the attackers were 
to rest a few hours and then proceed upriver to Guayaquil. 
The approach went as planned for the next two days until they came within sight 
of the village. The raid was very nearly botched when some Indian fishermen spotted 
them but, instead of hesitating, the privateers took initiative and overran the village 
without firing a shot.
3  
Immediately upon occupying the village, the raiders rendered 
every canoe and small boat at the posts and within the town unusable. The attack 
surprised the Spanish and triggered a complete collapse in their morale. The Spanish did 
not even have the presence of mind to dispatch a messenger to Guayaquil.
4
 
Unlike the old buccaneers, however, Rogers and his colleagues did not execute 
or torture random civilians in an attempt to find hidden caches of personal property. 
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Slitting throats, especially when the village was already won, would have guaranteed the 
locals’ hatred.5 
As the crewmen combed through the town for loot, they found a Spanish 
dispatch warning Lieutenant Andres Zamora, commander of Puna’s defenses, to be on 
the lookout for Dampier, who was suspected of accompanying a British squadron in the 
Pacific. Word of the Syndicate expedition’s presence had finally reached the coastal 
settlements. This did not bode well, but at least the Spanish had overestimated the 
expedition’s strength and thus were overly cautious. 
Printed in Lima on March 20, the dispatch was distributed throughout Peru. 
 
Warned of the presence of the British privateers, Spanish officials had already mobilized 
their forces to defend against the privateers. The ships at the Spaniards’ disposal were 
not poorly armed merchantmen, but frigates built to destroy privateersmen. Those ships, 
however, were stationed near the major shipping lanes in Callao, Pisco, and Concepcion. 
Confident that it would take at least 24 days for officials to organize and launch a 
counter-attack from Lima, the privateers expected they would have plenty of time to 
carry the weak defenses at Guayaquil, loot the city, and then sail safely away.
6  
On a 
more disturbing note, the dispatch also instructed officials in Guayaquil to move their 
coastal population, livestock, and supplies inland. The Spanish clearly intended to starve 
the privateers out. With no reliable supply line, any pirates or privateers could operate in 
the area for only a limited time.
7
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APPROACHING GUAYAQUIL 
The privateers began losing discipline immediately after occupying the village on 
Puna Island. Rogers, Courtney, and Dampier gave their 40-man shore party until 
evening to rest, but the delays piled up. Two of the crewmen found liquor and drank so 
much that they became useless. The vessels that were to bring Courtney and Dampier’s 
forces to Puna and join with Rogers’ remained out in the bay. One of the barks went off 
on its own and simply got lost trying to find Puna. When Rogers went back down the 
river to Dover’s group in order to gather the reinforcements, Courtney and Dampier sent 
some half-crewed barks ahead towards Guayaquil (they were recovered later). The two 
officers thought they were exercising initiative but that meant there was not enough  
room in the other boats for all the privateers left on the island, especially not when 
Rogers arrived with the rest of the party in tow. Some had to either cram into  
overloaded barks or be left behind as an improvised garrison once the group was ready  
to leave. The three leading officers and Dampier were so frustrated by the delays and 
miscommunication that the senior officers took one of the two drunk sailors who were 
still recovering from their debauchery after the attack and “had him severely whipt before 
the whole company as a terror to the rest.”8
Once the shore party departed from the village, the privateers took Zamora with 
them and cautiously advanced towards Guayaquil that evening, again using the 
mangroves for concealment and stopping frequently so as not to lose stragglers. The 
8 
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groups of privateersmen did not fully unite until the morning of April 21, when they 
made contact with the stray boats. The privateers reached Guayaquil’s outskirts at 
around midnight on April 21-22, with the newer half of the town in sight. The officers 
expected to land on Guayaquil’s riverbank within a half-hour and surprise the town. 
They were dismayed when they spotted their target, because Guayaquil’s lamps were lit 
and there was an enormous bonfire on a nearby hill.
9  
The townspeople created a great 
cacophony of gunfire and ringing church bells, indistinguishable from a general alarm. 
The officers asked the Indian guides if there had been a saint’s feast scheduled for that 
evening, and the guides replied that it must be an alarm. 
It had actually been a feast day, the Eve of the Invention of the Holy Cross. The 
predominantly Protestant crew had no way of knowing, while the Catholic crewmen 
might not have been aware that the English and Spanish calendars differed by over a 
week, with the privateers operating on April 22 while the Spanish New Style calendars 
showed May 2.
10
 
The privateers waited and kept themselves concealed. Rogers, Dover, and 
 
Courtney spent over an hour in one of the boats deliberating on the next course of action. 
They consulted Dampier, who had raided the waters around Guayaquil in 1684, and 
asked what the buccaneers he had sailed with would have done. Dampier replied that 
buccaneers never attacked any large settlement after it had sounded the alarm. 
Discussion turned into arguments and shouting matches as Rogers insisted on attacking 
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while Dover wanted to delay. Courtney, who was the deciding third vote, backed his 
Syndicate colleague on principle. 
Since the whole Council could not be there, it had instructed the three captains to 
rotate command of the shore party every day. Even though the officer of the day had 
full power, he was still required to strive for a majority vote if not complete consensus. 
There was a problem with this administrative setup. 
The Syndicate had required that the Council reach a consensus whenever 
possible. Thus far, the Council had largely behaved as a single, unified organization. 
But those orders proved confusing when applied to the specific landing force that had no 
full Council. Before launching the raiding party, the Council had loosely interpreted the 
Syndicate’s original instructions. By giving command entirely to the three captains, the 
full Council avoided any responsibility for the shore party and assumed that Rogers, 
Dover, and Courtney would represent the Council’s wishes as proxies. That disconnect 
became compounded by clashing personalities and the fog of war. Rogers did not help 
at all when he privately consulted the junior officers in the raiding force and sought their 
support against Dover and Courtney. This would have had no effect regardless because 
the junior officers had no vote. If Rogers ignored the Council’s vesting himself, Dover 
and Courtney with the power to make decisions and, supported by the junior officers, 
seized command of all the forces, such an attempt would have come dangerously close 
to mutiny.
11
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While the leaders debated, the tide decided for them. When it ebbed, making it 
impossible to approach the town via the river, the leaders ordered a withdrawal to three 
miles downstream where the group spent the rest of the night swatting mosquitoes and 
periodically firing their muskets so as to discourage ambush.
12  
The expedition leaders 
passed the early morning hours deliberating as tempers frayed once again. Dover argued 
that Gauyaquil was too large for the privateers to assault. Although he admitted the 
Spaniards were not especially good fighters, an attack would certainly fail once the 
Spaniards deployed and armed the mulattos as an emergency measure. Dover still 
believed that the Spanish knew of the attacking force’s presence and would prepare 
accordingly. 
Instead of attacking the town, Dover suggested sending a messenger to negotiate 
with the town residents for supplies and trading off some cargo. Furthermore, Dover 
added, Rogers and those who voted for an attack would have to answer for any 
casualties or damages sustained. Rogers was more focused on the plunder to be gained, 
while Dover was more concerned with safeguarding the shares that he had invested in 
the voyage. Cancelling the attack would lead to some grumbling and discontent among 
the crew, to be sure, but a repulsed attack might mean a failed expedition and 
catastrophic material loss. Rogers also stated that Dover had “other objections not fit to 
recite [in Rogers’ published account].”13 
As the privateers bickered into the next day, their renewed arguing was once 
again rendered moot by the genuine loss of surprise. At three in the morning, a Spaniard 
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who fled from Puna or one of the riverside plantations ran into the city and spread the 
news that the small island village had been taken.
14  
Once informed of the danger, the 
Spanish corregidor sounded a general alarm and called up the militia. As church bells 
rang, the militia armed themselves and fired at shadows in a panic, while other residents 
gathered their belongings and fled the town. 
 
 
The Attack 
Now that a genuine alarm had been raised, the shore party rightly supposed it had 
been detected and that the Spanish had had enough time to organize a defense. Without 
the element of surprise any attack could result in catastrophic loss of life. With the attack 
aborted, there was no reason to rotate command among the three captains any        
longer. Thus Rogers, Dover, Courtney and the junior officers ashore formed an informal 
council of sorts and discussed alternatives, including ransoming the town and/or trading 
with the townspeople. Unlike the South Sea buccaneers who preceded them, the 
expedition’s leaders considered the possibility of future transactions rather than simply 
the amount of ransom that could immediately be extorted.
15
 
 
The improvised council decided to try trading with the town and selling goods in 
their possession – many of which had belonged to Guayaquil merchants and ship-owners 
before their capture. In order to add an element of coercion, the privateers ascended the 
river once more and anchored at a position equidistant from both halves of the town. 
Two prisoners, Lieutenant Zamora of Puna and Captain Jose de Arizabala of the Havre 
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de Grace, were sent ashore to negotiate with Spanish officials on the expedition’s behalf. 
They were a good choice. Both had experienced combat against the expedition and 
would report that these privateers were not predisposed towards cruelty. The other 
prisoners brought ashore from the expedition ships promised not to attempt to escape 
and stated that if Zamora and Arizabala failed to return within an hour, they understood 
the privateers would attack.
16
 
The privateers spent the rest of April 22 chasing down stray Spanish canoes that 
tried to escape upriver and shuttling their spokesmen and two prisoners back and forth to 
meetings with Spanish officials. These meetings took place onboard one of the 
expedition’s barks or in Guayaquil’s main plaza, and always under a flag of truce. The 
town’s dockyards had recently launched two new but unrigged ships and five or six 
barks. To put additional pressure on the Spanish, the shore party seized the vessels. The 
bargaining continued until five o’clock that evening, when the Spanish agreed to pay 140 
pieces of eight per “bale” of previously seized cargo. This generous sum almost 
convinced the privateers that they could profit more from trading with the Spanish than 
from sacking the town, and without the risk of casualties. The Spanish requested a quick 
recess for both parties to discuss the terms amongst themselves and promised to return at 
eight o’clock that night. The privateers agreed to the three hour break, but were 
concerned when the Spaniards did not return at eight but instead plied the privateers with 
food and drink, and stated that, with one of the Spanish officials absent (neither side 
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specified how many Spaniards there were, or if that number even stayed constant), they 
could not negotiate further at the time. They would return at seven the next morning.
17 
Stalling was an effective tactic that the Spanish had used before against 
buccaneers. Corregidor Bosa used the opportunity send dispatches to Quito and Lima 
requesting aid. In the meantime, his background growing up in Tenerife (which was 
practically neutral) had taught him the importance of trade with British merchants. He 
knew that if he enticed Dover and the other officers with attractive commercial 
exchanges, they might leave the settlement unmolested and on their own accord.
18
 
In the morning of April 23, a Spanish messenger arrived to collect the privateers’ 
demands and relay them to his superiors. The privateers demanded the Spanish ransom 
their ships at the dockyard, purchase the seized cargoes and slaves from earlier captures, 
and immediately pay 50,000 pieces of eight in exchange for sparing the town. The 
Spaniards claimed it was impossible to pay such a high ransom. In the series of offers 
and counter-offers that followed into the next day, 50,000 pieces of eight was reduced to 
40,000, then 30,000, and finally up to 32,000 to be paid within nine days. There was no 
mention of the slaves.
19  
The Spanish were clearly playing for time. The privateers did 
not carry many supplies with them on the boats and dissention grew with every passing 
hour. Anglo-French buccaneers had successfully pillaged the settlement in 1687 with 
extreme brutality, but the Syndicate’s forces were not willing to torture or execute 
prisoners in order to force the Spanish to deliver the money. 
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By the afternoon of April 24, Rogers and the other privateer leaders tired of 
waiting for the Spanish to reply and ordered their interpreter Alexander White to tell the 
Spanish that “we were done treating, and bid the Spaniards ashore retire forthwith, and 
keep out of shot of us, if they design’d to save their lives.”20  Without waiting for a reply 
to this message, the three privateer captains ordered the flag of truce lowered and the 
English ensign run up in its place. Together they led the initial wave of approximately 
70 men ashore. 
The Spanish infantry took position in the houses facing the waterfront “within 
half musket-shot,” that is, within 300 to 400 feet, of the landing site.21  Since the houses 
in the newer part of town were arranged in a grid pattern, steady infantrymen in 
barricaded houses would be able to mutually support one another. If the privateers 
somehow made it past those buildings, they would run into the plaza and be met with 
fire from a four-gun battery of four-pounders. Mounted militia deployed far down the 
nearest parallel street to the riverbank and well away from the privateers’ avenue of 
approach, waiting to either charge the privateers in the flank or rout the broken landing 
force if the infantrymen did their job. This plan relied on great overestimation of the 
militia’s capabilities. 
The expedition’s landing force seized the initiative and psychologically defeated 
the Spanish before the battle even started. As Bosa tried to mobilize his militia earlier, 
he discovered that many of the militia had chosen to protect their homes and families 
instead by withdrawing to Old Town or even further north, into the hills. Out of at least 
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500 able-bodied men who could have answered the call to defend the city, only 70 
mustered in. Furthermore, most of the militia simply did not want to fight. The Anglo- 
French bloodbath of a raid in 1687 was still within living memory; as many as 60 
Spaniards had been killed in the fighting while many others had been brutalized or 
executed.
22  
With these terrible memories in mind, the defenders had not even fired a 
shot and were already on the verge of panic before the first privateer set foot on the 
riverbank.
23
 
When the privateers attacked, the Spanish lines evaporated. The Spanish infantry 
fired one half-hearted volley and some retreated to their artillery in the plaza while most 
ran away. The cavalry also retreated to the guns when the infantry withdrew from the 
houses.
24
 
The privateers quickly crossed the riverbank and pursued fleeing militia through 
the houses and into the central plaza, where they saw the battery and a few remaining 
infantry. The privateers’ sudden advance threw the rallying Spanish forces into a panic. 
The cavalry, upon seeing the first privateers approach the plaza, retreated once more and 
finally broke. Rogers then led an advance force to the battery that sent the Spanish 
reeling for good. In their haste and panic, the Spanish gun crews fired one panicked 
salvo that failed to kill even a single privateer.
25
 
 
As the Spanish retreated, Rogers and some of his vanguard entered the church 
and captured some stragglers. They also found two ornate batons that belonged to at 
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least field-grade officers. The fact that the valuable batons were discarded suggested to 
Rogers that the Spanish officers broke and fled as quickly as their men.
26  
Courtney and 
Dover soon arrived in the plaza with the rest of the company. Rogers immediately 
ordered Dampier, who had also brought his group up in support, to man and guard the 
captured Spanish battery to ensure that the defeated garrison did not attempt to reenter 
the town. 
The entire operation, from the initial landing until the privateers captured the 
church, lasted only 30 minutes at the most.
27  
The Spanish fled in confusion leaving the 
privateers in control of the newer part of Guayaquil. In the meantime, Dover and 
Courtney advanced into Old Town in order to exploit the Spanish retreat. They not only 
propelled the headlong Spanish rout even further, but captured Old Town. By sundown, 
the entire city was in privateer hands. This victory resembled that at Puna, except on a 
much larger scale.
28
 
Not only was this action over with quickly, it was almost bloodless as well. The 
privateers only suffered two wounded (one mortally). The Spanish had retreated so 
quickly that their own casualties were light as well. Rogers estimated Spanish losses at 
two dead and one wounded.
29  
The Spanish later reported fifteen total casualties, as 
many of the wounded retreated with the garrison. The militia had been so demoralized, 
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and their rout so disorderly, that they had quitted the battlefield before they could sustain 
many losses.
30
 
With Guayaquil under Syndicate control, the privateers prepared to defend the 
town against a Spanish counter-attack. In order to do so, it was absolutely imperative 
that they maintain discipline and avoid pillaging. To that end, the leaders forbade the 
drinking of alcohol. On the whole, the privateers acted with restraint while searching 
Guayaquil for hidden treasures, e.g., they did not torture captives to learn the location of 
buried valuables. Compared to the buccaneers who had raided Guayaquil in 1687, 
Rogers’ privateers behaved with surprising humanity. If all went according to plan after 
seizing the Acapulco or Manila galleon, the privateers might need to stop in Guayaquil 
again on their homeward journey. 
The shore party was not large enough to form long defensive lines, so Rogers and 
Courtney split their cohorts into small groups and fortified strategic locations, e.g., two 
nearby churches that offered clear fields of fire down the streets or into the surrounding 
woods. Dover, ensconced in the older part of Guayaquil, was in a more awkward 
defensive position. He did not have enough men to secure the nearby heights, so he was 
compelled to remain in a church where his men spent much of their energy avoiding 
sniper fire. The Spanish also sent out a probe that promptly retreated in the face of a 
volley fired by the privateers in the church. Aside from those minor actions, the Spanish 
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forces stayed quiet. Just because the Spanish were not attacking in force, however, did 
not mean they were idle.
31
 
 
THE WAITING GAME 
The Spanish had indeed organized a force to retake Guayaquil. Official 
dispatches from Guayaquil reached Quito and authorities there ordered all their coastal 
defenses from Peru to Panama to stand on the alert. They also outfitted six companies of 
cavalry to proceed overland while sending infantry on five ships to Guayaquil, each 
armed with more cannon than either the Duke or the Dutchess. Both the infantrymen  
and cavalrymen were professional soldiers and together they outnumbered the privateers 
occupying Guayaquil. If the Spanish ships captured or drove off the undermanned Duke 
and Dutchess, the landing force would be in an untenable position.
32
 
 
Meanwhile, the privateers were somewhat disappointed with the loot captured. 
The delay in launching the attack gave the townspeople time to gather and take their 
valuables with them when they fled the town. The local clergy did the same with altar 
pieces and communion sets.
33  
Many residents fled to plantations and hamlets upriver. 
Some of the crewmen under Alexander Selkirk’s command pursued the fleeing 
Spaniards hoping to catch stragglers carrying valuables. Selkirk, who had transitioned 
nicely from a marooned castaway to an able officer, organized a thorough search of the 
buildings on the outskirts of town that netted some valuable items without resorting to 
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the use of torture. Selkirk’s men found a house filled with young women, many of 
whom had bedecked themselves with jewelry. Under Selkirk’s watch, the sailors 
carefully removed £1000 worth of jewelry from the women without harming them.
34
 
Additional groups scouted the surrounding territory looking for valuables. The 
first night in Guayaquil, one of the junior officers took a bark and 22 men to raid houses 
upriver. However, they advanced with such noise as to alert the refugees who scattered 
into the woods and Andean foothills. While the crewmen plundered one building, 
occupants of nearby dwellings quickly departed. At one hacienda, a single defender 
repulsed a foraging party after wounding one of the sailors. Since pressing the attack 
might have resulted in more casualties, the foragers withdrew.
35
 
 
On April 25, Dover decided that his position in Old Town was untenable and, 
with Rogers and Courtney’s permission, abandoned the entire older half of the city to the 
Spanish. The privateers consolidated their forces into a defense in the principal church 
near their original landing site. By doing so, they protected themselves but allowed the 
Spanish to operate freely in most of the city and throughout the surrounding environs. 
The privateers completely surrendered the strategic initiative, and maintaining that 
initiative was a traditional strength that normally allowed buccaneers and privateers to 
dictate the tempo of their operations and deny the Spanish a chance to regroup.
36
 
The disarray that the privateers had found themselves in after the Puna action 
was but a taste of what eventually happened at Guayquil, where the privateers again 
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struggled with disorganization and poor discipline. The Spanish exacerbated matters by 
continuing to probe the privateers’ defenses. These actions were largely bloodless, 
resulting only in one wounded and one dead privateer to enemy action. But they rattled 
the privateers’ nerves and caused nervous crewmen to shoot any approaching figure 
(there was one death from friendly fire) or even to shoot themselves by accident.
37 
Others wandered off and found deserted taverns and inns; one of the crewmen vanished, 
went on a bender, and did not rejoin his comrades until they left several days later.
38
 
As the privateers fitfully settled into their new positions, the Spanish sought to 
reopen negotiations concerning ransom and the time needed to gather funds. Again, the 
Spanish played for time while the privateers demanded 30,000 pieces of eight within six 
days and some hostages, or else they would raze Guayaquil. Both parties agreed to meet 
on Puna on May 3 in order to complete the transaction.
39
 
The Spanish knew that the threat to burn Guayaquil to the ground was a hollow 
 
one. Putting Guayaquil to the torch would have removed any incentive for the Spanish 
to pay a ransom. Had the privateers truly wished to torture captives and demolish 
Guayaquil, they would have done so already. 
Sometime during the expedition’s occupation of Guayaquil, a Spanish slave 
named Joseph Boyce joined the privateers. He had been an English sailor in the West 
Indies before the Spanish captured him in the Bay of Campeche about seven years 
before. Enslaved since then, he had been sent from New Spain to Guayaquil on business 
185  
 
when the expedition arrived. Boyce warned expedition leaders that enough Spanish 
militia mustered around Guayaquil that, should they get organized, they could easily 
evict the 200 or so privateers occupying the town.
40
 
With the agreement for 30,000 pieces of eight reached and the rising danger of an 
attack by the Spanish looming, the privateers withdrew from Guayaquil on April 27. 
Rogers accompanied the rear guard and reported that he “pick’d up Pistols, Cutlasses 
and Pole-axes [dropped by crewmen], which shew’d that our Men were grown very 
careless, weak, and weary of being Soldiers, and that ‘twas time to be gone from 
hence.”41 
 
DEPARTURE 
 
The privateers reached Puna late the next day and returned to the Duke and 
Dutchess on the afternoon of April 29. Dover and Courtney remained on the island to 
await the Spanish envoys. 
Back onboard, the returning men learned that two of their shipmates had died 
from wounds received during the capture of the Havre de Grace, and that it had been a 
harrowing twelve days for the ships’ companies while they were absent. When so 
reduced in number, the crewmen were always anxious about the possibility of a prisoner 
revolt. The privateers practiced a careful routine by letting most of the prisoners on deck 
during the day and shutting them down below or in the forecastle in the evening.
42
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The ships had met with some success while waiting on station near the estuary. 
On April 21, lookouts onboard the frigates spotted a Spanish bark approaching. One of 
the Duke’s boats caught up to her and the bark’s tiny crew, correctly assuming the ships 
were British, abandoned ship and headed to shore. The Council members who had 
remained at sea put Simon Hatley in charge of the prize. Despite that easy capture, the 
crewmen were never at ease while their forces were split.
43
 
Just hours after reuniting, the lethargy, fear, and frustration that the expedition as 
whole had experienced evaporated. On the afternoon of April 29, the Duke’s pinnace 
seized the 30-ton bark Francisco la Salma, carrying an enormous supply of food from 
Panama to Guayaquil with a tiny six-man crew and four passengers. She yielded 270 
assorted bags of flour, beans, and peas, along with 30 hundredweight of sugar, four 
hundredweight of beef and cheese, and one ton of assorted onions, sweetmeats, and fruit. 
The six new prisoners reported that they had received warnings that a British squadron 
operated in the South Sea. But the captives expected a huge fleet instead of two frigates 
and assorted prizes; the Spaniards did not realize the Duke and Dutchess were British 
ships until it was too late to escape.
44
 
 
 
Payout 
 
Rogers met with Dover and Courtney on Puna early on May 2, the day the 
Spanish had promised to deliver the ransom money. The Spanish once again played for 
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time by sending Jesuits to deliver only 22,000 pieces of eight with a promise to pay more 
as soon as they could raise it. Recognizing this to be another ploy, the privateers 
demanded the full sum or else they would sail away with the hostages. When the 
Spanish withdrew to gather more coin, the privateers busied themselves with loading 
more provisions and stores from Puna. The expedition released Lieutenant Zamora and 
the miniscule Francisco la Salma prize out of gratitude for Zamora’s cooperation. It 
also freed four aged slaves and some prisoners. This move was not out of altruism, but 
because those captives were old or sick; they required more supplies to stay alive.
45
 
Four more days passed, and the prisoners began to fear they had been forgotten 
and that the ships would depart for Britain with them. Rogers noted that, “it’s worse than 
Death, they say to be carried to Great Britain.” The privateers themselves were      
fearful as well because they knew Spanish reinforcements were closing in. Finally, early 
on May 7, the Spanish delivered 3500 more pieces of eight in plate and some additional 
silver pesos and gold doubloons. Along with the previous payments this brought a total 
of 26,525 pieces of eight in ransom for the town and river vessels.
46
 
 
The expedition could have waited for more installments – Rogers wanted to stay 
in the hopes of receiving more – but the Council voted to leave the area and refit at the 
Galapagos Islands. The next day, the expedition set sail leaving behind the Beginning, 
Increase, and the unnamed river vessels. Apparently the ransom was enough for the 
smaller prizes and there probably were not enough sailors to effectively man every prize. 
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The privateers also released most of their remaining prisoners except for some of the 
wealthier ones and the Indian pilots. This was also a pragmatic move, as many of the 
captive Spanish sailors were ill with syphilis. “Few of those Prisoners that fell into our 
hands were healthy and sound,” Rogers wrote, “near half of the Spaniards discover’d 
publickly to our Coders their Malady, in order to get Physick from them against the 
French Disease, which is so common here.”47 
Unexpectedly, one of the released prisoners asked where he might meet the 
expedition before they left local waters, for he wished to trade with them. It was a 
tempting offer for the expedition, but the Council could not risk him relaying  
information to the Spanish navy and so declined. Rogers then continued in his journal 
with a glowing description of what there was to trade in Guayaquil.
48  
Cooke took a more 
realistic view, suggesting the invitation to trade may have been yet another Spanish    
ploy to keep the privateers stationary and vulnerable to a Franco-Spanish counter- 
attack.
49
 
Aside from the ransom, the privateers looted jewelry and plate worth £1200 
(about 5600 pieces of eight) and carried away 150 bales of dry goods that could be 
resold. Furthermore, between the stores taken from the Francisco la Salma and those 
seized in Puna and Guayaquil, the privateers left the coast with enough food to last 
several months.
50  
In addition, the expedition kept the battery of four-pounders, four 
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additional swivel guns, several barrels of power, and 200 small arms captured at 
Guayaquil. The raid resulted in the deaths of only three men (only one due to enemy 
action), a modest price to pay for all the ships captured and the plunder taken. The 
expedition left several storehouses full of cocoa, naval stores, and liquors behind 
because there had not been enough time to sort through them.
51
 
Rogers may have contributed to the unrest among the crew by criticizing 
 
decisions made by the Council. In his journal he reported that he had wanted to attack 
Guayaquil early on and repeatedly claimed that the expedition lost up to 200,000 pieces 
of eight by delaying that first night. He further complained that the expedition left too 
soon; he felt it should have plundered Guayaquil’s warehouses despite the time 
constraints and possibly taken the unfinished ships that he estimated to have been worth 
a combined 375,000 pieces of eight. Cooke seemed to agree with Rogers, noting in his 
journal that the townspeople had escaped with another 375,000 pieces of eight on their 
persons but he did not harp on it like Rogers did.
52  
If Rogers voiced these thoughts to 
non-Council members after his peers decided against remaining at Guayaquil, he was 
violating the Syndicate’s standing orders given to him off Bristol, mandating that all 
officers agree with the major decisions.
53
 
Rogers’ grousing clearly contributed to the developing rift between Syndicate 
 
members on the expedition and non-Syndicate officers. The first signs of that division 
appeared on the river off Guayaquil, as the officers bickered before their landing. The 
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Council meetings were ostensibly amicable and achieved consensus, but Vanbrugh and 
Dover wrote privately that the disagreements became anything but amicable after 
Guayaquil. This remained a major sore spot for the rest of the voyage, and Dover wrote 
decades later that he was still in the right for delaying.
54  
Thus far the missed 
opportunities for plunder were the only sore points and it seemed that mostly Rogers and 
Dover sniped at one another, but they became more disagreeable and organized into 
hostile factions that bickered over many issues later on. 
 
 
Straining Time 
Nevertheless the raid was successful. After that minor success, the Syndicate 
forces now faced one of the most challenging phases of the cruising voyage. Almost 
immediately after leaving for the Galapagos Islands, men started to fall ill with “a 
malignant Fever.”55  When Guayaquil had been ravaged by a fever about one month 
before the privateers arrived, there had been so many dead that the Spanish dug a mass 
grave near the church. Some of the more ghoulish privateers, thinking only of the 
jewelry they might loot from the corpses, dug up some of the bodies against strict orders. 
The privateers had slept and eaten around putrefying corpses in equatorial heat for 
several days and now the pathogens took their toll. By May 17, nearly half the 
expedition (including Courtney) was sick. The sheer volume of cases overwhelmed 
Dover and the medical staff. Even the Syndicate’s precautions in stocking more 
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medicines than usual before the voyage were not adequate. The Syndicate had already 
grossly underestimated how much food and drink its crews would need. Now it was 
apparent that the Syndicate had similarly miscalculated the necessary quantity of 
medical supplies. Thirteen men died by the end of the month, including Dover’s 
kinsman Samuel Hopkins. From that point until they left the Cape of Good Hope nearly 
two years later, the expedition’s crewmen were, as a group, never truly healthy again.56 
In the midst of sick and dying crewmen, morale began to sink. The expedition 
made landfall at the Galapagos on May 17 and found an acceptable anchorage the next 
day. Unfortunately, its leaders could not find a suitable spot to put their sick ashore. 
The expedition’s most pressing concern was fresh water, as the sick went through the 
water supply at an alarming rate. Some of the vessels and ships’ boats spent several 
days searching – with mixed success – for water, fish, and tortoises.57 
Conditions were exacerbated when two of the vessels: the Asenscion and the 
prize bark commanded by Simon Hatley failed to arrive when expected. While the 
remaining ships waited for them, men dropped like flies. The Asenscion returned on 
May 22 but not Hatley’s bark. The Council knew that Hatley only had water for two 
days and might be dead already, but it also realized that leaving might mean certain 
death for him and his crew if they were still alive.
58  
At the same time, Council members 
 
feared the arrival of the Spanish reaction force, which seemed to become more 
formidable with every rumor. After ten days in the Galapagos, the Council concluded it 
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would be too dangerous to remain any longer and so, on May 26, the expedition raised 
anchor and made sail for Isla de la Plata, almost 700 miles east of the Galapagos and just 
off Ecuador. Like the Juan Fernandez Islands, the Isla de la Plata was a popular rest stop 
for ships including pirates and privateers. Four days later, however, the Council decided 
to change course and make for Gorgona to the northeast, situated some eighteen miles off 
present day Colombia. Residents there were known to loath the Spaniards, and the 
Council assumed that they would be willing to barter for food and water.
59
 
 
As the expedition was en route to Gorgona on June 1, there was another crisis as 
the prize Asenscion’s remaining prisoners and slaves were thought to be plotting a 
revolt. The Spanish captives vehemently denied any such plot, but when the privateers 
placed lit matches between the fingers of two of the slaves both confessed that there was 
idle gossip regarding a possible mutiny, but that there had been no serious planning. 
Taking no chances, the privateers spread the captives between the other ships in order to 
prevent any future conspiracy.
60
 
Despite the steady rise in deaths among the crewmen and fears of conspiracy, the 
expedition’s fortunes once again changed. It seemed to be a pattern; just as morale 
among the privateers seriously declined, they experienced enough success to revive their 
flagging spirits. On June 5, the Dutchess took the Guayaquil-bound, 90-ton San Tomas 
de Villanueva y San Demas. Her cargo of some iron and cloth, eight bags of beans and 
peas, and 150 hundredweight of dry beef, was not particularly valuable. But in addition 
to her eleven crewmen, she carried seventeen passengers and fifteen slaves. That meant 
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more captives to ransom. One of the passengers, Don Juan Cardoso, the new governor 
of Valdivia, could potentially bring a large ransom. Cardoso was an unfortunate fellow, 
for he had once been taken prisoner and ransomed by Jamaica privateers on the other 
side of the Isthmus.
61
 
 
Gorgona 
 
On June 7, the expedition put into Gorgona for fresh water. As anticipated, the 
privateers were welcomed by the residents who were happy to do business with them, 
and the island became their home for the next two months. 
A week after their arrival, on the morning of June 8, lookouts spied another sail. 
 
Cooke gave chase in the Dutchess’ pinnace and easily captured the El Sol Doro. 
Estimates of her tonnage varied, but the agents claimed she displaced 30 tons. She had 
come to Guayaquil to load salt and brandy and her hold was empty, but she did carry 
£500-600 in precious metals with which to purchase the items. More important than the 
money captured was news that the expedition’s presence had still not reached most 
maritime traffic.
62
 
The privateers had to decide on what to do for the next few months. They knew 
they had missed the window of opportunity for intercepting the Acapulco galleon, as it 
typically left Mexico by March in order to sail before the wind. The eastward bound 
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Manila galleon usually did not make landfall in North America until winter.
63  
That gave 
the expedition several months to recuperate and refit. The ships, which had not been 
careened since February on the Juan Fernandez Islands, badly needed cleaning but  
Dover convinced the Council to postpone repairs long enough to raid the gold mines at 
Barbacoa. Like previous events, this attempt reeked of ill preparedness and 
disorganization. After four hours of planning, barking orders and belaying those same 
commands, the Council decided to remain at Gorgona and careen as originally intended. 
Cooke blamed this unproductive episode on “some differences between the Chief 
Officers.”64 
After that episode, the privateers settled in. Over the next six weeks, the men 
 
armed the Havre de Grace with twenty guns and repaired the Duke and Dutchess. The 
local residents were not only friendly but, as Dampier predicted, eager to barter. 
Throughout its stay on Gorgona, the expedition traded low-value items and nine slaves 
(valued at a combined £1003 or nearly 4500 pieces of eight) in exchange for fresh 
provisions, which kept the crews supplied and restored some of their health.
65
 
These regular transactions also led to an unexpected surprise on July 15 in the 
form of Michael Kendall. Originally a free black from Jamaica, he had signed up with 
English privateers during the Nine Years’ War and was captured when his crew tried to 
raid gold mines near Darien on the isthmus of Panama. Caught on land with few 
supplies, nearly the entire expedition was massacred except for those deemed fit for 
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slavery. He had remained in a state of servitude since then. When the expedition landed 
at his village, his masters fled and left him behind. He grabbed a canoe and followed the 
expedition’s boats back to Gorgona, where he offered his services and was immediately 
put onto the expedition’s roster. Like his counterpart Boyce in Guayaquil, he was an 
experienced sailor and eager to strike back at his former captors.
66
 
While in port the owners’ agents appraised cargo seized from the most recent 
 
captures. The assortment of clothing, ornamental swords, snuff boxes, jewelry, and even 
buttons was valued at £743 and fifteen shillings (nearly 3500 pieces of eight), not 
including the actual weighed gold.
67  
It was good for Rogers and the other officers that 
they were seen trying to divide the plunder and distribute portions of it to everybody, 
because that might defused unrest among some of the crew. 
The next day, the Duke’s steward reported that 60 men had already signed a 
“private Agreement” against their officers. The signers were concerned that the officers 
and agents were giving themselves too much plunder at the crew’s expense, and wanted 
more transparency in order to ensure they were not being cheated. Rogers and his 
colleagues did not know how far the signers would go if their demands were not met and 
so, taking no chances, the officers ordered the ringleaders arrested and the author of the 
petition put in irons. There were far too many crewmen involved to punish, so Rogers, 
Dover, and Frye gathered all hands, explained the situation to them and even agreed to 
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slightly reduce the size of the shares given to three officers including the two owners’ 
agents.
68
 
This concession, and the fact that the officers were keeping their accounts above 
board, must have convinced the crewmen that the officers were looking out for them 
because Rogers never brought this particular incident up again. The officers let 
everyone go without punishment so long as they promised to do nothing of the sort ever 
again. As Rogers described the sailors’ mood, he again brought up Guayaquil by stating 
they expected to have ten times the plunder looted from the town, and implied that 
maybe the whole episode could have been avoided had they only attacked earlier.
69
 
As the privateers attracted more traders, they worked out arrangements for 
ransoming some of the wealthier captives. Selkirk shuttled three Spanish captains (Juan 
Navarro and the brothers Juan and Jose Morel) and Cardoso between Gorgona and one 
of the unnamed mainland settlements and let them conduct business in order to ransom 
themselves and their ships. This was done over the course of the expedition’s stay. 
Once ashore, the prisoners reached into their own networks to arrange for payment of the 
ransom demanded by the privateers to obtain their release. Cardoso and most of the 
other prisoners were eventually exchanged. Navarro and the Morel brothers were 
allowed to keep their ships. In exchange for the captains’ assistance, the expedition 
transferred to them whatever excess cargoes its ships could not carry. As a testament to 
Peru’s efficient mercantile network, Navarro was able to summon his son-in-law to 
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Gorgona and place him in charge of his assets while Navarro himself stayed with the 
privateers.
70
 
As the Council awaited payment, it placed Cooke in command of the Havre de 
Grace (renamed Marquis) by August 6. In case he was ever separated from the other 
ships, the Council also authorized him to do whatever he deemed “convenient in his 
Return to Bristol.”71  The Council transferred 77 men to the Marquis and in the 
reorganization following the transfers, several petty officers were promoted to wardroom 
officers and an equal number of seamen replaced them as petty officers. 
Meeting again on August 7, the Council decided the San Tomas and Asenscion 
were valuable enough to ransom. The El Sol Doro, displacing a mere 30 tons, was just 
emptied of cargo and let go with her crew because the ship was worth so little that the 
Council did not want to bother trying to ransom her.
72  
Most of the remaining prisoners 
were transported to the mainland on one of the expedition’s barks and “parted very 
friendly” from the expedition.73 
The exact amount of ransom money asked for release of the prizes is impossible 
to ascertain. The owners’ agents listed all the precious metals and coins found on each 
prize vessel, and probably lumped those amounts together with whatever the expedition 
received in ransom for that vessel. Furthermore, that amount was divided between the 
three (later four) expedition ships and redistributed several times during the voyage as 
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the ships transferred their cargoes and specie around. The gold or silver specie (wrought 
plate, dust, paper, jewelry, etc.) was categorized by type and not by origin. 
The expedition left Gorgona and headed south towards Peru later that day. 
Remarkably, only one crewman died at Gorgona (from a fever). After that horrible time 
off the Galapagos, the expedition’s health seemed to finally recover somewhat as the 
ships set out. The expedition’s immediate goals were to resupply since the provisions 
from Guayaquil were all but exhausted and the provisions bartered at Gorgona were only 
enough to maintain rations. The privateers had also gotten bored and careless as they 
lingered, and several slaves took the opportunity to run away.
74
 
 
Just two days after setting out from Gorgona, it was evident the expedition had 
more problems. The Marquis, despite her repairs and modifications, sailed like a 
haystack. The expedition was under orders to stay unified as much as possible, but the 
Marquis was a sluggish sailor and significantly reduced the speed of the expedition. She 
had originally been a French supply tender, sent on a one-way trip to the Pacific. She 
was already in poor condition before the expedition captured her, but now her hull leaked 
eight inches of water per hour. The leak was found and stopped, but leaks would   
remain a constant problem as her hull weakened. Rogers proposed loading her with 
trade goods and sending her back to Britain with stops to trade at India and Brazil. 
Removing her would lessen the expedition’s supply problems. The rest of the Council 
did not consider this a good plan, preferring instead to retain the ship and her 20 guns 
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with the expedition, in effect choosing greater firepower over speed; she was the third 
most powerful ship in the expedition.
75
 
The Council anticipated more ship-to-ship combat in the near future, and so did 
every hand onboard. The crew continuously underwent more training exercises to keep 
sharp. This training mostly went smoothly and illustrated how the crews had coalesced. 
Rogers also followed his instructions to recruit more crewmen when practical, as the 
expedition had suffered recent losses. He mustered the Duke’s 35 slaves and offered 
them a deal. The Council had treated them like contraband, gave them away as presents, 
and handled them in such a manner that would never have been inflicted on white or 
mestizo Spaniards. But Rogers promised that if the slaves fought against the Spanish 
and French alongside the privateers, he would grant them their freedom. 32 agreed to it 
and began to train. Kendall, the recently liberated Jamaican, had some experience 
fighting the Spanish and so instructed the volunteers in the use of arms. Rogers 
sweetened the pot by giving each liberated slave clothes and liquor, and insisting that 
they think of themselves “as Englishmen, and no more as negro slaves to the Spaniards, 
at which they express’d themselves highly pleased.”76 
This marked a departure from the previous buccaneers. It was not unheard of 
pirates to recruit handfuls of slaves (Edward “Blackbeard” Teach did just that during his 
own forays) but most privateers strove for short-term profit that would make them 
comfortable until the next cruising season. As a young buccaneer in the 1680s, Dampier 
and his shipmates treated captured slaves as contraband and laborers. Dampier also had 
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not recruited slaves in 1703-04, when he commanded his own voyage. Rogers and the 
Council were more concerned with long-term cohesion and replacement capability, and 
so took any volunteers they encountered.
77
 
On August 18, the Syndicate expedition captured the 70-ton Lima-bound 
Concepcion. She did not carry much cargo except for 24 slaves and passengers who 
brought news that Spanish officials were aware of the expedition’s raid on Guayaquil. 
The authorities shut down all maritime traffic in Panama for a week, fearing it would be 
the next target. Like Bosa in Guayaquil, the Spanish were on the lookout for a 
formidable invasion fleet instead of the small expedition from Bristol.
78
 
Six days later, the expedition reached Tacames, a nondescript Indian village of 
seven houses and a tiny chapel in present day Ecuador. The Council first sent Courtney 
ashore to tell the Indians that the privateers wanted to purchase provisions from them. If 
the natives refused Courtney was to threaten to burn their houses.
79  
The boats were slow 
navigating the shoals and sandbars, and reached a suitable anchorage only late that night, 
so they postponed actually going ashore until the next morning. That night, the 
expedition’s linguist Alexander White, acting on his own accord and without Courtney 
noticing, went ashore with a Spanish prisoner and triggered an ambush by the village’s 
residents. Only White’s linguistic skills and quick thinking kept him and his compatriot 
safe. He was not only able to wrangle his way out of a painfully violent death, but to 
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convince the Indians to trade without resorting to threats. The Indians bartered with the 
expedition for the next week.
80
 
During the expedition’s time at the village, the Council agreed to a plan for 
obtaining the 3500 pieces of eight (a little over £750) that Guayaquil still owed for its 
ransom. The privateers would release Navarro, the highest-ranking prisoner, if he 
produced an “Obligation” that acted as a promissory note to the Syndicate and agreed to 
help it collect the remaining sum. The Council would give Navarro iron goods and “4 
Bales of Bays [baize], and one Piece of Camlet,” which he was to sell in order to raise 
the required sum.
81  
The Council wrote instructions for him to take to Puerto Bello in 
Panama. As in the Canaries, a group of British merchants in Puerto Bello (based out of 
Jamaica) had a special understanding with the viceregal authorities. The letters were 
addressed to four merchants, one of whom (Peter Day) came from a prominent Bristol 
merchant family.
82
 
In its correspondence, the Council requested the Jamaica merchants to collect the 
3500 pieces of eight from Navarro and transfer the sum to John Batchelor in Bristol. 
Even in the South Sea, the expedition found ways to contact its backers. In return for 
their assistance, the merchants were promised a small fee. Navarro agreed to the plan; 
there is a copy of Navarro’s signed pledge to pay the debt in the United Kingdom’s 
National Archives. The business with Navarro concluded, the expedition turned to more 
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mundane matters. The privateers were pressed for time, so they let the Concepcion go 
without ransom.
83
 
On August 31, the privateers set out for the Galapagos Islands once again on a 
supply run and a fruitless search for Hatley. They arrived on September 11, took some 
tortoises, and then made sail for the Tres Marias islands on September 16. This small 
archipelago lay north of Acapulco, and some 100 miles northwest of Puerto Vallarta. 
The Council hoped to cruise off the islands and then snare the Manila galleon as she 
made her way southeastward towards Acapulco.
84
 
The expedition made landfall on Mexico’s coast on October 1. Once it found the 
Tres Marias, its Council began planning how to take the galleon. Thanks to the refitting 
at Gorgona, both frigates were in good condition and capable of fighting. The crews 
were still suffering from malnutrition and dehydration but they were as healthy as they 
would ever be for the rest of the voyage; only one crewman had died at Gorgona. Some 
of the previous manpower losses had been mitigated by adding the 32 freed slaves that 
Rogers had recruited. The Council also released most of the remaining prisoners, and  
the expedition only had one small prize left (the Jesus, Maria y Jose) that was 
temporarily put into service as a packet boat. Thus the crews were not spread thin over a 
multitude of prizes that were not even suitable for combat. 
The Syndicate’s expedition was to face much adversity and engage in more hard 
fighting before it left the Pacific, but the Guayaquil raid and its aftermath showed that 
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the privateers were not only effective, but did not rely on brutality as the previous 
buccaneers had. The privateers actually behaved themselves and realized that dead or 
hateful townspeople would not trade in the future. In some ways the privateers were 
testing the market for future commerce, especially considering how Rogers and, to a 
lesser extent, Cooke, described many of the transactions they made. 
Despite its success, there were still constant difficulties that afflicted the 
expedition. The Council, which had usually found some consensus in its major 
decisions, had begun to fracture somewhat after Guayaquil. The recriminations 
regarding missed opportunities and lost ransoms persisted throughout the rest of the 
voyage and festered even after the journey’s completion. As the voyage progressed, the 
Council members became more querulous and fought over shares of plunder, 
administrative changes, and perceived slights. Furthermore, protocol within the 
expedition, especially during combat, made it frustratingly difficult for the privateers to 
coordinate their actions. These issues came to a head when the expedition faced its 
toughest opponent at sea. 
204  
 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
EYES ON THE PRIZE: THE MANILA GALLEON 
 
 
 
By late 1709, the expedition was at a crossroads. The problems that had harried 
its ships and sailors continued, and could only get worse without support from nearby 
Spanish settlements. With numerous crewmen still ill and distrust both among the 
officers and crewmen, the Council could have elected to return to Britain but it refused 
to. The privateers still had a Manila galleon to capture. Such a prize had been the target 
of the Syndicate when it sent the privateers to the Pacific in the first place. 
Thus on September 23 the Council met and decided to leave the Galapagos 
Islands, head north towards central Mexico, and await the Manila galleon. On October 4 
the expedition reached the Tres Marias islands.
1  
For most of the following month, the 
privateers conducted repairs and searched for turtles, wood, and water. This was near 
the spot where Dampier had unsuccessfully attempted to capture the galleon during his 
previous voyage. Based on that knowledge, the Council thought it best to concentrate 
the privateersmen in one area and allow the galleon to come to them. 
While at the islands, Dover requested to transfer to the Dutchess for unspecified 
reasons. He may have simply wanted to be closer to his Syndicate colleague Stephen 
Courtney, although disputes at Guayaquil may have been enough of a sore point that 
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Dover did not want to even be onboard the same ship as Rogers.
2  
Even though he was 
not on the Duke anymore, he was still her second captain and enjoyed the same benefits. 
Cooke also noted that “several hot Controversies happen’d, about this Time, among some 
of our chief Officers” but did not provide any details except that he was “much 
concern’d.”3  The crewmen and even the slaves had their own interpersonal disputes; the 
most serious involved a plot by seven slaves to kill the black Jamaican crewman Michael 
Kendall when they went ashore to cut wood. When their plan was betrayed the seven 
slaves ran into the woods, at which point Rogers decided it was not worth chasing after 
them.
4
 
The Council knew it had to prepare for a challenging confrontation. None of the 
prizes thus far had presented a serious threat to the Duke, Dutchess, or their converted 
prizes. Manila galleons were different. Those sturdy, well-armed vessels carried large, 
motivated crews. As the expedition made its way northwest, its officers reviewed plans 
developed during the summer. Originally conceived in August, the crews had 
continuously trained according to those guidelines and seemed ready. Edward Cooke 
described the expedition’s five-part combat doctrine. 
First, the expedition’s commanders were instructed to expend every effort to 
obtain the weather-gage before attacking an enemy ship. Being upwind from the 
opponent would give the privateers tactical flexibility in selecting the best time and 
angle to attack the Manila ship. 
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Second, the ships were ordered to keep their pinnaces and other boats ready to 
launch in case the Duke or Dutchess became disabled and needed to be towed to safety. 
Thirdly, should the expedition encounter two or three ships simultaneously, both 
frigates should converge on the strongest enemy ship and blast her rigging with double- 
shotted guns. Once her mast and rigging were disabled, the captains were instructed to 
bypass her and converge on the weaker enemy ship or ships. Since a flotilla or 
squadron’s commander most likely appropriated the largest ship as his flagship, such a 
maneuver, if successful, might seriously impede the enemy commander’s ability to 
coordinate any action against the privateers. 
The fourth instruction applied to situations in which one of the expedition’s ships 
was disabled. Disabled in this case was described as the “losing of masts, or springing 
of leaks.”5  In the event that the enemy disabled either frigate, the stricken ship should 
immediately disengage while the other covered her withdrawal. If possible the damage 
should be repaired and both ships resume their attack on the enemy. If the stricken ship 
was beyond repair, the undamaged frigate was instructed to take the damaged ship’s 
crew onboard and salvage what items they could before scuttling the crippled vessel. 
There was no contingency for a scenario in which a ship was too badly damaged to fight 
but not so badly that it was sinking. It was likely that the Council had assumed in such a 
situation, the captains would improvise. 
The fifth and final instruction encapsulated a typical privateer’s strategy. When 
engaging, the frigates were to close to point-blank range in order to quickly demoralize 
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the enemy and hopefully induce the ship to surrender. If the quarry did not immediately 
strike her colors, the privateers should sweep her deck with small arms fire from the 
rigging and follow up, if necessary, by boarding the vessel. Only if the intended victim 
maneuvered to avoid close combat should the attacker fire her main guns and risk 
rendering the prize unseaworthy or destroying her cargo. Should the quarry put up 
stubborn resistance or overwhelm the frigates, the privateers were to “endeavour to 
outsail them; but always the best sailor to stay for the heaviest.”6  In short, they were to 
 
outgun what they could not outrun, and outrun whatever ships they could not outgun. 
 
On October 24, after about three weeks in the Tres Maria islands, the Council 
decided to move northward to the Baja Peninsula and try to intercept the nao de la China 
(as the Spanish called the Manila ship) bound to Acapulco. The Council decided to 
cruise off Cabo San Lucas, on the southern end of the Baja Peninsula, and attack the 
Manila galleon when it approached.
7
 
 
CABO SAN LUCAS 
 
Modern Cabo San Lucas is a scenic resort city on Baja California Sur’s southern 
tip. It sits alongside the Los Cabos Corridor, and passing yachts and cruise ships 
frequent the area. In 1709, however, that corridor saw important and lucrative traffic in 
the form of fabled Asian cargoes. Manila ships, after months at sea, usually made 
landfall somewhere off California or Baja and turned to head south by southeast. Cabo 
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San Lucas was the most prominent landmark in the region and presented the first sure 
sign that central Mexico was not far off. Once the galleons rounded the cape and headed 
eastward, they continued until they reached Mazatlan or Puerto Vallarta. From there, 
they sailed southward once again, keeping land in sight, until reaching their final 
destination Acapulco. Expedition commanders knew this, ands well as they knew the 
galleon was likely to be found off the cape at some point. The privateers also needed to 
seize their prize well before she reached Acapulco. 
Like Santa Marta and Rio de la Hacha, Acapulco was an inhospitable place that 
the Spanish favored due to its natural harbor and strategic location rather than climate. 
Most of the town sank into a slumber between annual visits by the Manila ship.
8  
Cooke 
disdainfully described Acapulco as a miserable place that was barely more than a village 
of mud huts and “very unhealthy from November, ‘till the End of May, because then 
there falls no Rain, and therefore is hotter in January, than Italy in the Dog-Days.”9 
Small as it was, Acapulco was one of the most heavily defended Spanish 
settlements on the Pacific coast. After Dutch privateers led by Joris van Spilbergen 
looted the town in 1615, the Spanish strengthened Acapulco’s defenses. Nearly a 
century later, Rogers estimated that the harbor mouth was defended by 42 heavy fortress 
guns. These were supported by a fort garrisoned by regular troops who were better 
trained and more experienced than the militia protecting Guayaquil. While not a nearly 
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as fortified as Havana or Vera Cruz, Acapulco’s fort was more than adequate to repel 
some 300 malnourished and sick privateers.
10
 
The Council members knew of these defenses so did not even consider a cutting- 
out operation in which boat crews would infiltrate Acapulco and steal the galleon at 
anchor. There was also no chance of the privateers making an amphibious landing and 
assaulting the trade fair that always sprang up whenever a galleon approached or 
departed. There were no mangrove swamps or inland waterways to hide the privateers 
as at Guayaquil, and approaching from the interior meant crossing the Sierra Madre del 
Sur mountain range in late autumn or winter. Acapulco was just too well guarded and 
inaccessible. 
Between Acapulco and Cabo San Lucas, however, the Spanish maintained a 
minimal and infrequent naval presence. In his 1703 voyage, Dampier had operated 
freely in that area and missed the galleon through terrible leadership and atrociously bad 
luck. Both he and the remaining Spanish captives seemed to agree that was the most 
likely spot to find a Manila galleon and not risk encounters with Spanish armadillas, 
which were coastal defense vessels that could spoil the privateers’ chance at surprise if 
not defeat them outright.
11
 
The cape was easy to spot since it was capped by bare hills and surrounded by 
partially submerged rocks that Cooke thought resembled the Needles at the Isle of 
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Wight.
12  
Arriving there on November 1, the Council met and established a system of 
cruising stations. It ordered the Marquis to cruise between six and nine leagues from the 
cape, no further than three leagues from the Dutchess (the two later switched positions), 
which patrolled deeper waters. The Duke was the outermost ship, and was to go no 
further than three leagues from the Dutchess. Rogers estimated the ships covered any 
movement within twenty leagues of the shore on a fifteen-league stretch of coastline. 
The privateers maintained communication through signal guns and employed the Jesus, 
Maria y Jose (commanded by Selkirk) as a courier vessel. 
As the ships sailed back and forth crewmen became restless and petty arguments 
led to unrest. Rogers and his officers were kept busy enforcing discipline onboard the 
Duke. Some of the crewmen, disgruntled at not being included among those selected to 
go ashore at Guayaquil, threatened petty officers out of sheer frustration. One crewman 
even declared that he wished he was on a pirate ship, leading to his swift punishment.
13 
Both officers and crew were anxious waiting for a prize they knew might never appear. 
The Council was not insensitive to the tense atmosphere and took steps to make 
the crewmen focus on what they might loot when they finally captured the galleon. 
Anticipating a rich haul from the Manila ship, the Council met on November 11 and 
decreed that any crewman hiding any contraband worth more than half a peso would be 
fined twenty times the value of whatever he attempted to conceal. The agreement was 
signed by the ships’ companies, with every officer, seaman, and landsman also 
promising to give an exact account of any clothes or goods that they received after their 
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stay in Gorgona. If a crewman proved that one of his shipmates concealed plunder, then 
the informer was entitled to half its value as a reward. This was meant to keep the crew 
vigilant and provide an incentive to ferret out any hoarders. At the same meeting the 
Council forbade gambling, as any sore loser might accuse a lucky or dishonest gambler 
of hoarding. Furthermore, the men were forbidden to borrow or lend money from that 
point on in the voyage because of the ill feeling it might cause.
14
 
 
Supply Problems 
By November, the expedition desperately needed another prize if only to 
replenish its stock of food. The provisions it acquired off Guayaquil and from its 
subsequent visits to the Galapagos and Gorgona were largely exhausted. The Galapagos 
tortoises and their eggs were gone. The remaining original stores from Bristol, 
especially the salted meats, were almost inedible after more than a year in the ships’ 
storerooms and now only provided housing for vermin. There was no flour or pease left, 
which meant no fresh bread or anti-scorbutics as the crews subsisted on stale biscuits  
and whatever portions of meat or cheese that were not completely rancid.
15  
Throughout 
November and December, the ships ran short on many other essential supplies. By 
November 25, the Dutchess was almost completely out of fresh water. 
 
Thievery also manifested itself again due to the lean circumstances. On 
November 28, the Duke had some biscuit and sugar pilfered in the dead of night. The 
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thieves were quite delicate in their operation because the steward, who slept in front of 
the storeroom door, had tied the key around his “Privy parts” and not been awakened by 
the removal of it by a light-fingered thief. The thief and his consorts would have 
remained undetected but neglected to put the key back where they had found it. Instead 
they were caught although one escaped severe punishment due to having unnamed but 
influential friends in Bristol. The personal connections between merchants and mariners 
still mattered even on the far side of the world. Rogers spared him but had the 
ringleader flogged and put the others in irons.
16
 
After nearly two months of cruising off Cabo San Lucas, the Council met on 
December 19 and compared inventories of the ships’ food stocks. The officers estimated 
that they needed to spend at least nine days careening and repairing their ships, after 
which it would take at least 50 days to sail to Guam. If their estimates were correct, they 
would reach Guam with a mere eleven days’ rations left. Should the expedition be 
unable to resupply at Guam, it would press on to the East Indies. Rogers observed that 
when the officers signed the report at the end of the meeting, the entire Council “looked 
very melancholy and dispirited.”17 
 
 
FIRST GALLEON 
 
The Council met again on December 20 and decided to “gett a Harbr as soon as 
posible, and there Recruit [prepare] with the utmost Dispatch for ye Isle of Guam, or any 
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other place where we design further to Consult of our next proceedings.”18 The Marquis 
put into the harbor at Puerto Seguro on an island approximately one league east of Cabo 
San Lucas.
19
 
The next morning, the Duke and Dutchess were making their way into Puerto 
Seguro when the Duke’s lookout spied a sail. The two frigates headed on an intercept 
course and ran up a French naval ensign. The crewmen, sensing a stiff fight might be in 
store, tried to ease the tension by making wagers despite the standing ban while their 
officers ignored it. None of the privateers knew if the sail was indeed the Manila 
galleon, the Marquis, which had been out of touch for a day, or some other vessel. As 
the Duke and Dutchess drew closer, however, it became clear that the ship was the long- 
awaited Spanish galleon. 
After a night spent closing on the galleon, the two privateersmen cleared their 
decks for action. A little before eight o’clock the next morning, Rogers ordered a tub of 
hot chocolate to be heated for his crew. Maritime tradition called for grog or some other 
kind of hard liquor, but the Duke had nearly run out of alcohol. The crew then 
assembled for prayer before the Spaniard fired the opening shots.
20
 
The Duke set upon the galleon quickly, with the Dutchess lumbering up behind. 
 
After several broadsides, the Duke crossed the galleon’s bow and raked her. The 
accompanying Dutchess struggled against a headwind but still managed to join in the 
battle’s final stage. The Spanish fought back but were so exhausted after crossing the 
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Pacific that they quickly struck their colors. Of 193 crewmen on the galleon, nine were 
killed and ten wounded.
21  
Their resistance had been brief and of limited effect. One of 
the galleon’s shots disabled the Duke’s mizzenmast, sending wooden splinters flying and 
lightly wounding one sailor in the buttocks. Rogers was the only other casualty. In the 
final moments of combat, a musket ball pierced his left cheek, plowed through several 
molars, and lodged in his throat. Despite the excruciating pain, Rogers wrote down 
instructions for his junior officers to pass down to the crew. The whole action, from the 
opening salvo until the galleon struck her colors, lasted less than a half hour. 
The privateers boarded and examined their prize. Upon interrogating the 
prisoners, the privateers discovered they had seized the Nuestra Senora de la 
Encarnacion Disengaño. She displaced 400 tons and carried twenty cannon along with 
a like number of swivel guns. She was technically a frigate-built merchantman instead 
of a galleon, but a Manila ship nonetheless.
22  
After the mid-seventeenth century, the 
Manila-Acapulco route generally ran one galleon at a time. That was the assumption the 
Syndicate operated under when it issued its orders. The privateers happened to pounce 
on the galleons on a rare year when two ran simultaneously.
23
 
The prisoners told their captors that the other ship, the larger Nuestra Senora de 
Begoña, carried a cargo worth two million pieces of eight, that the Disengaño and 
Begoña had separated after leaving Guam – they had been out of contact with each other 
for three months – but planned to rendezvous off Cabo San Lucas and sail to Acapulco 
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together. The Begoña was supposed to reach the rally point several weeks ahead of its 
slower companion but myriad factors had delayed her.
24
 
The expedition brought its new prize into Puerto Seguro on December 23. Dover 
and William Stretton immediately took a prize crew onboard with some surgeons and 
treated the wounded from both sides. This was a necessary step but it removed the two 
officers from combat, which had consequences in the near future.
25  
The expedition 
posted sentries on the nearby hills and ordered them to signal if they spied another sail. 
The Duke was ordered into harbor and forbidden to leave unless the larger galleon was 
sighted; the other crews were jealous of the Duke’s success and suspected Rogers’ crew 
of hoarding plunder. Rogers was in no condition to argue. His wound bled so much that 
he nearly choked on his own blood whilst sleeping later that night with his “Throat and 
Head being very much swell’d.”26 
Dover, the Duke’s second captain, removed himself from the discussion on how 
 
to attack the Begoña and insisted on assessing the new prize, sending a subordinate 
onboard the Duke to act as second captain in his stead. In the meantime, Rogers was in 
unendurable pain, could not eat, and could barely drink due to his injury. He really 
needed to stay ashore where Dover, a competent physician – despite his other faults – 
could at least make him more comfortable.
27  
Despite Rogers’ incapacitation, he refused 
to relinquish command of the Duke. 
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With crew morale climbing again, the Council met on Christmas Eve and  
decided they had captured enough stores with the Disengaño to allow them to delay their 
departure to Guam for another eight days. Rogers proposed that they increase the Duke 
and Dutchess’ complements by stripping the Marquis of most of her crew. He suggested 
that while the Marquis and her skeleton crew assessed the Disengaño’s cargo and 
seaworthiness and sent prisoners ashore for ransom, the larger frigates attack the Begoña 
and hopefully carry her by boarding.
28  
The Council members rejected his proposals and 
 
decided instead that “Capt. Courtney in the Dutchess and Capt. Cook in the Marquis do 
forthwith go out on a cruise.”29 
The decision was a politically sound move – given the jealousy that the Dutchess 
and Marquis’ crewmen felt towards the Duke’s crewmen – but strategically inept as the 
privateers excluded their heaviest ship with the heaviest broadside. Perhaps the Council 
would have realized this had its members had more time to analyze the situation, but 
they did not. Within several hours of the decision, lookouts onboard the Marquis 
spotted the second galleon. 
 
 
SECOND GALLEON 
 
The Marquis was approximately two leagues off Cabo San Lucas when she 
spotted the larger galleon seven leagues off, bearing southwest.
30  
The Marquis flagged 
the Dutchess and the ships once again cleared for action and pursued the newly arrived 
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galleon for most of the day. However, they did not advance together as an organized 
force but raced each other instead. Although Cooke claimed the Dutchess caught up 
with the galleon around midnight and engaged in a short nighttime skirmish that nearly 
dismasted the frigate before she veered off, no other sources confirm Cooke’s assertion. 
Both the Dutchess and Marquis caught up to the galleon by daybreak the next day.
31
 
Meanwhile, the Duke’s officers negotiated a prisoner release. Dover, Stretton, 
and Rogers decided to ransom or simply release the prisoners taken with the Disengaño 
and the remaining Guayaquil hostages at a time to be determined later. The officers 
turned to the Disengaño’s captain Jean Pichberty, a man of means and connections (he 
was related to the French admiral Jean du Casse), to ransom the prisoners. Pichberty 
traded five bills of exchange, totaling 6000 pieces of eight, for the release of himself and 
the Guayaquil hostages. That sum was actually higher than what the privateers 
demanded, so they promised to turn the Jesus Maria y Jose over to Pichberty so he could 
transport the ransomed Spaniards to the mainland in her. Pichberty and the hostages all 
submitted certificates showing that they agreed with arrangement. This was done partly 
to keep all transactions above board, and partly to protect Pichberty against any charges 
of cowardice or treachery and ease the disbursement process when his bills of exchange 
were processed for the Syndicate in London.
32
 
 
At this critical moment there was a serious breakdown in communication among 
the expedition’s ships. The Duke and the sailors ashore were not even aware that a 
galleon had been spotted until that afternoon and did not leave Puerto Seguro until 7 
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o’clock that night. When the Duke departed, she left Dover at Puerto Seguro with just 
22 hands to refit the prize. The 170 or so captives and a handful of guards were kept 
onboard the Jesus, Maria y Jose, which the privateers intentionally stripped of rigging, 
sails, and rudder so she was just a floating hulk.
33
 
 
The Engagement 
 
The next two days involved much more frustration and suffering as the privateers 
received the worst of the engagement. The Dutchess took the lead on the first day and 
thus suffered the most damage. Her foremast was shot away and she was holed at the 
waterline. She also took a shot to the powder room that somehow did not detonate the 
magazine. The Marquis avoided most return fire but simply could not dent the Begoña’s 
hull with her motley collection of four- and six-pounders. The privateers were severely 
handled from sunrise to sunset, and their punishment only stopped when darkness came. 
The Duke, thanks to her late start and uncooperative winds, could only observe 
from the far horizon as her two consorts were pounded. Rogers was unaware of their 
damage until his ship joined them in the pre-dawn hours on December 27. His arrival 
seemed to spark some enthusiasm and the ship captains agreed to attack together once it 
became light enough. 
Thus the Duke entered the fight a few hours later but even the combined three 
privateersmen could not defeat the Begoña. Rogers was wounded in the foot by a 
musketball and rendered temporarily crippled in addition to being mute, leaving the 
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Duke without an effective commander. During a break in the fighting, Rogers, the 
officers, and senior petty officers gathered to assess the situation. The improvised 15- 
man subcommittee included Rogers, Cooke, Courtney, Dampier, and Selkirk. 
Although some of the officers desired to renew the attack on the Begoña, the 
carpenters argued that the ships were too damaged to continue the fight. The Duke had a 
disabled mainmast in addition to her severely damaged mizzenmast from earlier. She 
could not effectively maneuver and eleven of her crewmen were wounded. The 
Dutchess was in even worse shape, having suffered more severe damage to her rigging 
and taken over 30 casualties. The Marquis remained relatively untouched with no 
casualties but her four-pounders were virtually useless in combat with the much larger 
and more sturdily built galleon. 
The Begoña had sustained only moderate damage to her rigging and negligible 
damage to her hull.
34  
Statements by the prisoners taken with the Disengaño that even 
500 men could not carry the Begoña by boarding appeared to be true, especially when 
most of the privateers were weak from malnutrition and dehydration or had contracted 
food poisoning from eating bad fish. The entire action throughout December 27 was a 
costly failure that was exacerbated when the privateersmen vainly continued their attack. 
The subcommittee met again that evening after the ships limped away and the 
galleon ran out yet more cannon (she was pierced for 60 guns). The officers took stock 
of the situation and decided the Begoña was impossible to capture with their available 
numbers and resources. The doctrine the expedition had operated under dictated what 
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they should do in case one ship was crippled, but they did not want to sail with all three 
ships damaged. Therefore, the group decided it would be best “to do our endeavours to 
secure the Prize we have already took, which will be much more for the Honour and 
Interest of OUR selves and Country.”35  The full official Council that usually met, some 
of whose members were not present at the battle, would have to accept the 
subcommittee’s decision if its members wished to follow the standing orders to maintain 
consensus. 
Rogers was keenly aware that Dampier had been pilloried in the press after the 
latter’s failed attempt to capture a galleon. One of the most damning chapters in 
William Funnell’s work involved Dampier’s perceived ineptitude and cowardice as he 
hunkered behind a barricade while his crew fought. Rogers made sure the officers 
present signed a document stating their agreement with the decision to abandon the 
attack in order to “prevent false reflections hereafter.”36  During the night of December 
27-28, the privateers abandoned their attack on the Begoña which made its way to 
Acapulco without further harassment. The privateersmen returned to Puerto Seguro on 
December 29 to care for the wounded, repair what battle damage they could, and ransom 
the prisoners captured earlier. 
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Escape of the Begoña 
 
Despite their failure to capture the Begoña, the voyage thus far was a moderate 
success for the privateers. They had seized a rich prize, which was what the recruiters 
had advertised back in early 1708. That seizure was also exactly what the Syndicate had 
tasked the privateers with. It was a mitigated victory, however, and there were reasons – 
beyond what the smaller Council had already discussed – why the privateers failed to 
bring in the second galleon. 
The prisoners taken with the Disengaño informed their captors that word of the 
expedition’s presence in the South Sea had reached even the Philippines. Before the 
galleons departed the Philippines (Manila ships usually departed in June in order to take 
advantage of the southwesterlies), word of the privateers reached Manila via British 
settlements in India. Although the Spanish Philippines and British India were officially 
at war, the information disseminated through India, Siam, southeastern China, the East 
Indies, and the Philippines.
37  
The Spanish authorities in Manila thus operated under 
 
more accurate information than their counterparts in Peru who believed that they would 
face a naval fleet instead of several small privateers and prize vessels. The Begoña in 
particular had taken precautions to carry extra weapons and she had additional incentive 
to do so; insurers reduced freight costs if galleons carried weapons.
38  
The galleons, 
however, had expected to rendezvous at Cabo San Lucas and not meet the privateers 
until at least reaching Cabo Corrientes, several hundred miles to the southeast.
39
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As a result, the privateers caught the Disengaño by surprise. The Begoña, 
carrying a more valuable cargo, was better prepared to defend against attacks and her 
officers and crew more vigilant.
40  
The privateers had lost one of their traditional 
advantages; without surprise, they hurled themselves against a heavily armed opponent. 
The expedition’s previous encounters usually involved them fighting opponents who 
were either unsuspecting or too weak to put up a sufficient defense. Even when the 
privateers were divided, such as at Guayaquil, the Spanish were too demoralized and 
disorganized to coordinate a static defense much less to launch a counter-attack. The 
Begoña’s crew was not caught flat-footed. With better morale and more able leaders 
than the Disengaño, the crewmen did not suffer a debilitating psychological shock that 
privateers depended on to weaken their opponents. The Spanish then relied on superior 
hull strength and greater to repel the privateers. 
Rogers had taken to his journal on December 28 and adamantly contended that 
the privateers could have carried the Begoña by boarding if all three ships had attacked 
when first encountering her, and before her crew put netting over her decks thus 
preventing a boarding action.
41  
He suggested that if the Council had followed his plan 
from the start, with the Duke in the lead and the Dutchess providing support, it would 
have been an easy capture. By doing this, he absolved himself of culpability and placed 
the blame on Courtney and the remaining Council members. Rogers may have been 
delirious from the pain because he was suggesting a nearly impossible operation. 
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Privateer captains typically tried to avoid heavily armed ships, and especially those that 
were prepared for an engagement. 
The five-point doctrine that the privateers drilled under for months worked 
perfectly against the Disengaño but did not meet similar success against the Begoña 
because the privateers either could not or would not follow the agreed-upon tactics until 
it was too late. First, the privateers did not seek the weather-gage and were taken aback 
by the wind, thus relinquishing mobility and giving the Begoña time to react. The 
second and third rules did not apply, as the privateers did not face multiple enemy ships 
at once. The fourth rule, regarding damaged or disabled privateersmen, was only 
partially adhered to. The privateersmen remained engaged even when heavily damaged 
and only broke off the attack when darkness fell. The privateers did not obey the fifth 
rule and made no coordinated attack until December 27, by which time it was much too 
late to take the Begoña, if it were even possible in the first place. 
The attack on the Begoña demonstrated telling weaknesses in the expedition’s 
leadership and command structure. No single individual was in overall command of the 
expedition. Instead, the Syndicate required its officers to defer to the Council’s 
decisions even in combat. The Syndicate’s measures regarding fiscal affairs were sound 
and necessary, but its rules of engagement were a liability in the chaos of ship-to-ship 
combat as they removed officer initiative. When combined with privateers’ typical 
eagerness to attack for profit and without prudence in mind, the expedition’s leadership 
was in a state of paralysis. 
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The Syndicate’s top-heavy officers’ list was a liability in this situation with the 
crew uncertain which officers they should follow. The full Council had already laid 
down its doctrine months before but the ships in action were governed by a small ad hoc 
organization of fifteen men, most of whom did not have command roles, who had to 
strike a balance between following the full Council’s orders and improvising strategy on 
the spot. Rogers was the commander-in-chief, and most of the sailors looked up to him, 
but he was physically unfit to lead and was still bound to abide by the Council’s 
decisions. In effect Rogers was not an executive officer, but rather an agent of the 
Council’s will. Dover was the president of the Council (his signature is usually at the top 
in the meetings’ minutes) but was similarly bound to follow Council decisions and was 
not present during the battle because he had remained with the Disengaño. Thus 
Courtney was the only Syndicate member onboard either of the ships that initiated the 
attack on the Begoña. But Courtney did not have Rogers’ charisma, and Courtney 
always had to consider what Dover might have wanted because the Syndicate members 
represented each other’s interests. Cooke was preoccupied with running Marquis while 
the remaining lieutenants and mates present were qualitatively inexperienced and did not 
possess the confidence to influence a proverbial twelve angry men even if either the 
Council’s or the smaller subcommittee’s strategy was unsound. To make matters worse, 
there was no way to change tactics except in another Council meeting. This weakness is 
clearly illustrated during the engagement with the Begoña. 
Prior to the start of the battle, the Council had already split its forces by keeping 
the Duke at anchor. Rogers, whose strategy to fight as a single unit was sound, was 
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completely incapacitated but refused to relinquish his command of the Duke. When the 
Duke did finally enter the fray, Rogers insisted on continuing the fight even though the 
doctrine laid down several months back specifically called for a withdrawal if the 
frigates received potentially fatal damage. As a result, his ship operated with conflicting 
orders to both take the galleon as the primary objective and to withdraw if the day turned 
against the privateers. Finally, the privateers were so self-assured and impetuous that 
they jumped at the chance for a new capture without assessing the situation beforehand. 
This is exactly what led to problems with the Swedish frigate at the beginning of the 
voyage, the illegal Spanish prize taken off the Canaries, and the poorly conceived fight 
against the Havre de Grace outside Guayaquil. Despite Rogers’ previous remarks on 
buccaneers’ rashness, the privateers were almost as poorly disciplined. 
 
 
Aftermath 
The battle lost, the ships withdrew to Puerto Seguro and prepared to set out for 
Guam. After dealing with immediate problems, the privateers turned to inventorying 
everything captured with the Disengaño. They estimated the value of cargo, the 
personal effects belonging to the crewmen and passengers, and the ship’s stores. The 
cargo’s true value could not be quantified until they were properly condemned and 
auctioned off more than two years later, in London.
42
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Raw silk made up the largest single item on the manifest, weighing in at over 
fourteen tons. It was valuable on its own and was destined for Mexican weavers, as 
Mexico possessed an established sericulture that predated the galleon trade.
43  
Refined 
silk possessed exponentially higher value, as the auctions after the expedition’s return 
proved. Nearly six tons of thrown silk (that had been reeled and cleaned) and substantial 
quantities of other weaves were accounted for. Finished silk clothing also promised a 
lucrative payout at the end of the voyage. Since the agents were involved with cloth 
merchants in the Syndicate before the voyage (that was partially why the Syndicate 
chose them for the expedition), they had a practiced eye for such subtle differences in 
thread count and style. The Syndicate’s agents were so meticulous regarding equitable 
distribution that they kept track of the different kinds of clothing, including the exact 
number of handkerchiefs.
44  
In addition to prodigious amounts of clothing and silk, the 
galleon held literally tons of East Indian spices including high-value cloves. There were 
also “Several Parcels of odd things” that the agents did not think worthy of cataloging.45 
In addition to the cargo listed on the galleon’s manifest, the privateers found 
many other items not listed on the manifest. These included bulk items hidden in plain 
sight – but not listed on the manifest as well as extra items hidden between decks and in 
every nook and cranny. In fact, the prize crew would continue to find concealed items 
including even entire bales of cloth over the next several months. 
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Manila customs agents uncritically accepted statements from merchants without 
bothering to inspect the goods themselves. Few Philippines agents were willing to 
snoop around for undocumented cargo; doing so interfered with clandestine deals that 
intertwined both sides of the Spanish Pacific and the agents themselves probably 
received some kickbacks. Many powerful, influential parties had vested interests in 
under the table dealings that started just off Manila.
46
 
The privateers also seized the navigator’s derrotero, which contained 
navigational readings from throughout the galleon’s course. In addition to that, the 
privateers collected a number of charts depicting parts of the South Sea.
47  
To privateers 
and pirates, the maps often functioned as a ticket to wealth and status or could be used to 
“buy” their way out of legal entanglements if the occasion called for it. As it happened, 
the Syndicate’s voyagers never got into that much trouble but maps were a wise 
insurance policy. The buccaneer Bartholomew Sharp had used captured charts as 
bargaining chips to avoid being charged with piracy not once, but three times. Another 
buccaneer Charles Swan had also seized charts from his prizes. As Dampier (who had 
sailed with Swan) described that voyage, “now our Pilots being at a loss on these less 
frequented Coasts, we supply’d that defect out of the Spanish Pilot-books, which we 
took in their ships.”48 
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While some agents inspected the cargo, others focused on the possessions of the 
captured crewmen. In addition to their wages (up to 350 pieces of eight for a round- 
trip), crewmen were usually allowed space to take along items to trade on their own 
account in Mexico – items that were not placed with other cargo and did not appear in 
the ship’s records.49 
Many Spanish sailors also packed extra silk items into their sea chests when they 
left Manila, claiming the expensive clothing formed part of their personal wardrobe. 
Profits from reselling the clandestinely packed silks gave the sailors an even greater 
profit, up to 100 pieces of eight, which was all done while avoiding the relevant taxes 
and fees. The Spanish crown found this form of tax evasion so pervasive and difficult to 
prosecute (it was impossible for authorities to prove that the clothing was not intended 
for personal use) that it stopped enforcing those regulations by 1709.
50
 
 
The Spanish officers presented a likely source of plunder not just through their 
private cargo, but through solid coin and personal items in their private quarters. 
Galleons had a top-heavy roster, with many officers and several pilots. Since the 
Philippines contained few competent naval officers, and the galleons’ captains received 
their appointment through personal acquaintanceships within the viceroy of New Spain 
and experience in land wars, they usually chose their junior officers from among their 
friends who were just as wealthy.
51  
Two of the galleon officers, the accountant and 
overseer, were solely responsible for the cargo and kept detailed manifests. They played 
 
 
49 
Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 210. 
50 
Ibid., 177. 
51 
Ibid., 201. 
229  
 
such an important role that both were paid 2000 pieces of eight for every voyage. Such 
sums were greater than any other officers’ salary except for the captains’.52  Naturally, 
most officers traveled with luxuries and creature comforts that could be sold later on. 
Passengers also tended to be well heeled. The galleons often carried civilians 
hoping to return home to New Spain, Peru, or even Spain itself. Like the English nabobs 
in India, Spanish colonists in the Philippines could make a good living and return home 
to easy lives. Passage fees from Manila to Acapulco ranged from 2000 to 4000 pieces of 
eight, indicating that only wealthy Spaniards could afford the trip.
53  
There were ten 
passengers onboard the Manila ship and they carried numerous personal items, many 
crafted in gold or silver, that were promptly catalogued.
54
 
The privateers also requisitioned the Disengaño’s stores. Just before clearing the 
Philippines, Manila galleons restocked their storerooms and were supposed to carry 
enough food for six months’ sailing. Once the Manila ship closed its hatches, any Crown 
or viceregal regulations ceased and private traders swarmed aboard to cram extra cargo 
into the already bursting hold. In the interest of making as high profits as possible,      
the officers and crew freed up space by jettisoning stores such as food and water to make 
room for personal trading goods. The eastward voyage from Manila to Acapulco usually 
took six months, although it sometimes stretched to eight depending on the wind. Such 
practices sometimes led to a tragic end as the crews starved or died of thirst.
55
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The British privateers hoped to add to their depleted supply of food from the 
captured galleon but discovered that the Disengaño was nearly as short on food as they 
were. She was nearing the end of her Pacific voyage and, aside from a brief stop in 
Guam, had not stopped anywhere to revictual. The galleon’s storerooms contained 3700 
pounds of bread, 6400 pounds of beef, 2600 pounds of pork, a miniscule 200 pounds of 
pease, 500 pounds of flour, and 3400 pounds of rice. To supplement his sailors’ diet, 
Pichberty had been generous enough to allow for some salt, hams, and olive oil.
56  
The 
 
sheer numbers might seem like a decent quantity, but many provisions were already 
inedible due to the galleon spending months at sea. That food also had to be distributed 
to the entire expedition of over 300 crewmen and any remaining prisoners and slaves. 
At full rations, there was not enough bread to feed the privateers for more than two 
weeks. The prize crew also discovered some confectionary that had likely been reserved 
for passengers and officers, but not enough to alleviate the supply situation and candy 
had low nutritional value regardless.
57  
Finally, agents thoroughly searched the surgeon’s 
medical stores as well. The Disengaño held a little more than £30’s worth of medical 
supplies in her sick bay. Any medicines were welcome considering the expedition had 
already run out, but none of the requisitioned unguents were effective against scurvy, 
which was the primary health concern at this point.
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The privateers’ supply problems remained after their actions against the Spanish 
galleons. With dwindling resources, the expedition had no choice but to get its affairs in 
order and leave. 
Before departing for Guam, the expedition needed to deal with the prisoners it 
still held. First the Council ordered Pichberty and the higher-ranking prisoners to sign a 
document stating that they had been “very civilly treated; and whatsoever we have 
transacted or done, has been by our voluntary Will and Consent.”59  Pichberty’s letter 
echoes what the privateers instructed him to state, including that the Duke and Dutchess 
were indeed the privateersmen that had sacked Guayaquil and that the Englishmen had 
treated him and the other captives well.
60
 
On New Year’s Day, the privateers packed most of the prisoners into the Jesus, 
Maria y Jose and sent them to Acapulco. The privateers also settled their financial 
account with Pichberty. The French captain gave them the bills of exchange, intended 
for an unnamed French merchant based in London. The owners’ agents made sure the 
bills not only paid for the ransoms and the Jesus, Maria y Jose, but for every bit of cargo 
left onboard including items worth only several shillings.
61
 
 
As Pichberty left, the Council gave him some correspondence written by the 
senior officers and addressed to the Syndicate in Bristol. The officers edited the letters 
to avoid divulging information to the enemy (they were careful to not mention Guam) 
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and Pichberty promised to somehow send them to Bristol.
62  
In his letter to the 
Syndicate, Rogers stated that the privateers’ had achieved their primary goal. He briefly 
summarized the expedition’s engagements with the galleons. The smaller galleon, he 
informed his backers, had put up a “stout Resistance.” He noted that he had been 
wounded during the engagement but did not tell them the severity of his injuries. He 
informed the Syndicate that during combat with the second galleon, the larger ship had 
inflicted so much damage that the privateers were repelled and “forc’d [to withdraw and] 
to be Content with [their capture of] the first.” He closed by saying that the expedition 
was homeward bound.
63
 
Cooke and Courtney sent a similar letter with that dispatch. They did not go into 
 
any detail but informed the Syndicate that, though damaged, the privateers were headed 
to the East Indies. They did not tell the Syndicate exactly how much the galleon was 
worth, but bragged “we don’t doubt but all will prosper well, as we thank God itt hath 
hitherto.”64  Neither letter told the Syndicate just how poor a condition both the ships 
and men were in. Pichberty made good on his promise to forward the dispatches. The 
Syndicate did not record when it received the dispatches, but it would have been months 
before the letters arrived in Bristol.
65
 
Not all the galleon crewmen went to the mainland with Pichberty. The privateers 
kept 36 Filipino sailors to help the prize crew sail the galleon. The Filipinos were not 
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signed on as crewmen, but as a combination of prisoners and paid help.
66  
The 
Disengaño’s pilot was also forced to accompany the expedition because the Council 
members thought that his experience in the Pacific would be useful if he recovered from 
being shot in the throat. Retaining as prisoners individuals with specialized skills such 
as pilotage, carpentry, or even cooking, was a common practice among pirates and 
privateers.
67  
The expedition thus received more skilled hands regardless if they came 
willingly or not. 
Shifting their focus to the prize herself, the privateers finished repairs and 
renamed her Batchelor, after their benefactor John Batchelor from the Syndicate.
68 
Crewing a new ship presented an opportunity for more petty officers to advance in rank 
and pay, although selecting the right men for each position created a great deal of 
acrimony that festered for the rest of the voyage.
69  
Privateers often squabbled over who 
received which position and the Syndicate’s officers were no exception. The other 
prizes they had captured thus far were mostly small barks and so not worth arguing 
about. Even the Marquis, which was substantially heavier than the other prizes, did not 
cause any controversy when Cooke was put in command. The Disengaño, however, 
held what was by far the most valuable cargo. Commanding her seemed to hold a good 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
Schurz, The Manila Galleon, 277. 
67 
Bartholomew Sharpe, Captain Sharp’s Journal of His Expedition: Written by Himself 
in A Collection of Original Voyages ed. William Hacke (1699), 49. 
68 
Cooke, A Voyage to the South Sea, 2:2. 
69 
Rogers, A Cruising Voyage, 167. 
234  
 
deal of prestige for the officers and so the Council descended into acrimony and 
jealousy.
70
 
Rogers did not think Dover would want to command the Batchelor. As chief 
medical officer and second captain, being put in charge of the prize seemed beneath him. 
But the sheer wealth in the prize’s cargo must have been too tempting for Dover, and he 
refused to sign the Council decision and called a meeting of the Dutchess and Marquis 
officers on January 9 to challenge the decision. Dover and members of the informal 
gathering “brought a paper which impower’d him to be sole commander without the 
least restraint, of not molesting those that should navigate the ship, but to order every 
thing as he should think fit.”71  Since Dover’s cohort outnumbered Rogers’, Dover 
claimed to have the majority in his favor. Despite his other responsibilities, Dover 
insisted he was the most suitable officer to take command of the Batchelor although he 
conceded allowing Frye or Stretton to serve as second captain under him. 
Rogers and the Duke’s officers expressed their opposition to Dover’s 
appointment that same day. They stated that to maintain peace within the expedition 
they would allow Dover to remain in command even though he was incompetent. The 
signed statement was worded as insultingly as possible without actually crossing the line 
into insubordination.
72
 
Rogers added a personal note stating that he accepted opposition to Dover’s 
 
appointment only because the Syndicate had entrusted him to lead the expedition and 
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keeping peace among its members was necessary.
73  Rogers’ argument might have been 
more effective if Dover was not a Syndicate member himself. Most of the officers had 
accepted the Council’s previous decisions. Even at Guayaquil, Rogers had acquiesced to 
Dover and Courtney’s decision to abandon the “siege” and kept his complaints private. 
Now various officers were no longer accepting majority decisions without protesting. 
The Duke officers claimed that the Batchelor was “under an uncapable Command,” an 
insult that would have been unfathomable just a year before.
74
 
Both Rogers and Dover used their station to gather support against the other. 
 
Again, Rogers was the “commander-in-chief” of the expedition but was subject to 
Council rulings so he did not wield absolute power. Dover was the president of the 
Council but had no real power except for a tie-breaking vote in meetings. What the two 
captains did have was influence, and they used that to gather supporters. In the angry 
letters that were sent between the Duke and Marquis and presented at Council meetings, 
it is clear from the signatures there was a stark divide between the ships’ companies. 
Dover’s faction contained officers only from the Dutchess and Marquis (the Batchelor 
officially did not have a crew yet) whereas Rogers only had Duke officers supporting 
him. Both factions threatened that the other would be “liable to us for all Damages that 
may happen” and would owe “full Satisfaction and Reparation of all Losses and 
Damages whatsoever that may happen to the said Ship, during her Voyage to Great 
Britain.”75 
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The disputes at Guayaquil had not only been less vicious but seemed to mostly 
be between Dover and Rogers and of a personal nature. The arguments over the 
Batchelor displayed an obvious rift between officers of different ships. This was not an 
uncommon occurrence in other privateering voyages and had in fact happened in 
Dampier’s last voyage on three occasions, which resulted in unhappy officers sailing 
away in a ship. 
Discussion continued for the next two days at which point the Council met on 
January 10 and agreed that the Duke’s chief lieutenant Frye and the Dutchess’ chief 
lieutenant Stretton “shall both act in Equall Posts in the sole navigating sailing & 
Engaging if occasion should be under Capt. Thomas Dover on Board the Batchelor 
Frigatt.”76  Through this decision the Council seemed to tacitly side with Rogers by 
reducing Dover’s power but sparing his pride. An unsigned majority of Council 
members also sent an undated letter to Frye and Stretton, instructing them to ensure that 
the crew obeyed them and not Dover, and that the ship was “wholly Left to [their] Care 
and good Management.”77  With Frye and Stretton effectively commanding the crew, 
Dover was left with only a nominal command and each of the two frigates could claim to 
have a representative onboard. 
The same agreement that placed Frye and Stretton in command also assigned 
other officers to the Batchelor. The Council appointed Alexander Selkirk sailing master. 
Selkirk was the obvious choice, given his extensive maritime experience and the 
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leadership he had displayed during the raid on Guayaquil. By having Selkirk in place as 
the Batchelor’s master, Rogers was in a good position to undermine Dover. First, 
Rogers had another experienced sailor onboard the prize; if Dover did not know how to 
react to the winds and currents, Selkirk certainly did. Second, Selkirk could coordinate 
with other sailors who were transferred to the Batchelor in order to frustrate Dover 
should he threaten the expedition’s integrity. Frye and Stretton could not do so without 
violating the Syndicate’s instructions to support fellow Council members, but Selkirk 
was not on the Council and not subject to those same rules. Selkirk was loyal to Rogers, 
as were most of the Duke’s crew (35 of whom were transferred to the Batchelor versus 
25 from the Dutchess and 13 from the Marquis).
78  
Rogers knew that spreading out loyal 
crewmen among different ships was key to maintaining cohesion within the expedition. 
Although the worst tension was diffused, there was still tension between officers of the 
different ships. 
There was another vacancy to be filled as well. William Bath, the owners’ agent 
onboard the Duthcess, had died just before New Year’s. He was replaced by James 
Goodall on January 9. The previous year had not been kind to the original members of 
the Council. Carlton Vanbrugh had been dismissed in April and Samuel Hopkins took 
over his place on the Council, but Hopkins died during the time spent in the Galapagos.
79 
Hopkins’ replacement (Lancelot Appleby of the Duke) and that of John Rogers who was 
killed off Guayaquil (Robert Knowlman of the Dutchess) had been selected in June and 
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were unsure of themselves, being former mates newly promoted from the main deck. 
Goodall was in an even more precarious situation. Having been appointed while the 
various officers argued over the Batchelor’s roster, his appointment might be cited as an 
example of a mistake if he did not perform well and the officers accused each other of 
poor decision-making. During this time, the replacements must have either stayed out of 
the bickering or aligned themselves with their captain. Either way, they were pawns in 
this new round of infighting.
80  
Since Bath had been an owners’ agent, there was also 
 
indubitably the sneaking suspicion among the crewmen that the Dutchess officers had 
manipulated the inventory and plunder amounts in favor of one ship or another in the 
week or so between his death and replacement. The crewmen were already wary of each 
other even with officers accounting for the plunder; the absence of an owners’ agent, 
even for a week, would have led to greater suspicion. 
By the time the expedition left the coast of Central America, the original orders, 
which had stressed consensus and harmony in all things, no longer functioned outside 
the crewmen’s sight. Ill feeling among Council members flared up into angry 
recriminations that festered. The arguments were kept private, however, since the 
Council members continued to project an image of unity to the petty officers and ratings 
in order to maintain unit cohesion. The officers privately undermined each other but 
always seemed to put their differences aside when it came to unruly or mutinous 
crewmen. As far as Rogers’ faction was concerned, monitoring Dover onboard the 
Batchelor was for the good of the expedition. Actively setting the different ships’ crews 
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against one another would have helped no one if it caused the expedition to disperse. 
With the officers putting up a friendly façade, they decided to conclude the unpleasant 
arguments with a toast to a safe journey home.
81
 
 
DEPARTURE 
 
Despite all this infighting, the expedition remained intact. Nobody asked to be 
marooned as Selkirk had. There were and would continue to be desertions, but not 
enough to affect the expedition’s capabilities. There was no violence between the 
officers. Even though some of them were impulsive and prone to outbursts, at this point 
in the voyage the original Council members were focused on preparations to set sail for 
home. 
None of the officers or crewmen knew it at the time, but they had fired their last 
shots in anger for the duration of the voyage. With the capture of the Disengaño, the 
expedition had accomplished its primary objective. Most buccaneers would have kept 
raiding, facing diminishing returns, until their force dispersed as the crews went their 
separate ways. In fact, that was exactly what Dampier had experienced on multiple 
voyages. Many other privateers had done the same as their forces eventually 
disintegrated or turned pirate. But this expedition was better run and more organized. 
Since the Syndicate ran the expedition like a business, there was no point in sticking 
around Puerto Seguro. It was time to bring the prize back home and extract as much 
profit as possible. The Council at least agreed on that, since they were all employees 
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and there were two Syndicate representatives onboard to remind them of who they all 
worked for. 
The privateers left Puerto Seguro at midnight on January 10-11, just after the 
heated meeting of the Council ended. They headed north by northwest along the Baja 
coast. The Batchelor was soon discovered to be a slow sailer, and so the Council 
instructed all senior officers to carefully regulate distribution of their ships’ stores in 
order to make them last longer. In response commanders reduced rations, giving each 
five-man mess one and a half pounds of flour and one small piece of meat daily. 
Doubting they would be able to obtain food or fresh water anywhere in the Central 
Pacific, leaders hoped that these meager rations would be enough to get the expedition to 
Guam. With such limited food stocks and potable water dwindling, any navigational 
error was potentially fatal. Dampier and the other pilots faced a daunting task to find 
Guam based on memory, the stars, unreliable charts, and dead reckoning. 
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CHAPTER IX 
 
HOMEWARD BOUND 
 
 
 
By January 1709 the expedition was in a precarious position. Following the 
abortive attempt on the Begoña, Council members knew that it was time to return to 
Europe. They also knew that Spanish forces in Peru, the West Indies, and the Atlantic 
would be on alert, making that route home untenable. Thus Council members decided to 
return via the Pacific and Indian Oceans despite the fact that this route ran through areas 
controlled by Spain and the Netherlands and claimed by the East India Company. 
As the expedition struck out across the Pacific, its officers and crewmen were 
privateers no more. When in Spanish waters, with few opportunities to revictual, they 
had to behave like traders. And nearly all the Pacific was Spanish. When in Dutch 
waters, members of the expedition had to observe restrictions placed on trade by the 
Dutch East India Company. This entire time, there was also an undercurrent of vestigial 
tension from Guayaquil as some officers took every opportunity to undermine Rogers’ 
standing with the Syndicate at home. 
Upon leaving Puerto Seguro, the expedition elected to follow the route typically 
used by galleons from Acapulco to Guam. As the privateers headed west, the winds 
were favorable but nothing else seemed to be conducive to success of the 6000-mile 
journey. Two weeks after departing, the expedition’s water supply began to foul. The 
crew tried to supplement their victuals by fishing but only caught a single albacore tuna 
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in the entire month of January.
1  
At one point, Cooke suspected the expedition passed 
some lumps of valuable ambergris floating nearby but both officers and ratings were too 
hungry and thirsty to care about the potential wealth; they just wanted to get to Guam as 
quickly as possible.
2
 
On January 28, the Duke’s steward reported that some salt pork was missing 
from the storeroom. The culprits were swiftly apprehended and punished. All the 
thieves were tied to main jeers where the entire watch flogged them. The jeers were the 
ropes that suspended the lower sails, so the culprits were entirely exposed to the 
elements. Since the thieves’ messmates benefited from the stolen food and did not 
report the theft, they were given lesser sentences and placed in irons.
3  
This incident was 
 
another sign of growing unrest among the crews as hunger made them desperate. 
 
As the voyage to Guam continued, the Council stretched out the already meager 
five-man rations to every group of six slaves, which at least kept the healthy ones alive.
4 
Without a trace of irony, Rogers nonchalantly mentioned cutting the slaves’ rations 
while the recently emancipated slaves who agreed to fight with the expedition were 
treated as part of the crew. The expedition’s officers treated black crewmen without 
prejudice while simultaneously parceling out slaves as trade goods and reward items. 
Over the next two months, the fishing did not improve much and more crewmen 
died from disease or from wounds sustained in the fight with the Begoña. Burial 
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ceremonies became a weekly routine. To make matters worse, the Spanish pilot 
captured with the Disengaño was among those who perished, taking his knowledge of 
the Pacific with him. Rogers still suffered from his injuries sustained in the fight with 
the Begoña; his throat swelled and he spat out a piece of jawbone that had somehow 
lodged in his throat. Anyone is his condition would have struggled to eat and drink, and 
dehydration compounded his already poor health and mental state.
5
 
The ships were in deplorable condition. The Duke’s leaky hull required 
continuous pumping so that one pump was always in operation. Each watch rotated two 
men to turn the pumps every hour.
6  
The Marquis also sprung a leak that was so large it 
not be plugged, and Cooke had to bring her top-gallants down in order to ease pressure 
on her hull and keel.
7  
This spared the ship’s hull but further slowed the expedition. On 
February 11, in a desperate attempt to boost morale, Courtney proposed that the Council 
increase the daily flour ration by another half-pound per man and the motion carried. 
Rogers wanted to increase the meat ration as well but was voted down because, if the 
expedition missed Guam, all hands would quickly run out of the only animal protein 
source they had left. 
Things finally began to look up on March 8, when the privateers spotted some 
seabirds so knew they were close to land.
8  
Two days later, the expedition made landfall 
in the northern Mariana Islands, turned southward, and reached Guam the next day. 
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Knowing they desperately needed more supplies, the privateers hoisted Spanish 
colors as they approached the harbor. Since Guam was a Spanish possession, the 
privateers had to assume its inhabitants would be hostile and so relied on deception like 
privateers often did. Native watercraft, praus, came out to greet them. The Council 
discussed whether the privateers should entice some of the natives to come aboard and 
then take them hostage, but that discussion was rendered moot when the first prau 
approached the Duke. It contained two Spaniards who asked where the expedition was 
from and what it was doing there. The privateers answered in Spanish and declared they 
were friends from New Spain, then invited the Spaniards onboard. The two 
unsuspecting visitors climbed onboard to find themselves surrounded by distinctly non- 
Spanish privateers who detained them. The Spaniards were soon followed by a dispatch 
from their governor demanding to know the expedition’s business. 
 
 
GUAM 
 
Keeping one of the Spaniards as a hostage, the Council gave the other man a 
letter addressed to the governor and sent him ashore with the linguist Alexander White 
and a captive Irish crewman taken from the Disengaño.
9  
In the letter the privateers said 
that they wanted to purchase supplies and promised not to harm anyone on the island. 
But if their request was denied, then the Spaniards should “immediately expect such 
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Military Treatment, as we are with ease able to give you.”10  The next day, the Dutchess 
collected White and the Irishman who reported that had been well treated. The two men 
brought with them a message from the governor in which he promised to supply the 
privateers with whatever they needed. 
The privateers’ threat was unnecessary. Few ships came to Guam so Governor 
Juan Antonia Pimentel and his subjects, like those at Gorgona, welcomed the 
opportunity to trade with the expedition. The privateers purchased the usual foodstuffs 
including livestock, corn, yams, and 4000 coconuts which were extremely useful 
because of their versatility.
11  
They paid for these items with obsolete matchlocks 
captured from Guayaquil, slaves, and other items. Cooke described the exchanges as 
mutually beneficial and to the Spaniards’ “extraordinary Satisfaction.” When their 
purchases were complete, the Council presented two black boys to the governor as a 
gift.
12
 
Pimentel also took most of the remaining Spanish prisoners (and presumably the 
Filipinos) from the expedition, excepting those deemed necessary for sailing the Manila 
galleon and condemning it as a legitimate prize. This act eased Rogers’ supply problems 
and eliminated any chance for a prisoner revolt. One of the prisoners in particular, 
Antonio Gomez Figueroa, was released either through compassion or pragmatism. Poor 
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Figueroa was in declining health and the expedition’s surgeons did not expect he would 
last much longer at sea, and certainly not long enough to survive the return trip to 
Britain.
13  
Before the privateers left, they either allowed or coerced him to write a letter 
stating that he had been captured on March 15, 1709 (he was on the Asuncion), had 
witnessed the inventorying of everything captured with the prize ships, and that he had 
not seen the privateers attack anything else. This was likely meant for use in any legal 
proceedings should the expedition be accused of piracy or any other violations of the 
law. The Council officers signed his statement as witnesses.
14
 
After nine days in Guam, the expedition left the island and continued its 
westward journey. The time in Guam was crucial for the men’s health, as they had spent 
months short on food and especially fresh produce. On March 20, the Council met on 
the Marquis and decided to transfer portions of the expedition’s plunder to the Dutchess 
and the Marquis. This would prevent a total loss of the plunder should the Duke or 
Batchelor be taken captive or founder en route to Britain. Spreading the plunder among 
the other ships would also alleviate some of the suspicions that crews had towards each 
other.
15  
More importantly, the Council elected to steer southwest toward Batavia. The 
 
expedition set sail from Guam on March 21. It was fortunate that the privateers departed 
when they did because more hardship soon struck Guam. Just months later, a typhoon 
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caused catastrophic damage to the island that surely would have wrecked the 
expedition’s ships. 
 
 
EAST INDIES 
The next two months’ entries in Rogers and Cooke’s journals mostly contain 
mundane topics but do illustrate the expedition’s fragile state as it continued 
southwardly. The men were healthier but the ships continued to deteriorate. The Duke 
began to leak so much that every watch had to detach four men to continuously man the 
pumps instead of only two.
16  
High winds also split the ships’ rotted sails and the crews 
took efforts to avoid water spouts that would have only damaged the rigging further.
17
 
 
The expedition skirted the Spanish Philippines (ultimately deciding to avoid 
Mindanao) but its pilots did not know exactly how to reach any safe havens; Dampier’s 
memory was hazy while the others had never been in the region. On April 29, the 
Council decided that if the expedition did not find Ternate or Celebes, they would have 
no choice but to reverse course and stop at Mindanao. That was a risky proposition 
considering the Spanish in the Philippines were well aware that the expedition was in the 
Pacific. Dampier also advised the Council to immediately reject New Guinea as an 
alternative since there were no known settlements to trade with. The Council decided to 
cruise for ten to twelve more days in the hope that its pilots might recognize an island or 
landmark. The Council met again on May 8 but could not agree on anything except to 
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test the winds and currents for several more days as everyone was very much lost. Every 
time a lookout spotted land, nobody was quite sure what island it might be. 
Tempers frayed during this time as the famished crews began to suspect the other 
ships of hoarding supplies. On May 15 an inspection of the Batchelor found enough rice 
to supply the expedition for another three weeks. Discovery of rice convinced some 
crewmen that the rumors of hoarding were accurate. Distrust between officers spread to 
the crewmen as well, as Rogers mentioned everyone “being jealous of each other, who 
had the most Provisions.”18 
On May 22 Rogers described the expedition’s worsening state thus, “we begin to 
be in the utmost want of all manner of Refreshments and Necessaries, and doubtful 
where to harbour or refit.”19  One week later the privateers reached the island of Buton 
southeast of Celebes, which held the first allied settlement they encountered since Ilha 
Grande.
20  
As the privateers visited the principal town on Buton, the townspeople were 
open to trade. Cooke recorded that the privateers traded clothes and metal utensils for 
produce, but the expedition’s official account ledger lists the privateers trading serge, 
baize, and calico cloth that must have been captured from Spanish coastal shipping.
21  
It 
is likely that the small items Cooke described were part of an informal trade that the 
agents did not see fit to record. 
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The Dutch East Indies were a convergence point for South Asian, Southeast 
Asian, Islamic, and European markets, and the privateers were in the middle of this 
blend of ancient and modern forces. The king’s bodyguards were armed with scimitars 
and European matchlocks. The ancient stone wall that surrounded Buton had been 
modified to accommodate cannon. The settlement had a daily herb market for local 
traders but also accepted Dutch and Spanish coins.
22
 
 
Batavia 
With the immediate supply problems rectified, some of the crewmen found time 
to plot a mutiny. Even more disturbing was the fact that they were led by some unnamed 
officers. The expedition’s senior officers discovered the cabal on June 3 or 4,              
put the ringleaders in irons, and decided to “break the Knot” by spreading the group of 
malcontents to different ships.
23  
The expedition left Buton on June 7, and not a moment 
too soon. A separate group of Dutchess crewmen were on the verge of mutiny because 
they had not seen a penny of their shares. They were still frustrated at taking the brunt  
of damage in the engagement with the Begoña and wanted to know what they had earned 
for their troubles. Rogers and the Council made no mention of the incident but Cooke 
did. The Council transferred the troublemakers to the Marquis and Duke. The Marquis 
was the least seaworthy ship and there was no point in the mutineers seizing control of a 
vessel that might not make it home. The Duke’s crewmen were loyal to Rogers, so no 
mutiny could gain traction there. 
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The expedition next stopped at Batavia, the Asian headquarters of the Vereeniade 
Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC), which the British called the Dutch East India 
Company.
24  
In 1602 the Netherlands granted the company a monopoly on the spice 
trade. A century later the VOC controlled most of the trade between East Asia and 
Europe, making it the largest corporation in the world. From Batavia Dutch 
merchmantmen fanned out to ports in China, Japan, Ceylon, and the East Indies. Based 
on what the Council members knew from the journals of William Dampier, Charles 
Swan, and William Funnell, they understood that should they challenge the VOC’s 
monopoly on regional trade, they risked subjecting their ships and cargoes to seizure by 
Dutch officials. 
When the expedition arrived and anchored at the Batavia roads on June 21 its 
leaders knew they would have to readjust their behavior. Their situation was different 
from that at Guayaquil, Guam, or even Buton. In Batavia there were no permissive 
government officials who would allow them to engage in trade like those in Buton or the 
Spanish officials in Guam and the Americas. The expedition leaders explained their 
presence to the Dutch authorities and sent a list of supplies they wished to purchase. The 
ships were ordered to remain where they were and only a few of the officers were 
allowed to go ashore and explore what Cooke called the “metropolis of the Dutch 
Dominions in India.”25  More importantly for Rogers, he found a surgeon to both remove 
the musketball that had been lodged inside his face for months and repair his foot. 
Throughout the expedition’s stay, the Dutch only tolerated its presence. 
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When port authorities let the sailors ashore, all the boats were “severely 
searched” to assure that they carried nothing to trade for profit.26  The Council and its 
accountants had to produce a manifest listing exactly what cargo – down to the last box 
of thread – was onboard each ship had when it arrived at Batavia. This inventory could 
be compared to another taken shortly before their departure and anything not accounted 
for would be assumed to have been sold or traded illegally at Batavia.
27  
The Batavia 
inventory could be compared to one taken at the Cape of Good Hope later in order to 
determine whether the expedition had done any trading during its crossing of the Indian 
Ocean where the EIC enjoyed a monopoly in British trade similar to that of the VOC. 
Upon learning that the expedition’s cargo included nearly 1200 pounds of cloves 
and 9700 pounds of cinnamon, Dutch officials immediately became suspicious. The 
VOC did not allow anyone else to trade spices and placed strict quotas on the cultivation 
of cloves on plantations not owned by the VOC, even on those which were Dutch- 
owned. The privateers’ explanation that the spices had been captured with the 
Disengaño made little difference to VOC officials. The mere ownership of such large 
quantities of cloves and cinnamon by foreigners posed a threat to Dutch control of the 
spice trade.
28  
With Dover and Courtney onboard, any smuggling on the expedition’s 
part was a reflection upon the Syndicate. To remind all the crewmen of the absolute 
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embargo on private trade, the Council also agreed to post notices detailing the 
restrictions on each ship’s mast from that day forward.29 
For its part, the expedition made an effort to avoid trading for anything but 
necessary supplies. At a meeting on June 30, the Council agreed to give the sailors more 
and better food and so Courtney, Rogers, and Charles Pope were tasked with ensuring 
that the expedition received “not above nor under 350 Pounds [of food] every other 
Day” and that it included as many vegetables and eggs as possible. In addition, each 
mess on every ship was entitled to a daily quart of arrack and sugar.
30
 
Administrative changes planned by the Council since the expedition’s departure 
from Puerto Seguro were finally implemented. Vanbrugh was officially reinstated as the 
Duke’s owners’ agent. James Gooddall was made the Dutchess’ agent while John 
Vigors and Thomas Glendale became agents for the Batchelor and Marquis respectively. 
These men cooperated with the Council in taking stock of all plunder and completing 
mundane transactions with the Dutch in Batavia. 
The expedition needed to keep its books in order, otherwise the VOC could 
accuse it (and the Syndicate by extension) of anything from short-changing those the 
expedition traded with to smuggling. Of further importance was the Council’s decision 
to allow each ship’s crew to appoint a representative who would work with the agents. 
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This helped allay the crewmen’s fears that expedition leaders were not conducting 
business honestly.
31
 
The Council agreed to advance 10,000 pieces of eight to the ship captains so they 
could “provide themselves with Necessaries in our long Passage to Europe.” Aside from 
this allotment and the purchase of essential items, the Council decreed “all trading be 
prohibited by any of us with the inhabitants of this city of Batavia, or this island of Java, 
or any part of India.”32  To help pay for the supplies, the agents bartered cloth from their 
previous captures but left the Manila galleon’s cargo largely untouched.33 
Immediately after calculating how to pay the Dutch for needed supplies, the 
Council had to deal with individuals who spread dissension. First, the Council tried 
midshipman Henry Duck of the Dutchess and found him “Guilty of Notoryous falsitys & 
Mutinys.” Duck’s behavior was odd, given the fact that Duck was one of the 
midshipmen who had criticized Alexander White for similar behavior earlier in the 
voyage. To punish Duck, and to make an example of him, the Council ordered that he be 
locked in leg-irons on the Batchelor’s poop deck for the duration of the expedition’s stay 
at Batavia or until they released him. The Council allowed one concession by      
keeping him under an awning so he would not die of heat stroke.
34
 
 
The next day, the Council tried Charles May, the Duke’s surgeon’s mate, for 
various infractions including going ashore without leave and spreading lies to fellow 
 
31 
Woodes Rogers, A Cruising Voyage, 206. 
32 
Ibid. 
33 
Account of the Purchase Taken by The Ships Duke and Dutchess, Folio 12. “Creagh 
v. Rogers,” C 104/37, NAUK. 
34 
Council Minutes Book, disciplinary meeting on July 1, 1710. “Creagh v. Rogers,” C 
104/36, NAUK. 
37 
Bundle No. 75, loose leaf accounts and disbursement papers. “Creagh v. Rogers,” C 
104/161 Part I, NAUK 
254 
 
 
Englishmen, in this case officers of the EIC. The Council’s record of the trial did not go 
into any details but its members feared that May’s behavior might land the expedition 
and Syndicate in legal trouble. It was one thing to lie to the Spanish. Deception (e.g., 
flying false flags) was a common behavior for privateersmen when dealing with an 
enemy, but not when interacting with allies. The Council decided that May’s actions 
proved he was not responsible enough to care for the sick and so it demoted him and 
made him join the unfortunate Duck on the Batchelor’s poop deck to serve an identical 
sentence.
35 
These were harsh punishments, but the two were given at a proper hearing 
so the crewmen accepted their sentences. 
At the same meeting in which the Council tried May, it returned to logistics and 
gave an additional 6070 pieces of eight to the senior officers in order to purchase 
additional supplies.
36  
Unlike most other privateers and South Sea buccaneers, this 
expedition ran itself like a business rather than a roving band of freebooters. As always 
since the beginning, every captain kept a record of all purchases for his ship and 
regularly compared notes with the agents so there were no discrepancies.
37
 
With disciplinary issues and expenses settled for the time being, the expedition 
desperately needed to repair its ships. The expedition had been in the Dutch East Indies 
since June 10 but Dutch officials did not agree to assist in getting the ships repaired until 
June 22, and even then the Dutch were deliberately vague as to when workers and 
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equipment would arrive from Batavia.
38  
Rogers had already sent a letter to Governor- 
General Abraham van Riebeck telling him that “delays are very prejudicial to our ships, 
that have been long without the benefit of a friend’s port. Which we earnestly request, 
you’ll please to consider.” Those pleas fell on deaf ears.39 
The sabadar, who served as the chief customs officer for foreigners, refused to 
even introduce the officers to the governor. Rogers and Courtney lost patience on July 
20 and resorted to bribery. The VOC paid outrageously low wages to its middle 
management and employees beneath them.
40  
In Rogers’ expense report, he recorded a 
sum for six pounds and four shillings (nearly 70 guilders) for “bribing the Guards when 
Capt Courtney and I waited on ye Generall.”41  The guards quickly waved the captains 
through to see Riebeck. When he realized he could no longer avoid the meeting with 
Courtney and Rogers, the governor ordered a VOC vessel to help careen the expedition’s 
ships, along with some Malay caulkers to repair the most severe leaks. The privateers 
were also allowed to move to an anchorage off Horn Island, which was nearer to the 
center of Batavia than their previous anchorage. 
On July 30, the owners’ agents calculated the value of a portion of the currency 
and precious metals captured to date, determined that each full share in the enterprise 
was due approximately 26 shillings, and allotted that amount of prize money to each of 
the crewmen who had elected to be paid fully in shares or 13 shillings to those on the 
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partial share/partial wage plan. While at Gorgona, agents had assessed the value of the 
plunder taken at Guayaquil but did not authorize paying shareholders anything. Finally, 
at Batavia, each officer and rating saw an estimate of his earnings from the Begoña. 
That money was still in the ships’ holds but at least the privateers had an idea of what 
their labors had earned them. 
While the expedition remained in Batavia, several British Indiamen came and 
went. On August 21 Rogers sent a letter to the Syndicate via the Indiaman Nathanael 
bound for Britain. In the letter he informed the Syndicate that the expedition had arrived 
in Batavia more or less intact.
42
 
On September 7, the Council instructed Vanbrugh to take 1305 pieces of eight 
 
ashore and exchange that amount for Dutch money.
43  
Just a little over two weeks later, 
on September 23, the Council met again and instructed some officers to divide 1341 
pieces of eight between the ships’ companies as plunder on the spot. The Council 
assessed a single box filled with gold and silver paper (metal dust that was glued onto a 
sheet of paper), jewelry, ceremonial swords, amber, and coral. The assessors determined 
the items’ value and instructed the owners’ agents to distribute an equivalent amount in 
Dutch coins (about 3200 guilders) to the members of the crew. This was the first time 
the crewmen received any solid coin.
44
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As the season for sailing westward to the Cape of Good Hope then northward to 
Europe approached, leaders assessed the condition of each of the expedition’s ships. 
The Marquis in particular suffered from shipworm and simple wear and tear, which the 
warm waters exacerbated. An old ship, she was in poor condition when the privateers 
captured her outside Guayaquil. Crossing the Pacific made her condition worse. The 
caulkers who examined her determined “that she had but a single bottom, eat to a 
honeycomb by the worms, they judg’d her altogether unfit to go to Europe.”45  Dutch 
regulations prevented getting the Marquis repaired at Horn Island so the decision was 
made to sell her and divide her crewmen among the other three ships. 
Dutch officials closely regulated the sale of ships to benefit local buyers.
46  
The 
VOC sabadar who arranged the auction also informed Rogers that the governor 
instituted a policy decreeing that anyone who purchased the ship would have to break  
her up or burn her. Thus the ship would have to be sold as salvage. Dutch policy also 
forbade the sale of ships to non-Dutch buyers, although that rule was ignored in some 
cases, as it was now when an EIC captain named John Opie was allowed to participate in 
the auction for undisclosed reasons.
47  
His 575 Dutch guilders (worth just over 240 
pieces of eight) was the highest bid on the ship. Vanbrugh strenuously objected to the 
deal and was not shy about voicing his opinion, while Opie sarcastically offered to sell 
the ship back to Vanbrugh for ten pieces of eight. Opie already commanded the EIC 
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frigate Oley and did not need the Marquis, so he resold her to Chinese merchants, 
making a profit on the transaction.
48
 
The owners’ agents made the sale and resale possible by lending Opie £500 (at  
50 percent interest). A bill of exchange recorded the transaction and called for 
repayment of the loan once Opie’s Indiaman returned to England. This was a transaction 
purely between British mariners, and which the VOC had no right to interfere in.
49
 
As the days dragged on, some of the English crewmen ran out of patience 
waiting to return home, deserted, and signed onto EIC ships bound for Britain. Others 
decided to stay in Batavia and blended in with the local population. These desertions 
exasperated Rogers, who thought the hardest phase of their journey ended. Furthermore, 
the deserters forfeited their shares and wages. He described the deserters as “straggling 
fellows that cant leave their old trade of deferring, tho’ now they have a good sum due to 
each of them, so that their shares are by contract due to those that continu’d.”50 
 
The original crewmen had been at sea for two years by this point and were aware 
that they were heading home soon. The sailors also knew there was still a good chance 
of dying at sea before they finally received payment for their shares. Some probably 
figured that they might have more lucrative options deserting and signing onto a VOC or 
EIC ship.
51  
Many others knew that disease could still claim them, and at least four men, 
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including the Duke’s master John Bridge and the Dutchess’ gunner Francis Weeks, did 
indeed succumb to fevers during their stay in Batavia. Losing Bridge and Weeks to 
disease meant losing two specialists who possessed irreplaceable skills.
52  
Rogers 
reported that bloody fluxes (most likely dysentery) incapacitated many more of his crew, 
mostly from drinking the brackish water at Horn Island. Even healthier crewmen were 
not immune to hazards, as one of the Dutchess’ sailors was bitten in half by a shark 
whilst swimming.
53
 
In order to make up for the dead and deserted crewmen, the Council hired on 
approximately 40 sailors. Most were Dutchmen eager to return to the Netherlands and 
knew they would be better treated on British privateersmen than on a VOC Indiaman. 
The fresh crewmen were necessary not only to ease the workload for the remaining 
hands, but to fulfill the Syndicate’s standing orders that all ships were to be fully 
manned. Since the privateering phase was well and truly over, the new hires only 
received wages instead of shares. Allowing them shares from plunder taken – which the 
new hires did not play any part in capturing – would have incensed the old hands who 
originally departed from Bristol or Cork in 1708. 
 
 
Departure 
 
On October 14, the expedition left Batavia for the Cape of Good Hope. Its 
leaders knew they had worn out their welcome in Batavia. Plus, they knew that they had 
to leave soon or they would be too late to join a convoy leaving the Cape of Good Hope 
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for Europe. VOC convoys were subject to seasonal weather patterns as much as the 
West Indies and Philippines trade routes were. Furthermore, VOC officers were often 
Dutch naval officers and so convoy timetables were state matters that could not be 
modified on a whim. The privateers were already running out of time to take advantage 
of fair winds. Dampier had previously written about Batavia that “the fair Weather 
begins in April or May, and continues to October, then the Tornadoes begin to come, but 
no violent bad Weather till the middle of December.”54 
 
Several British ships accompanied the expedition when it set out from Batavia, 
but left the group once it reached the open waters of the Indian Ocean. Vanbrugh sent a 
letter to the Syndicate via one of the passing merchantmen, summarizing the stay at 
Batavia and assuring the Syndicate that the crews were “in [every] good 
Circumstances.”55 
It was fortunate for the privateers that they did not travel from Batavia with a 
 
VOC convoy. Despite the safety in numbers, the privateers would have been forced to 
travel at an even more sluggish pace. The VOC relied on heavy ships with three masts 
and double oaken hulls. Since they were built with optimal cargo capacity in mind, the 
Indiamen crawled along at a steady but lethargic two and a half knots. The voyage from 
the Batavia to the Netherlands measured approximately 15,000 nautical miles. It was a 
well-established route, honed through decades of trial and error which cost many sailors 
their lives. 
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Since the Dutch merchants and guilds knew that timely deliveries mattered in 
setting market value for spices, they designated the Cape of Good Hope as the single rest 
stop on the route. Ships that did not tack at the right moment risked wandering aimlessly 
until the westerlies pushed them back and ran them aground in western Australia. All 
these factors made the Batavia-Texel route perilous, resulting in one out of twenty ships 
that sailed from Java never reaching Texel. The Syndicate privateers ran those same 
risks as they sailed practically the same route.
56
 
 
The expedition held course for over two months before finally reaching the Cape 
of Good Hope. This part of the voyage passed without much incident, although it was 
abundantly clear by now that both ships and men were still in poor shape. With little 
opportunity to resupply between the East Indies and the Cape, fresh water began to run 
out and the expedition implemented water rationing once again.
57  
The Duke’s chief 
surgeon Jacobus Wasse died, taking his professional education and “study of physick” 
with him. Shortly afterward a sailor named Joseph Long, either through exhaustion or 
carelessness, fell overboard whilst stowing an anchor and drowned before the Duke’s 
crew reached him. Rogers spent the first few weeks laid up in his cabin, not quite 
recovered from the surgeries on his foot and mouth.
58  
The expedition also needed to 
travel at a painfully slow pace because the hasty repairs at Batavia were not as thorough 
as previously hoped; the Duke sprung another leak and the Dutchess was not in much 
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better condition. The Batchelor’s construction made her seaworthy but she had not been 
built for speed. 
 
 
CAPE TOWN 
 
Despite the very real threat of losing its bearings, the expedition reached the Cape 
on December 30. With the instantly recognizable Table Mountain in view, the privateers 
and the Dutch garrison exchanged salutes. The British Indiaman Donegal also        
joined in the ceremony, representing the British mercantile presence on Africa’s far 
southern point; the Donegal was homeward bound on her own long voyage from Mocha. 
Cape Town might not have generated as much commerce as the burgeoning 
entrepot in the Dutch East Indies, but it filled the need for a way station on the route 
between Batavia and the Netherlands and served as a vital crossroads between the Indian 
and Atlantic networks.
59  
Just west of the Cape, Table Bay provided an anchorage for 
ships sailing between Atlantic European ports and Indian Ocean ports in the East Indies 
and India. Between 1700 and 1714, Table Bay provided safe harbor to over 1000 ships. 
Of those, approximately two-thirds flew Dutch colors but hundreds of British and 
Portuguese vessels also stopped there.
60  Britain’s alliance with the Dutch allowed the 
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privateers to resupply and refresh themselves just as they had at Batavia. The expedition 
also put sixteen sick men ashore and paid for their treatment at the local hospital.
61
 
While awaiting an opportunity to depart with a convoy, the expedition ships 
filled their water casks and began taking on supplies. On January 18, 1711, the Council 
authorized Rogers and Courtney to use some of the expedition’s unwrought gold and 
silver as well as to sell or trade six slaves to pay for the needed provisions and stores. 
Since both the Syndicate’s agents and expedition crewmen were loathe to part with 
precious metals, bartering with slaves and cloth was preferable.
62  
The expedition’s 
agents catalogued every item they sold or traded, even a length of crape that was worth 
only six stuivers (about sixpence).
63  
The expedition’s ships were soon reprovisioned and 
the crewmen ready to sail for home. 
Much to their unhappiness, no suitable Europe bound convoy arrived for them to 
join until early April. Rogers and Cooke spent time on their journals while they were 
otherwise idle. Rogers especially wrote about the potential trade that the British had in 
India if only they had established colonies on the Cape that might facilitate that 
commerce. He also spoke with Dover and Courtney and proposed foregoing the convoy 
altogether and just taking the expedition or one frigate to Brazil where they could trade 
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away their cloth at an immense profit. The other two captains firmly rejected Roger’s 
proposal and so the ships remained together.
64
 
As the expedition waited, its numbers dwindled further. Carlton Vanbrugh, who 
persistently annoyed both officers and crewmen during the expedition, and who had 
caused diplomatic incidents in the Canaries and in Brazil, succumbed to disease. The 
wounds he sustained during the engagement with the Begoña probably included third- 
degree burns that compromised his immune system. Three other members of the 
expedition (including one officer) died and four deserted and melted into the Cape 
population before the expedition finally set sail.
65
 
While waiting, the Council sent a letter to the Syndicate, assuring the owners that 
the expedition was doing well and informing them that it was refitting at the Cape of 
Good Hope. The Council also reported that all the ships were sufficiently manned and 
supplied, and that all the officers hoped to be on their way to Britain by the end of 
March.
66  
The Council sent the original letter to Bristol with Opie, who had followed 
them to the Cape and left for Britain before they did. Several days later, the officers 
gave a copy of the letter to a Danish ship that was headed in the same direction. When 
he reached London Opie reported what he knew about the expedition to his EIC 
employers thereby alerting them to the possible infringement of the company’s 
monopoly on trade in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The EIC would prepare 
accordingly. 
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Unbeknownst to Rogers, Dover also sent a letter to the Syndicate. Signed by 
seven Council members including Cooke, Courtney, and Dampier, it accused Rogers of 
gross incompetence and hoarding plunder. All of the assignees were from the Dutchess 
and Batchelor, signifying that the rift had deepened between officers of different ships. 
Dampier, hoping to end the voyage with powerful friends, had evidently figured Dover’s 
faction was going to come out ahead. In addition to incompetence, Dover added charges 
that Rogers was a secret Catholic, and that he was plotting to take the Duke to Brazil and 
Newfoundland not for the expedition’s profit but for his own private gain. Dover 
assured the Syndicate that neither he nor the others who signed the letter would go along 
with such a plan and that Rogers’ faction would be responsible for “all Damages 
whatsoever that may happen or Ensue from such Proceedings and Neglect.”67  By 
denigrating Rogers, who was the commander of the expedition, the signees came close 
to violating the orders to achieve consensus. Technically, they did not make their 
disapproval public and so they had followed the letter of the law if not the spirit. 
Despite the official consensus in other matters, the Council was all but fractured 
with Rogers and Dover effectively not on speaking terms outside the meetings. Dover’s 
complaints, combined with his influence with other officers, caused much frustration for 
Rogers during the voyage. The aggregate effects of Dover’s irate letters home may have 
compelled the Syndicate to cut Rogers out of the post-voyage administration. Council 
members had started to bicker more after Guayaquil and the breaking point came after 
the fight against the Begoña. The long-simmering tension had gotten progressively 
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worse until the expedition’s arrival at Batavia. With starvation and shipwreck averted, 
the officers no longer needed to work together simply to survive. With little to keep 
them occupied while awaiting the opportunity to join a convoy, they turned on one 
another and brought up issues that had been smoldering for months. The main disputes 
were over missed opportunities at Guayaquil and perceived unfairness in dividing the 
spoils. The situation was exacerbated by the irascible personalities of those – Rogers  
and Dover – who led the two main factions. Dover’s group of about seven members was 
small, but included both of the Syndicate members that accompanied the expedition. As 
a result, the rest of the Syndicate paid more attention to their views when it received the 
dispatches. At this moment, however, Rogers was blissfully unaware of the note. 
Finally during early April, a suitable convoy began to coalesce at the Cape.
68
 
 
Twelve ships in a VOC convoy arrived first. Four ships from Ceylon arrived shortly 
afterward. While these vessels repaired damage inflicted by a cyclone off Madagascar 
that sank two of their convoy, additional ships arrived until, on April 7, the Duke, 
Dutchess, and Batchelor weighed anchor and joined a Texel-bound convoy of sixteen 
Dutch and six other British ships.
69
 
The privateers were headed back to Europe after months of operating on the 
 
edges of maritime law. The officers and crewmen had functioned first as privateers and 
smugglers, then as merchants, and struggled to transition between these roles. Their 
ability to continue to work together would soon be tested even more vigorously when the 
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expedition reached Europe and its leaders had to defend their rights to plunder from 
external parties. After that, the owners and sailors struggled to divide said plunder. 
268  
 
 
CHAPTER X 
JOURNEY HOME 
After departing the Cape settlement, the expedition reentered the Syndicate’s 
Atlantic network. The same web of economic and familial relationshps that had assisted 
the Syndicate in organizing the expedition in 1708 affected the expedition once again in 
1711. The Syndicate members used their business and personal connections in Bristol, 
London, and elsewhere to assist in ensuring that the three ships reached home safely, and 
the London investors utilized theirs in the EIC and in the Netherlands when they learned 
that the expedition would stop there en route to Britain. Their efforts were necessary 
because the expedition was still in an extremely vulnerable position in which  
competitors could accuse it of any number of misdeeds. 
The voyage from the Cape to Texel proved to be uneventful. Before putting to 
sea on April 6, Dutch admiral Peter De Vos ordered the captains of all the ships of the 
convoy to remain together for protection. This would prove unnecessary because the 
journey passed without spotting a single Spanish or French vessel. The expedition’s last 
shots fired in anger had been discharged off Cabo San Lucas, and since that time the 
expedition encountered no hostile ships. If they had sailed alone, the expedition might 
have gone first to the Slave Coast, Madeira or the Azores and then directly to the British 
Isles. A massive convoy such as the one the expedition ships sailed in, however, needed 
to stick to better patrolled lanes where the ships could stop at more accommodating 
seaports in case of emergency. The convoy passed the British-owned St. Helena on 
April 30 and Ascension a week later. During this final leg of the journey, the Dutch 
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naval officers were far more courteous than the VOC colonial administrators and 
provided regular entertainment for the officers during the voyage. 
While the expedition officers relaxed and enjoyed the hospitality that the Dutch 
naval officers provided, crewmen became more agitated with the speed of the convoy 
that was dictated by the slow, lumbering Indiamen. Although Rogers and the Council 
made no mention of it, Cooke writes that two more Dutch sailors were flogged and put 
in irons on the Dutchess on June 8 for “Mutiny and Quarrelling.”1 
French privateers out of St. Malo and Dunkirk posed such a threat to British and 
 
Dutch ships passing through the English Channel, that Admiral De Vos chose to avoid 
that direct route and instead sailed west of Ireland then to the Shetland Islands north of 
Scotland. On July 14, convoy officers learned from a Dublin-bound Danish convoy that 
the War of the Spanish Succession still raged on. Rogers gave the Danes a copy of his 
Cape dispatch to take to Dublin and from there forward it to Bristol. The next day, the 
allied convoy reached the Shetland Islands where it paused to await the arrival of Dutch 
warships that would escort the convoy on its final leg of the voyage. The Dutch naval 
escort arrived on the same day, and on July 16 Rogers forwarded yet another copy of his 
Cape dispatch to the Syndicate via a Shetland fishing boat.
2  
The Syndicate received 
both of Rogers’ letters, although its recorders did not specify when the correspondence 
arrived except to say “a little before [Rogers’] arrival July 1711.”3 
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In the letters Rogers repeated his previous warning that “no Doubt the English 
East India Company will procure a convoy to meet us.” In the latest dispatch from the 
Shetlands he asked the Syndicate to use its contacts in the Admiralty to prevent any of 
the crewmen from being impressed upon their arrival in British waters. For the sailors to 
endure more than three years at sea, in strange waters, then to return home only to be 
snatched by a press gang struck him as cruelly unfair.
4
 
Despite the opportunity to purchase fresh provisions from the locals, more sailors 
became ill – many from exposure and/or sheer exhaustion – before their two-day stay 
ended. By that point there were more than 40 sick on the Dutchess alone.
5
 
There were disagreements amongst the officers, Rogers reported in his letter, but 
they were not nearly as internecine as the initial infighting when they set out in August 
1708. Unknown to Rogers, however, Dover had also sent a letter (signed by six of the 
Dutchess officers) to the Syndicate on July 16. It had been sitting in his sea chest for a 
month and now he finally had an opportunity to send it without being noticed. In the 
letter Dover again complained about Rogers and suggested that the Duke’s officers were 
responsible for “any Loss by Sea or Embeslement.”6  Dover seems to have been the only 
 
active antagonist to Rogers during the voyage’s final stage, with his faction passively 
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cosigning Dover’s letters. Stephen Courtney also sent a private dispatch to Bristol at this 
time but only described the mundane day-to-day affairs and did not attack Rogers.
7
 
On July 17, the convoy sailed southward. Four days later, one of the warships 
left the convoy, sailed to Texel, and spread word that the convoy would reach the port 
shortly. Rogers sent more correspondence via that ship, hoping that it would reach any 
Syndicate members awaiting the expedition’s arrival in the Netherlands. The 
expedition’s dispatches from the Cape of Good Hope had suggested the ships might stop 
at the Netherlands, and the Shetlands dispatches confirmed that Texel was the 
destination and so the Syndicate focused its efforts there. The convoy reached Texel late 
on July 23.
8
 
 
TEXEL 
The Syndicate had been preparing for the arrival of the expedition from as far 
back as June. Thomas Palmer, one of the Syndicate members from London, wrote to 
John Romsey in Bristol and enclosed a letter of introduction to his friend Robert 
Jackson, a British merchant who partnered with a Dutch merchant in Amsterdam who 
was willing to assist in dealing with legal complications that might arise with Dutch 
authorities once the expedition arrived in the Netherlands.
9
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Edward Acton, another London member who joined the Syndicate after the 
expedition left Bristol, had relatives who worked for the EIC. They passed Acton 
everything they heard at the office about the Syndicate and its expedition. Acton also 
did some investigative work himself. When visiting the EIC’s headquarters for business 
purposes, but surreptitiously eavesdropped on meetings that might mention the 
Syndicate. Acton’s relations clearly took their kinship with him seriously, as their 
actions would surely have meant dismissal from the EIC if they were caught. Perhaps 
the most important information came from Acton’s uncle who told him – and Acton 
warned the Syndicate – that, “the Comp would certainly seize, our ships all their effects 
and that of right they did belong to them as having been in their seas.”10 
Weeks before the expedition reached the Netherlands, Peter de Wolff and Daniel 
Crellius offered to assist the Syndicate in its dealings with officials in Amsterdam. The 
two men were either prominent merchants (they refer to each other as partners) or, more 
likely, government officials given their statement in a letter that they could arrange 
calling a meeting of the legislature, if desirable. They also said that they could meet 
with “one of the chiefest officers” in the Dutch Admiralty to discuss what to do with the 
expedition when it arrived. Beginning on June 12, the two Dutchmen sent a series of 
letters to Batchelor in Bristol proposing a reciprocal arrangement in which they would 
block the VOC and the EIC from interfering with the expedition in return for which the 
Syndicate would allow the Dutch to purchase all the expedition’s cargo. The Dutchmen 
urged the Syndicate to “take in consideration to lett the cargoes of your sayd South Sea 
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Ships be sold here… being the sayd goods in no place will yield better prices than here.” 
Doubting they would get as much from selling to the Dutch as they could by selling their 
cargo at auction in Britain, the Syndicate ignored the offer.
11  
The Dutchmen repeated 
that offer in letters dated June 26 and June 29, and again there is no record of any reply 
from the Syndicate.
12
 
On July 24, the day after the expedition dropped anchor in Texel, Rogers “went 
up to Amsterdam” where he found correspondence waiting for him. It was from the 
Syndicate and it warned Rogers and the Council to stay at anchor and to not leave for 
Britain under any circumstances. 
Three days later, on July 27, expedition leaders received a message from the 
Syndicate dated June 6 informing them that the Syndicate’s members were preparing for 
the expedition’s arrival.13  First, they stated that they were glad the expedition had made 
it safely to Europe (the writers had assumed the expedition had reached Europe). 
Second, they reported that they had been corresponding with friends and associates in 
London to develop a legal strategy to deal with the EIC whose leaders were using their 
considerable political clout to find some legal grounds on which to sue the Syndicate. 
The letter stated that Syndicate members were confident the expedition had not broken 
any laws while in the Pacific, but that they were concerned about what its sailors might 
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do while in the Netherlands. Any infraction – such as trading silk – that could be 
interpreted as violating the monopolies of the VOC or EIC could have dire ramifications. 
Since the Syndicate wanted to make sure the Council received the letter, it had mailed 
copies to Rotterdam, Galway, and Harwich in case the expedition put into any of those 
ports before reaching Texel. Rogers was annoyed at the general tone of the letter and its 
lack of any specific instructions. 
More importantly, he was distressed by letters he received from his wife and 
mother informing him that his family’s finances had deteriorated while he was away and 
that the Syndicate had done nothing to help the Rogerses. Creditors had no doubt been 
hounding that family. Rogers furiously scribbled a letter to the Syndicate complaining 
that he had expected better treatment of his family and pleaded “for Christ’s sake don’t 
lett me be torn to pieces at home [by creditors] after I have been so rack’d abroad.”14 
Rogers was not the only unhappy soul in the expedition. Crewmen were angered 
when officers refused to allow them to go ashore for fear that they might carry with them 
something that could be used as evidence that the expedition had infringed upon the 
VOC’s monopoly on trade with the East Indies. As at Batavia, trading even a single 
handful of cloves could be enough to bring the VOC raining lawsuits down on the 
expedition. Worried that their ships might be seized and condemned by overzealous 
Dutch officials, the Council ordered that no Dutchmen be allowed to come onboard any 
of the expedition’s three ships.15  This also had the unintended effect of causing some 
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Dutch sailors who had joined the expedition in Batavia to threaten to desert if they were 
not paid the wages due them and be permitted to go ashore. On July 28, Cooke made an 
exception when he let some of his Dutch crewmen go ashore on a 24-hour pass so they 
could see their families in Amsterdam. Those crewmen who went ashore signed a note 
stating that they would pay 100 pieces of eight from their wages if they returned late, 
and forfeit all their wages if they did not return at all.
16  
Cooke also wrote to unnamed 
authorities in Amsterdam, requesting permission to discharge the Batavia sailors early 
but some had already run out of patience. On August 1, Cooke reported that eighteen of 
the Batavia contingent deserted by sneaking onto a passing Dutch boat. They had only 
signed on to get home and decided that was more important than getting paid.
17
 
At around this time, Syndicate members got word of the expedition’s arrival in 
the Netherlands and James Hollidge and Edward Acton traveled to Texel, arriving there 
on August 10. They were later joined by Philip Freke and John Duckinfield.
18  
Rogers, 
Dover, and Courtney were largely powerless to influence Dutch officials, but the four 
Syndicate members had contacts among the business and government leaders in the 
Netherlands. On August 11, the Dutch customs officials sent a dispatch to the 
expedition, reassuring its leaders that the EIC could not seize their ships in Texel. Dutch 
law held that no two ships belonging to the same country could seize each other’s 
cargoes in Dutch territorial waters. Any breach of that law would be “a very 
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unwarrantable undertaking” that the Dutch would neither permit nor condone.19 
Expedition officers welcomed the news because it temporarily removed any threat from 
the EIC thus giving them more time to prepare their response to lawsuits they expected 
the EIC to file against them. 
It had been years since the expedition officers had spoken directly to any 
Syndicate member aside from Dover or Courtney. The presence of more Syndicate 
members reassured the crews that they would be heading home soon. In an effort to 
curb desertions, the Council decided to distribute some payment for the crewmen “to 
recruit themselves ashore.” On August 12, the Council met and gave Hollidge £1800 in 
gold and “other Treasure” to distribute among the crew. Every able seaman received 
twenty Dutch guilders, and every landsman ten. This disbursement contented the 
crewmen as they impatiently awaited their next orders. The officers received larger 
sums proportionate to their rank. They were also given funds to purchase necessary 
supplies for their ships.
20
 
 
Two days later, some officers drafted a short account of the expedition’s 
activities during the entire voyage, including the seizure of prizes, the Guayaquil raid, 
and the expedition’s visits to Guam and Batavia. The account rather emphatically 
insisted that no one had traded anything in the East Indies except to purchase essential 
supplies. Perhaps most importantly, the account also asserted that each of the ships had 
a letter of marque, a license making it a legal privateering enterprise, and that the Duke 
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and Dutchess had originally set out as privateersmen and not as merchantmen who had 
seized enemy shipping without a letter of marque.
21
 
Every officer and all but three of the ratings signed the account and gave it to the 
Syndicate members in Amsterdam who, along with the expedition’s senior officers met 
Texel’s chief magistrate, presented the signed oaths, and swore that the account of the 
voyage was true.
22  
Whatever the Dutch suspicions were, the sworn statements allayed 
those doubts and allowed the expedition to prepare for departure. Between August 17 
and 29, the expedition paid the Batavia crewmen any wages due them and discharged 
them from the expedition.
23  
The Syndicate and Council wished them gone so the 
accountants could begin calculating the number and value of shares without fear that the 
crewmen who joined the expedition in Batavia might suddenly claim they were entitled 
to shares and perhaps bring suit to claim them. 
As the Batavia crewmen were discharged, the expedition waited at anchor in 
Texel Road and ran up expenses. Throughout August and September, the expedition’s 
captains gave receipts for their time in Texel to Hollidge, who combined them with his 
own expenses and presented a bill for over 9700 guilders to the rest of the Syndicate. 
The items on the bill included pilot fees, insuring the Batchelor while she lay at anchor, 
and even eight guilders and twelve stuivers for postage fees (about fifteen shillings and 
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sixpence).
24  
All these accounts were tabulated while the expedition awaited 
authorization to depart. The British Admiralty, which was in contact with the Syndicate, 
also took it upon itself to suggest that the expedition pay off and discharge as many 
crewmen as possible in order to avoid costs. Since most of the crewmen were paid in 
shares, however, that was impossible without sparking a mutiny.
25
 
On August 19, four British warships dropped anchor in Texel Road (neither the 
officers nor the Syndicate members knew exactly why) but all hands hoped that the 
warships would escort them on the final leg of the journey home. The crewmen had 
already been kept onboard for weeks and the officers “had much ado to keep the 
Companies aboard till now.”26 
The VOC and Dutch government officials had not been the only threat to the 
 
expedition. The EIC believed its monopoly on trade in the Pacific and Indian Oceans 
entitled it at least a portion of the proceeds from the sale of those goods captured in the 
Disengaño that originated in China and the East Indies. Among other British merchants, 
there also must have been the fear that Dutch consumer goods might be clandestinely 
mixed into the expedition’s cargo, which grated with British merchants. Writing in 
1714, the British essayist Richard Steele vehemently excoriated the VOC. “The 
prohibited Manufactures of China and India often find their Way back [to England] from 
Holland,” Steele ranted, “by clandestine Reimportations [either by the EIC and 
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smugglers], by which the fair Trader is greatly damnify’d.”27  It was ironic that the 
Syndicate’s expedition, which had been intended to benefit and increase British 
commerce, was being attacked by the same parties who might benefit from the voyage’s 
after effects. As the Syndicate cautioned the Council, “we lye liable both to the English 
and the Dutch East-India Company upon any Mismanagement, and they are resol’d to 
give us all possible disturbance.”28 
The flurry of correspondence between Syndicate members in Bristol and their 
colleagues in the Netherlands continued unabated and several Syndicate members, 
including John Batchelor, John Romsey, Francis Rogers, and Christopher Shuter, 
temporarily moved to London in an attempt to speed up communication and to seek 
government support. They were later joined by Thomas Clement, Thomas Coutes, 
Thomas Goldney, John Hawkins, and Lawrence Hollister. With Acton and Palmer 
already in London, approximately half the Syndicate members went to London at one 
point during the time the expedition ships were in the Netherlands.
29
 
 
It is difficult to determine exactly who was in London at any one time because 
most of the correspondence is addressed to “John Batchelor and Company” or simply 
“Sirs.” In a letter dated August 23, the investors in London informed their colleagues in 
Amsterdam that steps were being taken to “procure One or Two Men of War” to escort 
the three ships across the North Sea. This was probably a reference to John Romsey and 
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Thomas Palmer who had been trying to persuade Lord Treasurer Robert Harley to get the 
Admiralty to send warships to the Netherlands in order to protect the expedition from 
enemy warships and privateers as well as from interference by the EIC. Palmer was soon 
added to the list of managers for his efforts; the Syndicate had added some 
personnel who were not shareholders but who were paid for performing administrative 
tasks.
30  
Harley was particularly amenable to helping the expedition because he was 
enraptured with the idea of South Sea trade. In fact, just as the War of the Spanish 
Succession ended, Harley became a key contributor to the South Sea economic bubble. 
On August 29 the lobbying in Whitehall finally bore fruit, when the Admiralty promised 
that a squadron under Thomas Hardy would soon be “ordered to convoy the [expedition] 
to England.”31 
Meanwhile, the Syndicate and its friends in Amsterdam were worried about EIC 
agents intercepting correspondence. On September 13, Hollidge personally delivered 
dispatches to his colleagues in Britain instead of sending them by courier. In order to 
escape notice by EIC agents, Hollidge did not sail directly from Amsterdam but instead 
traveled overland to The Hague and Rotterdam, and from there crossed the North Sea.
32
 
Dutch officials cleared the expedition to depart on September 19, escorted by 
 
Kerrill Roffey’s (not Hardy’s) squadron of four ships that arrived that same day. Once 
the weather permitted, they left Texel on September 25. To ensure that the warships 
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protected their three ships, expedition leaders entertained senior naval officers lavishly 
and presented them with “gifts” that included fine wines, tea sets, and lace. In all the 
Syndicate spent 1210 guilders (almost £109) ingratiating themselves with their escort.
33
 
 
BRITAIN 
 
Once word of the expedition’s presence in Texel spread to Britain, smaller 
businessmen ranging in size from the Guild of Porters to small subcontractors who 
advertised their “judgment and dispatch in business” offered to help unload goods. It is 
likely that the subcontractors would be discreet enough to not ask too many questions 
about the origins of the cargo.
34
 
The expedition reached the Downs on October 2, but was prevented by the 
 
weather from moving upriver for nearly a fortnight. On October 14, the ships moored at 
Erith and began unloading. After more than three years of stormy weather, near- 
mutinies, scurvy, and fighting the Spanish and French, the expedition was back in 
England. Its arrival in Britain brought its arduous voyage to an end but a new phase was 
just beginning. 
The very next day, the EIC claimed ownership of all the privateersmen and their 
cargoes. An EIC agent and some aides rowed out to each ship and nailed a legal notice 
stating such to the hulls of all three ships. This was exactly what the Syndicate had 
feared, and what it had prepared for over the past several months. As a precaution, the 
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Syndicate had already sent an attorney named John Ward to represent it in the Court of 
the Exchequer. Ward was clearly on retainer and his task was to fight any lawsuit 
against the expedition or Syndicate. It cannot be exactly known when he was hired since 
much of his correspondence is not dated. The earliest date on any in the archives is 
October 30, 1711, but it is clear that by then he had represented the Syndicate for some 
time.
35  
There is a bill from Ward in the National Archives for everything from his fee to 
tavern expenses, amounting to over £116.
36
 
In the midst of the ensuing excitement, Rogers was worried. He had tried on 
multiple occasions to get instructions from the Syndicate regarding the unloading of 
cargo. He also wanted to know how exactly the Syndicate planned to reimburse the 
expedition for naval stores and provisions that the Council had bought, as per the 1708 
articles. Dover and the late Vanbrugh’s letters home had indubitably influenced 
Syndicate members’ view of Rogers. As a result, the Syndicate appears to have cut 
Rogers out of post-voyage administration. 
In a November 3 letter to the Syndicate, Rogers wrote that he had hoped for a 
workable plan from it to unload cargo and deal with demobilized crewmen, but instead 
had received “nothing butt delays & disappointments.” Among many other points, 
Rogers stated that he would not allow the Batchelor to be unloaded until the Syndicate 
assured him that the EIC would not seize her cargo. He closed with a warning that the 
expedition’s articles were “very doubtfully worded & it is very justly to be feared that 
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both Officers and Seamen [and the Syndicate members too] will be perplex’d with many 
Law Suits.”37 
Rogers’ prediction proved accurate; there were numerous suits brought against 
the Syndicate. The EIC’s lawsuit involved the most money and took the longest time to 
deal with. The Syndicate first bribed customs officials with £149 for unstated reasons, 
although that was likely to ensure that they would not side with the EIC. Through a 
succession of conferences, lavish dinners, endless rounds of beer and wine, and bribes to 
EIC officials, the Syndicate managed to strike an accord with the company. In early 
1712, the two organizations reached a £6161 settlement to satisfy all claims by the EIC 
against the expedition. Some Syndicate members opposed the settlement, but others 
considered it better than wasting thousands more pounds in protracted legal disputes.
38
 
The Company of Silk Throwers or Throwsters also sued over a possible 
infringement of its own monopoly, hoping to gain some of the proceeds from the cargo 
sales, but was unsuccessful and the suit was thrown out of court.
39
 
In January 1712, an individual named Stephen Creagh convinced 209 crewmen 
to sign a statement declaring him their agent in exchange for five percent of their wages. 
Creagh filed multiple suits against Rogers, Courtney, and the Syndicate members in the 
Court of Chancery charging all the owners and captains with cheating the crewmen and 
Rogers specifically with cheating the Syndicate. 
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Every Council meeting report, every purchase made during the voyage, and 
copies of all correspondence between the Council and the Syndicate were compiled into 
ledgers and presented at court. The case went up to the Court of Chancery, the highest 
court in England and Wales, where Lord Chancellor Simon Harcourt ruled that the 
ships’ articles regarding plunder would stand as written and assigned the master John 
Meller to settle all specific grievances that the Syndicate members and crewmen may 
have had.
40
 
While Harcourt’s rulings were basically in favor of the Syndicate, they did serve 
to prevent the Syndicate taking advantage of the sailors in any new ways thereafter. In 
one instance, the Syndicate it demanded £2700 from the crews’ shares (which included 
Rogers’) because the owners decided the Council had spent too long waiting to join a 
convoy at Batavia. The Syndicate insisted on having nine months’ wages (the £2700) 
deducted from the officer and crewmen’s accounts. This was another case in which the 
Syndicate tried to penalize Rogers and the Council for adhering to the Syndicate’s own 
orders to operate as the officers thought necessary to insure the safety of the expedition. 
Meller ruled the owners had no grounds to take money from the crewmen and so 
protected their wages.
41
 
 
Responding to the suits incurred expensive legal fees and wasted so much time 
that payment to the shareholders and crew were delayed for nearly two years. The 
disputes also had a ripple effect by confusing the accountants so that some of the 
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crewmen were not fully paid off until July 1714. The paybook was not even finalized as 
late as 1717 due in part to the owners and crewmen claiming more money.
42
 
 
SALES AND EXPENSES 
 
With the claims of the EIC settled, sales of the ships and their cargoes began and 
the resultant profits were added to income from other sources. Neither of the original 
owners’ agents had survived the voyage so the Syndicate members and their managers, 
with Meller overseeing the proceeds, began compiling a list of money and shares due to 
officers and crewmen of the expedition. 
The Duke and Dutchess were sold quickly. They had been worn out even by the 
time they reached Cabo San Lucas, and would require extensive repairs or have to be 
broken up to salvage reusable materials. Together the frigates sold for a combined sum 
of £935 while the Batchelor was sold for £895. The gold and silver plate, paper, and 
dust were also easily exchanged for over £10,100. Sale of the rest of the cargo would be 
far more complicated.
43  
Unloading it took months as Syndicate agents examined every 
 
container and bale to make sure that it matched an entry on the manifest. 
 
The prize goods were sold in London’s Marine Coffee House on Birchin Lane. 
 
The first of nine sales was held on February 27, 1712 and the last sometime in May 
1713. The sales were held approximately two months apart to avoid saturating the 
market and driving down prices. The combined sales brought in nearly £127,000, a 
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figure that dwarfed that derived from the sale of the ships, the tribute paid by Guayaquil 
to prevent its destruction, the ransoms paid by Spanish ship-owners for the return of 
those vessels seized by the expedition, Pichberty’s bills of exchange, the smaller 
ransoms paid by individual prisoners taken on said prizes, the gold and silver plate and 
specie, slaves, and “sundries” received over the course of the voyage.44  The gross 
profits from the voyage, including the aforementioned items, amounted to £147,975, 
twelve shillings, and four pence.
45
 
 
Expenses 
 
From the nearly £148,000 gross profits, £42,159 was deducted to pay for customs 
fees, William Dampier’s pay (his was a special case), and “storm money.” This left a 
balance of approximately £105,816. 
As per the 1708 agreement, the Syndicate claimed two-thirds these profits. By 
purchasing shares originally assigned to expedition members (explained below), the 
Syndicate raised its two-thirds portion enough that the sum increased to £87,293, from 
which £49,584 was deducted to pay costs that were the Syndicate’s responsibility. 
These included expenses incurred in preparing the expedition for its departure (£13,188), 
sailors’ wages (£12,262), provisions bought by the Council during the voyage (£11,295), 
the settlement with the EIC (£6161), the privateering commission (£2689), fees for 
managers who assisted the Syndicate (£2400), and smaller amounts for bribes, enough to 
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reduce the Syndicate’s share to just under £38,000.46  That amount was later increased 
once the unspent funds remaining in the Syndicate treasury were returned. 
Since the expedition was entitled to the remaining one-third of the profits, the 
officers and crew should have divided up £49,325 but that amount was also reduced by 
deductions from the general account. 
The Syndicate’s portion was then by 256, the number of shares the investors 
purchased before the voyage had set out. Investors had paid £103 and ten shillings for 
each share, and when all the goods were sold and calculations completed, those same 
shares were valued at £189, twelve shillings, and three pence according to B.M.H. 
Rogers’ calculations (which are the most accurate).47  The Syndicate members were paid 
off relatively quickly, once the prize cargoes were sold. They did not have to wait for 
the expedition shares to be calculated and could easily access the funds. 
 
 
Wages to the Men 
 
Calculating the amount due to officers and crewmen was more complicated than 
paying the investors. The Syndicate approved some bonuses to sailors’ individual 
accounts. Every crewman who participated in the capture of the Havre de Grace was 
given an extra guinea. Most of the crewmen were also entitled to “storm money” for 
their part in attacking Guayaquil. The amount received depended on the crewman’s 
rank. Each landsman received ten pounds while captains and second captains received 
 
 
46 
Beattie, British Privateering Voyages, 93. 
47 
B.M.H. Rogers, “Woodes Rogers’s Privateering Voyage of 1708-1711,” Mariner’s 
Mirror 19:2, (1933), 205. 
288  
 
£100.
48  
This bonus initially went only to individuals who participated in the landing and 
occupation of the town. Sailors who had remained onboard the Duke and the Dutchess 
and thus would not receive the bonus protested so vigorously that Meller decided in 
April 1714 that all men who had been in the ships’ companies before April 1709 would 
receive storm money. However, the amount each man received in storm money would 
not be increased any further because, since the time at Guayaquil, they had done “no 
more than was their Duty.”49 
All the crewmen who had helped ready the privateersmen for sailing in 1708 had 
 
their wages supplemented by varying amounts dependent on how long they had worked, 
as did the men who remained with the ships to help unload cargo after the expedition’s 
return.
50
 
Finally, there was also “smart money” for crewmen killed or wounded in action 
with the enemy. Each of them received 30 to 40 pounds, which was a substantial 
bonus.
51  
The vast majority of deaths during the voyage were due to disease, and there 
was no compensation for that. As far as the Syndicate members were concerned, scurvy 
and shipboard accidents were just normal risks that any sailor ran, and so they were not 
entitled to anything more for doing their job. 
Conversely, there were also many reductions to the expedition members’ 
accounts. Some crewmen were not paid for some of their time unloading cargo at the 
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end of the voyage, and appealing met with mixed results.
52  
The Syndicate also reduced 
the amounts paid to individual crewmen who had been convicted of concealing plunder 
in violation of the voyage’s articles. The rest of the crew welcomed such a decision 
because thieves were unwelcome and it would leave more money to be divided amongst 
the remaining hands. The Syndicate also docked pay for items legitimately purchased 
during the voyage, whether from the ships’ pursers or from prize cargoes. The payout 
books list a multitude of small expenditures for pipe tobacco, shoes, and bits of cloth 
taken from prizes. Most of the latter were damaged and probably unfit for sale, but the 
Syndicate charged the crewmen regardless. Officers were not exempt from this 
parsimonious accounting either; the deceased Lance Appleby’s account had the price of 
a coffin deducted from it.
53
 
These deductions, a total of £596, four shillings, and seven pence, spread among 
all members of the expedition, resulted in significant reductions in the amount of money 
paid to many of the crewmen.
54  
Dover and Courtney did not care about losing several 
shillings here or there (or even hundreds of pounds), since they were independently 
wealthy. For the common sailors, however, those small amounts hit their coin purses 
hard. 
There was another tax that had to be paid “at the Sixpenny Office for the Chest at 
Chatham.” The tax was taken from every officer and crewman’s wages after he received 
his pay. The proceeds from this tax went into a fund to assist indigent or invalid Royal 
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Navy personnel. The tax, which was not discussed in the voyage’s articles, caused most 
expedition members to have nearly one pound deducted from their final payouts.
55
 
Wages were relatively easy to calculate; determining the value of shares was 
more difficult. The expedition’s portion of profits was divided into shares according to 
the articles, and it took two years to determine even the number of expedition shares. 
The amount of shares each officer and crewman got varied, depending on their rank and 
which payment option (full share or part share/part wage) they had selected at the 
beginning of the voyage. Deserters forfeited their shares, leaving more money for their 
shipmates to split. Promotions, demotions, and the handful of new recruits such as 
Alexander Selkirk and Michael Kendall all affected exactly how many shares there were. 
There were disagreements on how many shares some of the officers were owed. 
For example, Cooke, who had originally been assigned as the Dutchess’ second captain, 
commanded the Marquis from the time she was refitted at Gorgona until the expedition 
auctioned her off in Batavia. He had originally been promised twenty shares with no 
wages. Since he had had a command position, Cooke requested that his allotment be 
changed to 24 shares, which is what Rogers and Courtney received as captains. The 
Syndicate decided that only officers or sailors who were promoted in order to fill 
vacancies were entitled to more shares. Since all the Marquis’ company (including 
Cooke) was just assigned as a prize crew, and not as replacements, they were paid 
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according to their original station. The Batchelor’s crew was also subject to the same 
regulation.
56
 
It was also possible to exchange shares for wages. After some negotiations, 
Cooke exchanged ten of his twenty shares for wages. He was still trying to recover from 
his terrible run of misfortune before joining the Syndicate expedition and probably could 
not afford to wait completion of all the sales to receive the money due him for his shares. 
After some more off-the-books deals, he negotiated a settlement that increased the 
number of shares due him from ten to fourteen and nearly £154 in wages.
57  
There were 
many more off the books dealings that saw crewmen trading their shares in that 
manner.
58
 
In another move that almost certainly irked Rogers, the Syndicate reduced the 
number of shares that crewmen were entitled to if they died early in the voyage. When 
Rogers’ younger brother John joined the expedition he elected to be paid in ten shares 
with no wages. At the time of his death – during the engagement with the Havre de 
Grace off Guayaquil – the expedition members had taken only one-fifth of their total 
prizes. Based on this, the Syndicate leaders calculated that John deserved only two 
instead of ten shares. 
In August 1713, the accountants and agents determined that the ships’ companies 
possessed a combined 833 and two-fifths shares. Each expedition share was worth £42 
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and six shillings.
59  
Calculating that value into that number of shares indicates that the 
crewmen had over £35,200 to divide, although the number of expedition shares 
fluctuated slightly as the Syndicate and crew litigated and appealed. One year later, after 
some extra sales were conducted and funds shifted, this amount increased to £42 and 
eighteen shillings.
60
 
The Syndicate initially paid its sailors in a staggered order from July 12 until 
August 21, 1713, with small groups coming to London at appointed times (alphabetized 
according to surname) to collect what was due them in wages and shares. There was 
also a short list of sailors who, for various reasons, were not entitled to any pay or 
shares.
61
 
Some sailors had to visit multiple times as further calculations were made, and 
 
they were continually fleeced by innkeepers and publicans who overcharged them for 
food and lodging.
62  
Many of the officers and crewmen could not wait for the Syndicate 
to sort out its finances. They needed to join other ships’ companies and find other 
employment. 
To accommodate these individuals the Syndicate gave men who had to depart 
remittance letters stating the number of shares they possessed. Their next of kin or an 
appointed solicitor collected payment once the sailor’s account was settled. This 
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courtesy was also extended to the foreign crewmen.
63  
Remittance letters were also sent 
to the families of deceased and missing sailors. If an individual appeared with one of the 
letters and proved that he or she was the next of kin to the sailor named in the letter, that 
individual would be paid what was due the sailor. For example, Simon Hatley’s sister 
collected the money due him while he languished in a Lima prison.
64
 
 
RESULTS 
Several Syndicate members used the money they received to purchase items 
auctioned off at the cargo sales. Many of those who made purchases were cloth 
merchants and knew exactly how much each bolt of cloth was worth based on its style, 
color, and thread count. Syndicate members John Corseley, Richard Hawksworth, John 
Duckinfield, and Philip Freke all purchased cloth. If the members themselves did not 
make purchases some of their relatives certainly did. The names of Giles Batchelor, 
John Batchelor’s son, appears often in the records of sales. In addition, the names 
Goldney, Hollidge, Hawkins, and Saunders appear on the list, but the scribe recorded 
few first names (the names mentioned above were exceptions) but jotted down surnames 
only, thereby making it impossible to determine whether the purchaser was a Syndicate 
member himself or one of his relatives.
65
 
 
One of the non-Syndicate officers, or at least his family, also became involved. 
 
The name Hatley appears several times. Simon Hatley did not return to Britain until 
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after the war, but his family had a haberdashery business. A Richard Hatley purchased 
an assortment of colored cloth for use in the hats he manufactured. There is also a 
Cooke listed, although that is most likely not Edward Cooke or anyone related to him. 
Edward was a mariner and made no mention of any family connections related to the 
cloth trade. 
Furthermore, the sales demonstrate the strong connections between Bristol’s 
maritime merchants and its mercantile elite. The lists of individuals making purchases at 
the sales form a veritable who’s who in Bristol politics, the Society of Merchant 
Venturers, and the Corporation of the Poor. The purchasers operated in the same 
economic circles (and presumably social circles) as the Syndicate members. Of 
particular interest are the Day, Dyer, and Yeamans families. Days served as mayors in 
1694 and 1705, and would provide the city with several more mayors and aldermen over 
the next couple decades.
66  
Members of the Dyer family were active in Bristol politics 
from 1621 until the present; in 2016 a Tony Dyer ran for mayor.
67  Yeamans’ 
importance to Bristol’s economy and their indirect involvement with the Syndicate 
expedition is described in Chapter 3. 
 
Those who purchased shares nearly doubled the return on their investment at 83 
percent. The Syndicate members, who were generally comfortable, either enjoyed a 
moderate increase in their fortunes or became fabulously wealthy depending on how 
much they invested in the enterprise. Either way, few could have engaged in as many 
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activities after the war without the profits they received from the cruising voyage. As a 
result, the Syndicate members further elevated their status in Bristol society. 
Thomas Goldney, whose 36 shares made him the largest investor, also acquired 
the deceased Vanbrugh’s crew shares due to some pre-voyage dealings and received 
£7210 in total.
68  
It was enough to restore his fortune. Dover, who served as Rogers’ 
sometimes physician and sometimes antagonist while at sea, profited immensely. With 
30 owners’ shares, he did not invest as much as Goldney but still made an enormous 
profit with over £6000 from his owner’s shares alone. He also received a portion of the 
money paid to expedition officers. With his 20 expedition shares as second captain and 
storm money he earned an additional £1129 before other miscellaneous bonuses and 
deductions.
69  
Combined with the separate wages the Syndicate paid him as a physician, 
he earned a total of approximately £7600.
70  
That amount was life-changing money that 
firmly placed him in Bristol’s economic elite. 
 
There is no concrete information regarding what Stephen Courtney earned as an 
investor because the exact number of shares he purchased is unknown. He possessed up 
to fifteen owners’ shares. Assuming he owned fifteen (which is extremely unlikely as 
there were other investors with undetermined shares), he would have earned £1552 and 
10 shillings from his investment alone. In addition, the expedition’s accounts show that 
he was entitled to 24 of the expedition shares worth about £1020 before any bonuses and 
deductions were applied. 
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Finally, the leader of the whole endeavor, John Batchelor, did not live to see his 
payout of just over £3033 (from sixteen shares). During the last phases of the voyage, 
he took ill and died, and his son Giles assumed his administrative role and, it can be 
assumed, inherited his shares as well.
71
 
With the exceptions of Dover and Courtney, who were both investors and senior 
 
expedition officers, the other officers did not do as well. Rogers, who earned a little 
over £1500 during the voyage, calculated that he could have earned nearly as much 
money in three voyages to Newfoundland in the same amount of time that his cruising 
voyage had required. 
William Dampier went bankrupt while waiting payment for his shares. Unlike 
his previous voyages, Dampier did not write an account. He may have planned to 
publish a book, but circumstances did not permit him to do so. He died in genteel 
poverty in early 1715. As per the agreement he had made with the Syndicate before the 
voyage, Dampier received “one-sixteenth part of two-thirds of the clear Proffitts of the 
Voyage.”72  With bonuses and other disbursements factored in, his brother received a 
 
little more than £1050 for Dampier’s shares as an officer in March 1715 while  
Dampier’s widow received between £2000 and £3560 from his one-sixteenth portion and 
an additional £500 for another deal that he had brokered.
73
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The two other captains had to return to work because they did not have a 
financial cushion like their Syndicate counterparts. There is little known about Cooke 
after he received close to £800 for his services. Since he was not embroiled in disputes 
with the Syndicate, Cooke had more time than Rogers to devote to writing, and his A 
Voyage to the South Sea was published several months ahead of Rogers’ account. 
Whatever Cooke did with his life after that is unrecorded. He drowned in an unknown 
location sometime prior to 1732. The fact that he died at sea suggests he did not earn 
enough from the voyage to retire.
74
 
The officers met with mixed success, but what of the crewmen from the main 
deck? The petty officers and able seamen who participated in storming Guayaquil 
(which eventually included nearly all of them) earned at least £120 when combined with 
their wages and shares. From that figure, it is obvious why the entire crew wanted to 
raid the town and not sit out in the gulf. Even if the sailors had found berths on a Royal 
Navy warship or even a merchantman and spent 38 months working without a break in 
employment, they would not have earned as much as they did with the Syndicate. An 
able seaman in the navy would have earned (assuming no prize money) £45 and twelve 
shillings while a merchant sailor would have earned £66 and ten shillings before 
deductions.
75  
But like many other aspects of the voyage, many crewmen groused about 
 
what they could have had if their cargo was more valuable, if they had taken Guayaquil 
just a little more quickly, or if they had just captured that second Manila ship. The 
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constant “what if” scenarios that dogged the officers and crewmen throughout the 
voyage continued to do so after their return. 
 
 
Post-Voyage Activities 
 
For many Syndicate members, the cruising voyage was just another investment. 
A risky gamble, but nevertheless an investment that operated on the same principles as 
investing in a brewery or glassworks. Some of the members used at least a portion of 
their earnings to enhance their status in Bristol society by donating to Bristol’s charities. 
In the political realm, Christopher Shuter became mayor in 1711 as he climbed 
the political ladder. Thomas Clement was the most senior magistrate in 1718 when the 
incumbent mayor died and Clement assumed office and served as mayor from June until 
September. Afterwards he became alderman of the St. Michael ward from 1719 until 
1722. Shuter also became an alderman for the St. Michael (1715-16) and St. Thomas 
(1716-1730) wards.
76
 
Syndicate members who went into politics seemed content with remaining in 
Bristol. They had sought local prestige and appear to have had little interest in anything 
beyond that. Only one of the members, Philip Freke, entered national politics. He ran as 
a Tory MP candidate in the controversial, vitriolic 1715 election. Although he received  
a majority of votes, the irregularities in that year’s election nullified his victory and he 
never sat in Parliament.
77
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Syndicate members added to their status in Bristol society when they joined the 
Merchant Venturers. Abraham Hooke and Philip Freke became “masters” in 1712 and 
1713 respectively.
78  
Louis Casamajor and John Duckinfield were the first members of 
their families to be admitted into the Merchant Venturers, and their entry paved the way 
for their descendants to enter the society as well.
79  
Other Syndicate investors, Hawkins 
and Casamajor, did the same thing; they made contributions that “purchased” 
membership in the elite organization. 
Those who were already in the Corporation of the Poor remained active, while 
others joined the group. For some, their profits from the cruising voyage allowed their 
advancement in the organization, as the Corporation did not pay anything and even 
required payments of regular dues. Nathaniel Webb became treasurer of the charity 
(1716-17) and Christopher Shuter its governor (1718-19).
80
 
Other Syndicate members became involved with other charities. Abraham 
 
Hooke partially funded construction of the Traitor’s Bridge over the River Frome in 
 
1711.
81 
A decade later, in 1722, he founded the Stoke’s Croft School and Almshouse, a 
charity that was operated by Lewin’s Mead Society of Protestant Dissenters, which was 
a local English Dissenter organization that he had previously worked with.
82
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Syndicate members also invested their earnings in their existing businesses. John 
Duckinfield earned enough to own or co-own at least four ships that traded for slaves in 
Madagascar.
83  
The voyage’s success gave Thomas Goldney the capital to invest in 
Abraham Darby’s ironworks mentioned in Chapter 2. The Goldney family ultimately 
came to own a controlling interest in the establishment.
84  
In large part due to Goldney’s 
investment in the expedition, his family was able to experiment with other ventures and 
become early manufacturers. Their wealth and influence increased steadily enough 
through the next two centuries that they were granted a baronetcy in 1880. Most of John 
Duckinfield’s descendants stayed in Bristol, but his son moved to the West Indies where 
he became a wealthy Jamaican sugar planter, presumably supported by family money 
when establishing himself there.
85
 
Several Syndicate members invested in additional enterprises together. Shuter 
and Casamajor formed a ship-owning partnership with other Bristol merchants in 1723.
86 
The following year the two became co-owners of the slave ship Peniel Gally from 1724 
to 1728.
87  
Hollister and Hooke did the same in 1728 as they invested in the Joseph and 
Anna merchantman, which traded with Guinea, Jamaica, and Boston.
88
 
While the Syndicate members gained experience and contacts through 
privateering ventures, co-owning establishments, charity, and religious institutions, their 
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networks also came to include personal friendships. In his 1720 will Edward Hackett 
named his “good friend” James Hollidge an executor.89  When Romsey, the town clerk, 
passed away, he left the entirety of his estate to a small group of people including 
Hollidge; he entrusted Hollidge with part of his Monmouth holdings. Hollidge must 
have possessed some sharp acumen, or perhaps he was simply a well-liked gentleman, 
but he was the recipient of considerable sums.
90  
Batchelor also left some of his estate to 
other Syndicate members upon his death, listing Romsey, Coutes, and John Corseley as 
good friends.
91
 
Some of those relationships went beyond friendship to marriages between 
families. Shuter’s daughter Elizabeth married Freke’s kinsman (also named Philip, so he 
was probably the elder Philip’s son) after her father’s death. Shuter left all but £500 to 
the younger Philip and the rest of his estate to his wife and only daughter.
92  
Stephen 
Courtney also became brother-in-law to Hollidge’s kinsman John.93 
 
The experience Dover gained during the voyage led the South Sea Company to 
offer him a post in Buenos Aires, which he took after settling his account with the 
Syndicate. Dover did not hold the position long before he was dismissed from it in 
1716. That, combined with the bubble finally bursting in 1720, bankrupted him and 
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forced him to return to the practice of medicine.
94  
Dover proved more successful as a 
physician than a businessman and wrote his treatise on medicine in 1732, wherein he 
continually defended all his actions and decisions during the voyage of 1708-1711. His 
longest lasting legacy was Dover’s Powder, a medicine he invented to treat colds and 
fevers. It was produced until the mid-twentieth century when narcotics legislation 
outlawed it because it contained opium.
95
 
Little is known about the later life of Stephen Courtney. Syndicate account 
ledgers show that he used £473 of his earnings to purchase seventeen slaves from the 
expedition. Those were far too many to be used as domestic staff in a Bristol townhouse 
so most were probably resold.
96  Courtney’s name appears in a newspaper notice in 1715, 
asking anyone knowing the whereabouts of his runaway slave Scipio to contact him. 
The slave was 20 years old, and so was the right age to be one of the enslaved boys 
seized from Spanish ships.
97
 
Several of the petty officers and ratings who served under Rogers and Courtney 
had their lives transformed after the voyage. In 1719, Duckinfield invested in the slaver 
Prince Eugene with William Stretton and James Goodall, who had served on the 
Dutchess respectively as chief lieutenant and owner’s agent.98  There is nothing else 
known about Goodall, but Stretton had risen in the world. He became a property owner 
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in Bristol in 1712 and purchased a ship. He was clearly trying to reach a higher 
socioeconomic rung so that he might one day have the same stature as his Syndicate 
employers.
99
 
Alexander Selkirk returned to Largo for a time where he bought a house. He also 
earned enough to co-own in the Grayhound Gally slave ship in 1713.
100  
More 
importantly, he told his tale to eager audiences including a Daniel Defoe. His story 
became embellished and transformed into Robinson Crusoe; his contribution to English 
literature is fully explored by Tim Beattie and David Cordingly. Unlike Stretton, Selkirk 
never quite settled down and continually ran afoul of the law. Eventually, he signed  
onto Royal Navy warships, first Enterprise and then Weymouth as a master’s mate. He 
was on the Weymouth as she cruised for pirates off the Gold Coast. There he contracted 
a combination of yellow fever and dysentery, died, and was buried at sea in December 
1721.
101
 
Perhaps Simon Hatley’s case best illustrates the Syndicate’s influence and the 
 
benefits that came to officers who were tangentially associated with them. Hatley, who 
had been left behind and captured after the Guayaquil raid, had not died of thirst and 
exposure as feared. Instead he was captured with most of his crew and sent to a Lima 
prison, where he met with Selkirk’s old captain Thomas Stradling and some of the 
surviving crew from the Cinque Ports. Hatley wrote to the Syndicate in November 
1709, informing its members of his condition and asking them to do what they could to 
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get him released. The Syndicate received the letter in the spring of 1711 and petitioned 
Whitehall, which forwarded it to Queen Anne herself in order to arrange some sort of 
prisoner exchange. Nothing came of it, however, and Hatley was not released until the 
close of hostilities.
102
 
Hatley had been a recruiter in Ireland and so was entitled to some extra money. 
Through his sister, the Syndicate paid him wages for 38 months and thirteen days, minus 
some miscellaneous expenses he had incurred. When his shares and storm money were 
calculated, he had a tidy sum. He returned to England to find his family safeguarding 
approximately £220 that the Syndicate had transferred to them. It was not life-changing 
money for someone of middling wealth like Hatley, but it was enough to advance his 
career.
103
 
 
Hatley had spent more than three years of his life in the Syndicate’s service and 
endured severe hardship, so his employers repaid him a fair amount. The Syndicate’s 
members could have just tossed his letter aside and let him rot. It would not have been 
the first time that shipowners and merchants left one of their sailors behind in order to 
save money on wages. The Syndicate had nothing to gain from petitioning for his 
release but he had played a role, through recruiting and serving onboard, that had 
enabled its members to enhance their stations within Bristol society. The members 
probably felt obligated to compensate him for his efforts as much as they felt obliged to 
donate to Bristol’s workhouse or a cathedral. 
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Rogers, like Dampier, found himself in tight financial circumstances, even after 
receiving the money due him for his shares. While he was at sea, his wife must not have 
been able to maintain the family’s residence in Queen Square, so she took the children 
and moved back with her father (the Rogerses still owned the property, however). The 
Rogers family went deep into debt with no income. 
Upon his return to Bristol, Rogers quickly published his Cruising Voyage Round 
the World, just months after Cooke’s A Voyage to the South Sea appeared in print. 
Rogers was desperate to counter any negative press about the voyage and to show that, 
although the expedition did not earn as much as it could have, none of its setbacks were 
not his fault.
104  
Indeed, he asserted that the expedition would have made much more had
the Council acted on his proposals at Guayaquil or allowed him to trade with settlements 
in Brazil. When the war ended, bringing an end to privateering, many privateers such as 
Edward Teach became pirates when they continued to attack merchantmen. Rogers 
rejected that option, though he could not find immediate employment, and soon went 
bankrupt and separated from his wife. 
He eventually received the £1530 due him for his shares and additional bonuses, 
although too late to prevent the bankruptcy. There was also the matter of John Rogers’ 
account. With £50 in smart money for being a killed in action, a little more than one 
pound for harbor pay attending the ships pre-voyage, and an extra guinea awarded for 
104 
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attacking the Havre de Grace, John’s final portion amounted to just less than £140. 
Woodes probably received the money due John, but it seemed such a paltry recompense 
for his brother’s life.105 
The cruise and his book made Rogers famous but did not immediately lead to 
suitable employment. The only notable work Rogers had between the end of the voyage 
and 1718 was another voyage to the Indian Ocean. In 1713, with the help of the EIC, 
Rogers gathered enough investors to purchase the merchantman Delicia. He procured a 
contract from the EIC to travel to Madagascar, purchase slaves, and sell them in 
Sumatra. The business venture was a success.
106  
He also had a secondary objective, the 
 
establishment of a British colony on Madagascar itself. Rogers had referred to the island 
several times in his book as a sanctuary for castaways, pirates, and aging buccaneers. 
With the war over, the Crown offered a general amnesty to all pirates and Rogers 
remained in Madagascar for a time to inform the isolated sea rovers of their options.
107 
Rogers was convincing enough that the pirates circulated a petition to Queen Anne, 
asking for clemency. When it became clear that Madagascar was not a viable site for a 
colony, Rogers shifted his attention to the Bahamas. 
Rogers petitioned for and, based on his modest success in Madagascar, was 
appointed governor of the Bahamas, which had descended into anarchy as pirates had 
virtually taken control of the islands. Rogers sailed to the Bahamas in the summer of 
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1718 and began another chapter of his life. He served as governor of the islands for two 
separate terms and never returned from his second tenure, dying in Nassau in 1732. 
During his time in Nassau, Rogers directed a campaign against piracy. A key 
component of his campaign involved his issuing commissions similar to letters of 
marquee granting their holders the right to track down and capture pirates. Within a few 
short years his campaign succeeded in ridding the Bahamas and much of the Caribbean 
of the scourge of piracy. At last Rogers received the respect and fame he so dearly 
yearned for. 
308 
CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSIONS 
The expedition’s return to Britain coincided with a time of great popular interest 
in the Pacific Ocean, an interest that manifested itself most prominently in formation of 
the South Sea Company. Founded in 1711 – the year the expedition returned from 
circumnavigating the globe – the company’s investors included a number of current and 
future statesmen, merchants, and upper-class sponsors. It became an immensely 
profitable company in 1713 when Britain and its Bourbon antagonists signed the Treaty 
of Utrecht. As one of the terms in the treaty, Britain received the asiento for the next 30 
years. That gave the British the lucrative monopoly on the annual importation of 4800 
slaves to colonial markets in New Spain and Peru. The British government turned the 
asiento over to the young South Sea Company and its investors’ pockets swelled with 
coin and stock options.
1
Several Syndicate members, officers, and crewmen who had sailed in the 
expedition were connected to the South Sea Company, either directly or indirectly. 
Some members of the expedition, such as Simon Hatley, actively participated in further 
South Sea voyages to expand British influence in the Spanish Pacific. Others, such as 
Louis Casamajor and Alexander Selkirk, invested in slave ships that fed Spanish 
America’s voracious appetite for slaves. Thomas Dover became part of the South Sea 
Company’s administrative machinery. 
1 
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The company was short-lived. In 1720 it imploded, triggering a financial panic 
similar to that which accompanied the end of Tulipomania in the mid-seventeenth 
century or the dot-com crash of the early twenty-first century. The dreams of British 
colonists settling in the Spanish Pacific as they had done previously in the West Indies 
ended, at least for the next several generations.
2  
There would be no prosperous British 
settlement on Juan Fernandez to undercut Spanish commerce. This setback did not 
remove that idea from the British imagination, however. Rogers and Cooke’s accounts 
practically became required reading for British naval, merchant, and privateer captains 
operating in the Pacific. 
Relative to the other Bristol privateering ventures of the War of the Spanish 
Succession, that of the Duke and Dutchess was remarkably successful. The two frigates, 
eventually with the aid of the converted prize Marquis, took 20 prizes during their 
voyage and captured and ransomed a large town. In contrast, altogether Bristol 
privateersmen took 85 prizes during the entire conflict. In just over three years of 
cruising, the Syndicate’s Pacific expedition accounted for nearly one-quarter of Bristol’s 
captures throughout the entire war (1702-13).
3
 
 
Furthermore, the expedition’s captures were more valuable since it seized ships 
that carried high-value cargoes and passengers. Auctioning the Disengaño’s silks and 
spices accounted for most of the expedition’s profits, although the other captured 
merchantmen provided cloth of their own, jewelry, and wrought gold and silver plate. In 
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contrast, the prolific Channel Island privateersmen in contrast took 530 prizes during the 
war but most of their captures were fishing boats and other small vessels with far less 
valuable cargoes. As a result, the Syndicate privateers brought in around £148,000 in 
three years from 20 prizes and Guayaquil, whilst the Channel Islanders earned no more 
than £350,000 from 25 times the number of prizes taken in over a decade of privateering. 
The sale of silk and ransoming of captured officials brought in much more revenue than 
the sale of herring and ransoming of captured fishermen.
4
 
 
The cruising voyage brought its investors an approximately 83% return on their 
investment after three years. The Syndicate members had made a wise choice compared 
with other ventures that were available to them. Had they decided to be more cautious 
and dealt exclusively with finances, the investors could have privately loaned out money 
but regulations forbid interest rates over six percent.
5  
Similarly, the Syndicate members 
could have invested in government bonds that paid approximately four percent interest 
per annum. Both loans and bonds guaranteed a profit albeit an unimpressive one 
especially compared to what a cruising voyage might bring. 
Investing in a slave ship might have given ship-owners up to a 100% return upon 
completion of the voyage, but it was dangerous. Syndicate members knew merchants 
who had lost slave ships, and might have even lost ships themselves. The investors were 
probably eager to strike back and accepted a lower profit if it meant going on the 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
David Starkey, British Privateering Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (1990), 107. 
5 
John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 
(1988), 201. 
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offensive. In this case personal gratification weighed heavier than profit.
6  
The 
Syndicate’s voyage had done better than Dampier’s, which incurred a total loss. The 
Syndicate had even done better compared to the next South Sea cruising voyage. From 
1719 to 1722, the privateers John Clipperton and George Shelvocke tried to imitate some 
aspects of the Council’s organization and incorporated some of Rogers’ suggestions, but 
could not duplicate the Syndicate’s success. Clipperton and Shelvocke brought back a 
similar amount of plunder that initially provided 1000 percent and 200 percent returns on 
investment for their respective ships, but much of that vanished due to fraud and both 
captains had suffered catastrophic material and manpower losses.
7
 
The Syndicate, despite being ill-prepared for some difficulties the expedition 
 
faced, nevertheless funded a successful voyage with relatively few losses. The  
Syndicate achieved success due to four reasons. First, the Syndicate members provided 
for regular maintenance of their ships and for the care of the crewmen who served 
onboard. The result was the return of both frigates more or less intact, with a prize in 
tow. Precautions taken before the ships sailed (namely the installation of double- 
sheathed hulls) and constant maintenance performed during that cruise increased the 
ships’ durability. Material losses were at a minimum and even the personnel losses were 
relatively few. Prior to setting sail, the ships were stocked especially well with more 
food stores and medical supplies than normal for similar ships. Even with the extra 
 
 
 
6 
Port Cities Bristol, “Profits,” accessed June 19, 2017, 
http://www.discoveringbristol.org.uk/slavery/routes/america-to-bristol/return-to- 
bristol/profits/. 
7 
Tim Beattie, British Privateering Voyages of the Early Eighteenth Century, 134. 
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supplies, the expedition ran out of food on several occasions and disease took its toll, but 
the crews never actually starved. 
By the time the expedition returned to England, it had lost between 70 and 100 
men from the combined 333 who set out from Cork in the Duke and Dutchess.
8  
The 
losses resulted mostly from a combination of desertion, disease, and accidents. 
Relatively few crewmen were killed in action or died of wounds. The personnel roster 
was kept in such a fashion that it is impossible to determine exactly how many died. 
The 40 or so sailors who ran off at Cork are not included in this tally as they were never 
officially entered on the expedition’s roster. More importantly, most of the Syndicate’s 
manpower losses were made good through the Council’s resourcefulness. Rogers 
followed the Syndicate orders to sign on as many hands as he deemed necessary. He and 
the other officers, throughout the cruising voyage, displayed a willingness to accept 
recruits whenever and wherever they appeared. Recruiting was easy enough in an open 
entrepot like Batavia, and there were also two cases where former British sailors, 
enslaved by the Spanish, literally walked into the expedition’s forces. When crewmen 
were needed, slaves taken captive from their Spanish owners were invited to join the 
ships’ companies. Other British expeditions into the Pacific did not resort to such 
methods and their effectiveness suffered. 
Second, the Syndicate took steps to ensure that the men would not mutiny. There 
were deserters, of course, and there was even a murder plot but that was broken up 
before it could be carried out. At least part of the reason that crewmen never mutinied 
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was due to the Syndicate’s provision of the right to appeal to the Council should any 
crewman felt that he was being mistreated or unfairly punished. Crewmen were 
permitted to choose one representative from each ship to observe the handling of all 
plunder. By allowing minor concessions to the crew, the Council kept the sailors 
content. 
Third, establishment of the Council provided a forum for senior officers and the 
Syndicate’s representatives to discuss contentious issues, reach consensus, and present a 
united front to the crewmen. Factions formed within the governing Council but that 
division did not prevent members of those factions from cooperating to achieve the goals 
established for the expedition before it left Bristol. There was administrative 
backstabbing, to be sure, but that was done through private correspondence and not 
public outbursts in front of the crew. There were indeed instances during the voyage in 
which the expedition might have broken up, such as the acrimony when Dover wanted to 
command the Batchelor, but those divisions were never serious enough to render the 
Council dysfunctional. Those situations were defused either through Council meetings 
(during and sometimes after every major decision was made) or under the table 
agreements (such as when Rogers told Frye and Stretton to ignore Dover’s instructions). 
The presence of two Syndicate members and Syndicate-appointed owners’ agents also 
enforced Syndicate authority. Personal animosities outside the Council meetings aside, 
the officers were usually willing to collaborate with each other because, at the end of the 
day, they all understood the importance of presenting a unified image to members of the 
crew. 
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Fourth, the voyage accomplished its objectives. As authorized in their letter of 
marquee the privateers captured enemy shipping, including the Manila ship that the 
Syndicate specified as their primary objective. Unlike British privateers operating in the 
Atlantic, and even others who had cruised the Pacific, Syndicate members looked 
forward to the end of the war and instructed their captains to explore and report on the 
prospects of developing trade with settlements on the Pacific coast of Spanish America. 
In their published accounts of the voyage both Cooke and Rogers included assessments 
of prospects for establishing trade in the region, something previous English visitors to 
the Pacific had not done. Moving beyond simply describing prospects for trade, the 
expedition set an example by making some remarkably successful commercial 
exchanges, the records of which constituted a virtual guide to which settlements were 
willing to purchase what types of goods from non-Spanish traders, and what people in 
those areas could offer in exchange. The return of the expedition to England coincided 
with – and contributed to – a spike of public interest in Pacific commerce. The 
Syndicate did not create that interest in South Sea trade; such a concept was already a 
popular topic in British coffee houses and boardrooms. What the Syndicate did was 
prove that trade in the Pacific was possible. 
 
 
POSTSCRIPT AND SUMMARY 
 
This dissertation places the 1708-1711 cruising voyage led by Woodes Rogers 
firmly in the context of the maritime world of the early eighteenth century. At the same 
time that the War of the Spanish Succession (1702-1713) disrupted peacetime patterns of 
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international trade and commerce, the conflict also presented new opportunities for 
investment, especially in privateering. In late 1707 investors in Bristol, the second 
busiest port in England, formed a “syndicate” with the dual goals of attacking French 
and Spanish commerce and exploring opportunities for trade with Spanish colonies. 
Privateering, always a high-risk/high-reward proposition, was made riskier by the 
Syndicate’s decision to send their ships to the west coasts of Central and South America. 
It was a bold venture and its success altered the lives of several Syndicate members and 
the men who survived the voyage. 
Many Syndicate members were among Bristol’s civic elite, and others aspired to 
join them there. Every Syndicate investor certainly hoped to profit financially from his 
investment, to be sure, but a portion of the investors may have hoped that the return on 
their investment would be great enough to raise their social as well as their economic 
status in the community. Whether a conscious or unconscious goal, several did just that. 
Their status is reflected in the number of Syndicate members who were invited to 
become members of the prestigious Society of Merchant Venturers and the Corporation 
of the Poor, and who held public office after investing in the expedition. 
Participation in the voyage promised an avenue for middling ship-owners’ sons 
(e.g., John Vigors) and merchants’ younger sons (e.g., the eighth-born son Carlton 
Vanbrugh) to earn enough money to establish careers ashore. Some of those junior 
officers and even petty officers such as Selkirk rose in station to become ship-owners 
and merchants after the voyage. This comparison of the socioeconomic status of 
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Syndicate and expedition leaders before and after the 1708-1711 voyage provides a 
unique lens through which to view the maritime world of the early eighteenth century. 
The War of the Spanish Succession created a manpower shortage that forced 
privateers, merchants, and the Royal Navy compete against one another when manning 
their ships. To attract crewmen to the Duke and the Dutchess the Syndicate offered 
recruits a choice of two competitive payment plans, an observer in the inventorying of 
cargo from prize ships, and a system of shipboard governance that included a procedure 
by which any individual could appeal to the Council any punishment he believed to be 
unjust. Knowing these incentives would probably not be attractive enough to fill the 
crews for their ships with experienced sailors, Syndicate recruiters accepted any man 
willing to enlist. As a result, the Duke and the Dutchess set sail with a full but motley 
crew of landsmen, unskilled laborers, and adventure-seeking boys who gathered round a 
small core of several dozen able seamen. 
The voyage’s success was based in part on the instructions given to its leaders by 
the Syndicate, in part on the decisions made by those leaders regularly meeting as a 
Council, and finally on the skill and leadership qualities of Rogers and Courtney, the 
men chosen to command the Duke and Dutchess. The Syndicate instructed the 
expedition leaders to both attack enemy ships and settlements and to establish trading 
relations with settlements in enemy territory. To achieve both of these goals the 
privateersmen had to balance their use of violence. Few privateers and buccaneers had 
any scruples regarding violence. Indeed, most buccaneers seem have been entirely too 
eager to torture their captives in order to gain information regarding hidden valuables. 
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The Syndicate’s privateers, however, resorted to no more than threats. At Guayaquil, the 
expedition threatened to destroy the town and to take the prisoners back to England if the 
Spanish did not pay sufficient ransom, but did neither. At Guam, again, expedition 
leaders threatened to destroy the settlement if its residents refused to sell provisions to 
them. Their goal was to avoiding angering the Spanish to such a degree that they would 
not trade with any British merchants in the future. Examination of the privateers’ 
treatment of captives and townspeople also adds to the body of work published on the 
Rogers voyage by adding this new element. 
As the commander-in-chief, Rogers had to ensure that the expedition adhered to 
the laws that regulated privateering and deal with unruly crewmen who preferred to 
ignore them. Much to the unhappiness of expedition crewmen, the first prize, taken off 
the Canaries, had to be given up because of local commercial relationships. In the 
Pacific, the Council had to consider the best way to gingerly avoid infringing on EIC or 
VOC monopolies, as instructed by the Syndicate. 
Disputes between the Council members were first pronounced outside Guayaquil 
and became more heated after the fights with the Manila ships. Personal relationships 
were strained but the administrative machinery stayed operational. What would have 
most certainly broken up a group of buccaneers just caused angry letters and 
uncooperativeness among the Council officers. The voyage still continued as the 
privateers transitioned from attacking enemy ships and settlements to one that focused 
on trading such as at Buton. 
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Throughout the voyage, the Council and its accountants recorded every penny 
that was exchanged. Not doing so would have just been asking for trouble. And trouble 
nearly found them in the form of the EIC as the expedition returned to Britain via Texel. 
Again, the Syndicate members relied on their personal and commercial ties to extricate 
their ships from a situation that could have reversed all their fortunes. Edward Acton 
used his relatives in the East India Company to gather information. Thomas Palmer used 
connections both in London and in the Netherlands to help prepare for lawsuits against 
the Syndicate. Other Syndicate members journeyed to London and Amsterdam in order 
to prepare for the expedition’s arrival first in the Netherlands, then in London. By 
including this aspect of the voyage, this dissertation provides specific examples that 
illustrate the workings of the British mercantile world. 
Once the EIC’s claims to at least a portion of the cargo in the holds of the Duke, 
Dutchess, and Batchelor were settled, and the Creagh lawsuit failed, the expedition 
began selling the cloth and other items. Bristol merchants and relatives of Syndicate 
members were among the leading buyers. 
Several Syndicate members who – prior to receipt of profits from their 
investment – had not had the means to participate in Bristol’s civic institutions prior to 
the voyage suddenly received invitations to join the Merchant Venturers and other 
prestigious organizations. Thus the political status of several other members rose along 
with their economic standing. The tracing of the impact of the profits on their status 
following the expedition is a unique features of this study. Rogers may not have 
prospered as much as the Syndicate members, but his leadership of the expedition and 
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his account of the globe-circling voyage made him a national hero and paved the way for 
his appointment as governor of the Bahama Islands. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS DRAWN 
 
It was within an established series of commercial regulations and ties that the 
privateers and their investors operated. The privateers had to avoid sandbars and shoals 
whilst the backers had to dodge equally dangerous hazards ashore. Everyone involved 
in the expedition, from the Syndicate members to the officers and crewmen from petty 
officers down to ship’s boys, consciously weighed his options before investing in the 
enterprise or sailing onboard the Duke or the Dutchess. The investors, since they put up 
the funds, could become incredibly wealthy and enhance their status in Bristol civic life. 
While none of the Syndicate members openly stated their motivations, it is clear from 
their activity after the voyage that they increased their charitable donations and either 
moved up or entered civic institutions. 
Some of the investors risked financial ruin if the voyage failed, as some 
(especially Thomas Goldney) were in precarious financial straits. Had some events gone 
differently, it is likely that more investors would have joined Goldney in debtors’ prison. 
As a business investment, the effects of a failed cruising voyage would have resembled 
those of a failed distillery or bakery except on a much grander scale. 
The captains and senior officers put their reputations on the line. William 
Dampier and Edward Cooke sought to restore their recently tarnished images. Less is 
known of Stephen Courtney and Rogers’ motivations, but Dover clearly wanted to 
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become a sea captain, and he never tired of mentioning his role in the voyage afterward. 
Had Dover been solely interested in money, he would have been content to stay ashore, 
continue to make a comfortable living as a physician, and let the owners’ agents 
represent him like most of his colleagues had. 
The petty officers and crewmen, like all sailors, ran the usual risks of being 
drowned in a storm, falling from the main top, or dying of scurvy or yellow fever. They 
understood the risks and made sure they got the most favorable deal possible when they 
signed up to join the expedition. Many must have found the provision of an appeal 
system attractive. These sailors were not uncomprehending cogs in a machine, at the 
mercy of the press gang or miserly merchant captains. They all volunteered in a great 
gamble, offering several years of their labor in the hopes of a lavish return. 
To organize the expedition, for it to achieve its goals, and to protect its profits 
when it returned to England, every participant needed to respect the authority of the 
Syndicate and, while at sea, that of the Council. The Council was the key to success 
because it provided a forum for senior officers and owners’ agents, to discuss potentially 
divisive issues in private, arrive at a consensus, and draft a document that all members 
would sign, thereby projecting a unified image to other officers and crewmen of the 
expedition. 
Members of the Syndicate did not appear to have fully understood the Council’s 
importance and the contribution its members made to the success of the expedition. This 
is illustrated by the Syndicate’s treatment of Rogers. 
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Some Syndicate members may have formed a dim view of Rogers when he had 
to wait longer in Cork than they expected in order to sail under protection of a convoy.
9 
Its antipathy against Rogers became more intense when Syndicate members received 
letters from Vanbrugh and Dover, implying that Rogers had delayed the expedition’s 
departure from Batavia and the Cape of Good Hope longer than necessary. In fact, 
Rogers had done exactly as instructed; he had used his best judgment to bring the 
expedition safely home. But that seemed unnecessary to the Syndicate as its members 
cut Rogers out of post-voyage activities who, with the advantage of hindsight, knew the 
expedition had met with no danger from enemy warships or privateers after leaving 
Batavia. Rather than applaud Rogers for his prudence, critics ignored documents signed 
by Council members that approved of Rogers’ decisions and blamed him for incurring 
costs accumulated while awaiting departure with the convoys. 
Rogers was not above criticizing Dover, especially after the expedition’s failure 
to extract a larger ransom from Guayaquil to spare their town from the torch. Rogers 
believed that the expedition could have gotten more from the residents and captured 
additional incoming vessels had it remained off Guayaquil longer. Rogers’ mere 
suggestion that the ships go to Brazil from the Cape of Good Hope and trade in that low- 
risk area drew criticism from Dover in his letters to the Syndicate and a charge that 
Rogers was about to turn pirate. 
 
 
 
 
 
9 
Letter from Francis Rogers to Batchelor, dated September 3, 1708. “Creagh v. Rogers,” 
C 104/160, NAUK. As quoted in Tim Beattie, British Privateering Voyages of the Early 
Eighteenth Century (2015), 74. 
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The Syndicate was just as focused on maintaining a united front at home as the 
Council was at sea. If Dover decided that Rogers was untrustworthy, then the rest of the 
Syndicate was inclined to believe him. As Tim Beattie speculates, the conflict between 
Rogers and Dover was probably of a deeply personal nature between two ill-tempered 
individuals that turned into a rivalry between crews of the Duke and Dutchess when 
Dover moved to the latter frigate. Ill feeling continued as the expedition sorted out 
plunder and reached its zenith at the Cape of Good Hope.
10  
James Poling suggests 
 
something more of a constant, envious, one-sided grudge from Dover that fermented for 
nearly the entire three years of the cruise. It is likely that the rivalry sharpened because 
the Duke experienced much more success at sea whereas the Dutchess suffered more 
casualties while capturing fewer prizes. Privateers and buccaneers often argued over 
plunder no matter how well run their voyages were, but a prize as valuable as the 
Disengaño instilled envy in the Dutchess officers who had missed the action with the 
Disengaño when she was captured and took the brunt of punishment in the failed attempt 
on the Begoña. 
There were other interpersonal conflicts, such as those between Carlton 
Vanbrugh and the many officers he had annoyed. The difference was Vanbrugh was 
never seen as a threat to anybody’s authority and he did not have the influence to  
damage his superiors’ reputations. It is quite likely that Dover, who desired appointment 
to command of a ship, resented having to serve under Rogers. Dover was probably also 
jealous of the support Rogers received from the Duke’s crewmen during the dispute over 
 
10 
Tim Beattie, The Cruising Voyages of William Dampier, Woodes Rogers and George 
Shelvocke and their Impact (2013), 102. 
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crewing the Disengaño. There is a reason the Syndicate’s expedition soon became 
known as Rogers’ expedition. Dover, however, did not command that respect from the 
crew and so he constantly used his influence with fellow members of the Syndicate to 
impugn Rogers’ competence and character. 
Rogers, Dover, Cooke, and Courtney did not cross paths again after the voyage. 
 
The sailors they had worked with for more than three years also parted ways and 
dispersed throughout the maritime world. Whatever became of them, the veterans of the 
1708-1711 expedition shared a common experience. They had entered the Spanish 
Lake, captured a Manila galleon, and made a mockery of Spain’s trade policies by 
openly trading contraband. It was clear that the Syndicate privateers could enter the 
Spanish Lake and turn it into their hunting ground and marketplace.
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